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Foreword 
IN July I 8J6  final jurisdiction of non-federal litigation passed from the Michigan Territorial Supreme Court to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan. Then, 
substantially as now, the Constitution provided: "The judi­
cial power shall be vested in one supreme court, and such 
other courts as the legislature may from time to time estab­
lish." Mich. Const. I 835, Art. VI, §r. Those who are inter­
ested in the judicial history of Michigan prior to I 8 3 6 are 
fortunate in having access to much of such history contained 
in the six volumes entitled "Transactions of the Supreme 
Court of Michigan," edited by Professor William Wirt Blume 
of the Michigan Law School faculty. Along with other inter­
esting material, he has included therein and thus made avail­
able some seventy of the opinions of the Michigan Territorial 
Supreme Court. His present volume of "Unreported Opinions 
of the Supreme Court of Michigan, I 836- I 843" brings to 
light and for the first time makes accessible the Michigan 
Supreme Court decisions therein contained which were ren­
dered during the indicated period of seven years. 
Contrary to the prevailing assumption among laymen and 
some members of the legal profession, the Michigan Supreme 
Court Reports do not (with a few exceptions) contain the 
'·Supreme Court opinions which were rendered during this 
·. seven year period from I 8J6  to I 843. This failure to per­
. petuate opinions of the Supreme Court from I 8 3 6 to I 843 
· may in part be attributed to the fact there had been no printed 
1� reports of the Michigan Territorial Court during the immedi­
. � ately preceding period. Seemingly there was no orderly pro­
� cedure adopted for permanent preservation of the Michigan 
Supreme Coures opinions during the first years following its 
:LBG431 
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creation. Thus quite naturally such of the Court's opinions as 
were reduced to writing found lodgment in diversified reposi­
tories and often in obscure places. The fact that during the 
noted period the Supreme Court held its sessions in various 
localities doubtless was a contributing circumstance to the dis­
appearance of many of its records. But since the informative 
introduction to this volume by Doctor Clark F. Norton of the 
University of Michigan so amply narrates the circumstances 
which produced this hiatus in Michigan's judicial history, 
there is no need of amplification in this foreword; but the 
circumstance is worthy of note as indicative of the value of 
Professor Blume's present contribution to Michigan's judicial 
history. 
The authenticity of this volume's contents is vouchsafed 
by the detailed references painstakingly provided by the edi­
tor to many manuscripts, public records, etc. Readers of this 
volume will find therein the earlier and probably the first 
utterances of the Supreme Court of Michigan relative to many 
interesting phases of our law. Suffice to note among them the 
following: 
Lack of legislative power to revive abated suits. Calhoun 
v. Cable, et al. Jurors in justice court are judges of both law 
and facts, hence it was error for justice to direct a jury in 
matters affecting verdict. Burhans v. Reynolds. General ap­
pearance in a civil case waives objections to process ; and de­
cision by lower court on issues of fact will be affirmed though 
not entirely free from doubt. Dorr, et al. v. Dreyer. A wit­
nessed memorandum purporting to dispose of his property 
approved orally by one in his last sickness, though not written 
or signed by him, constitutes .a nuncupative will. Brewster, et 
al. v. Hastings, et al. Receipt of security by an endorser of a 
promissory note to indemnify him against his contingent lia­
bility, does not waive his right of demand and notice. Brewster 
v. Drew. Validity of a will requires that a subscribing witness 
saw testator sign. McCall, et al. v. Hough, et al. 
FoREWORD vii 
In addition to the subject matter hereinbefore noted, 
Professor Blume has preserved for us in this volume the 
early rule making activities of Michigan State Courts. He 
notes that at the outset ( I  8 3 7)  the State Supreme Court 
adopted the rules of the Michigan Territorial Court. And 
by reproduction to some extent of the early promulgated 
court rules, we are given the genesis of the exercise of the 
rule making power by the judicial branch of our State gov­
ernment, thereby seeming to exemplify the fact that this is 
an inherent power of Michigan's judiciary. 
The compiler of this volume has, as it were, saved from 
complete loss much of the subject matter presented. By its 
perusal the reader can gain a closer touch with the manner 
in which cases were presented in the State Supreme Court by 
early and noted practitioners, among them such outstanding 
members of the legal profession as Henry M. Walker, Al­
pheus Felch, E. Burke Harrington, G. E. Hand, B. F. H. 
Witherell, E. Farnsworth, and Samuel T. Douglass. 
In this volume and the preceding volumes of "Transac­
tions of the Supreme Court of Michigan" we seemingly have 
as complete an assemblage of the record from I 805 to I 843 
of both the Michigan Territorial Court and the Michigan 
State Supreme Court as could well be accomplished. These 
volumes are a merited tribute to the patience, industry and 
ingenuity of Professor Blume, and likewise a credit to the 
Michigan Law School which has made their publication pos­
sible. For this work the bench and bar of the State, historians, 
and others interested owe a debt of gratitude to those who have 
made it accessible. 
WALTER H. NoRTH 
Justice, Michigan Supreme Court 
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Historical Introduction* 
IT IS a commonly known fact that, although Michigan was admitted to the Union in I 8 3 7 (many of her citizens had claimed statehood for more than a year prior to her 
formal admission), few opinions of the state supreme court 
written before I 843 have ever been published. Why a period 
of almost ten years should have elapsed before the first volume 
of state reports was issued in I 846 (with the exception of two 
volumes of chancery reports),  or why the early reporters seem, 
from a casual examination, to have neglected decisions of the 
court before r 843, or what happened to the opinions, if any, 
that were rendered by supreme court justices during the first 
seven years of the state's existence, are ques.tions which have 
never been answered adequately. 
The historical setting of this subject may be summarized 
for present purposes in a few sentences. During the summer 
of I 835 a constitutional convention, which had been elected by 
the people of the Territory of Michigan, drew up and sub­
mitted to the electorate for ratification the first constitution of 
the state. This document was approved by a large majority of 
the people voting at a surprisingly small election in October 
of that year.1 At the same time a governor, lieutenant-gover­
nor, and members of the state legislature were chosen, all of 
whom shortly thereafter assumed office and, without Congres-
* This introduction is a shortened and revised version of the sixth chapter 
of the writer's unpublished doctoral dissertation, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, I836-1857, pp. :uo-273 ( 1 940) (Legal 
Research Library, University of Michigan). It appeared in slightly different 
form in 42 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 87 (August, 1943) . 
1 The total vote was: Yes--6,299 ;  No-1,359· In only one county (Branch) 
were there more ballots cast against than for the constitution, and that was by the 
narrow margin of 29 to 32. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN (hereafter cited as SENATE JOUR.) ,  I835-1836, Doc. No. 1. 
xii HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
sional sanction, attempted to establish a state government and 
to cast off the territorial government. 2 Of the various meas­
ures undertaken in the interim preceding final entrance into 
the Union, it is necessary to note here only that the new legis­
lature early in the next year adopted laws which provided for 
the cessation on July 4, I 8 3 6, of the terms and functions of 
the territorial officers, 3 for the establishment of a peripatetic 
supreme court whose members were to act singly as presiding 
judges in the circuit courts of the various counties and jointly 
as the highest court of review, and for the selection of the new 
state judges! Subsequently, the governor in July nominated 
for the positions of chief justice and associate justices of the 
state supreme court three men who were approved almost 
unanimously by the senate. 5 Within a week after their appoint­
ment these men began to assume control of Michigan's judi­
cial business. 6 
• For a detailed account of the actions taken by the governor and legislature 
of Michigan, counter measures carried out by President Jackson and his aides, 
and the arguments presented on both sides in regard to the right of Michigan 
to proceed as a state previous to approval by Congress of her constitution, see 
NORTON, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
I836-1857, pp. 68-III (I940) . Also see the treatment of the same subject in 
I TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, 
I825-I836, pp. xlv-liii (I94o) (edited by W. W. Blume) . 
1 Mich. Pub. Acts (I836) , pp. I4-23, 30-35. 
• Id. 30-35. 
• The three were William A. Fletcher, George Morell, and Epaphroditus 
Ransom, all nominated and approved on July IS, I836. EXECUTIVE JouRNAL 
OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, I835-I836, pp. I7-I8. 
• Although no session of the state supreme court as a whole was held until 
January I837, the individual justices, as required by law, presided in the state 
circuit courts which were held in several counties during the latter part of I 8 3 6. 
See the STATE JoURNAL (Ann Arbor) , Oct. 20, 1836, and the Journal of the 
Washtenaw County Circuit Court for the session of circuit court held in Wash­
tenaw County ; for reports on circuit court terms in Kalamazoo and St. Clair 
Counties, see Ransom, "Kalamazoo County," 7 MICHIGAN PIONEER CoLLEC­
TIONS 469 at 473 (I886) , (Michigan Historical Commission) and 1 W. L. 
JENKS, ST. CLAIR COUNTY, MICHIGAN: ITS. HISTORY AND ITS PEOPLE I96 
(I912) . In addition there were at least three writs issued before August I ,  I836, 
which bore the heading "State Supreme Court": a writ of certiorari, dated July 
25, in Batty v. Fraser, Sup. Ct., ISt eire., file No. 23; a writ of certiorari, dated 
July 30, in Lee v. Force, Sup. Ct., 2d eire., file No. I 8 ;  and a writ of error, 
dated July 30, in Mathews v. Howell, Sup. Ct., ISt eire., file No. 8. 
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Little emphasis had been placed upon the reporting and 
publishing of judicial opinions during the thirty-one years 
Michigan had territorial status. As far as is known, the Su­
preme Court of Michigan Territory never appointed an 
official reporter of its decisions, although for two years ( I  8 I 9-
I 82 I )  a court rule was in force which provided that reports 
of the judges' opinions should be kept by some person ap­
pointed by the court, and James Duane Doty, clerk of the 
supreme court at that time, appears to have made an attempt 
to report several cases. 7 In I 8 2 5 another private venture at 
reporting the supreme court decisions at least was projected/ 
apparently without success. The legislative council adopted a 
resolution in I 828 instructing the committee on the judiciary 
to inquire whether it would be advisable to require the judges 
when sitting in bank to file written opinions on the cases 
disposed. 9 While there were no immediate tangible results of 
this resolution, in I 8 3 I a law was passed by the legislative 
council which required the judges of the Territorial Supreme 
Court and of the Wayne County Circuit Court to write 
decisions "in such cases and matters as are usually reported 
in the several States of the United States, where there are 
reporters provided by law," and such opinions to be filed and 
preserved by the clerks of the courts.10 However, no collection 
of decisions by the Territorial Supreme Court was published 
until recently,11 and the few opinions which were printed 
• Doty's reportorial activities, as well as his manuscript volume of reports, 
have been recorded in I TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, I8I4-I824, pp. 365-427 (1938). 
8 Notice was given in I 825 that A. G. Whitney, United States District 
Attorney, was engaged in taking notes on the arguments of counsel and on the 
decisions by the supreme court with the intention of collecting materials for a 
report of cases in that court. MICHIGAN HERALD' (Detroit), Dec. 13, I 825 
(photostatic copy in the Legal Research Library, University of Michigan) .  
0 JoURNAL OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHI­
GAN, I828, pp. I8, 27. 
10 Act of March 3, I83I, 3 Mich . Terr. Laws (I874 ed.) , p. 886. 
u All available opinions which could be located have been printed in th; 
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contemporaneously appeared mainly in newspapers. 
In view of these precedents, as well as the examples of 
similar practices followed by many other states during their 
early history, it is not surprising that neither the constitution 
of I 835, nor the acts which established the state supreme 
court in I 836, provided that the justices should write their 
opinions or that a reporter should edit and publish them. 
Some evidence exists that at least Chief Justice William A. 
Fletcher intended to write some opinions during I 8 3 7, which 
was the first year sessions of the court were held, 12 but no 
extant opinions have been found which date prior to I 838/3 
The latter year marked the earliest statutory provision for 
a court reporter. According to the revision of the laws made 
in I 8 3 8, this official was to report the decisions of both the 
supreme court and the court of chancery, and was required 
to attend all terms of those courts, to make "true reports of 
their decisions upon all such causes and matters as are usually 
reported," and to publish every year the decisions of each 
court separately. His appointment and tenure of office were 
subject to the action of a majority of the justices and the 
chancellor, but in the selection of cases to be reported he was 
given a certain amount of discretion on the basis of their im­
portance. In turn it was made the duty of the courts to give 
their opinions to the reporter in writing as soon as conv�nient. 
Although the compensation of the reporter was fixed at six 
six volumes of TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF 
MICHIGAN (1935-I940). 
"'In I842. newly appointed Chief Justice George Morell wrote a notation 
on the wrapper of a case file that Fletcher had taken the papers in that particular 
file at the June term, I837, "to draw up the opinion of the court." Fletcher did 
not return the papers until March 31, I 842.. United States v. Cornell, Sup. Ct., 
Ist eire., file No. 62.. . 
13 There are thirty-seven cases decided before I 843 in which opinions, 
manuscript and printed, are known to be in existence. By year, these are 1838, 
six ; 1839, four; I84o, two; I841, eight, and I842., seventeen. Eight of the 
thirty-seven have bee.n published in full and one in part. The remainder are pub­
lished for the first time in the present volume. 
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hundred dollars annually, payable quarterly, he was to re­
ceive in addition any profits which might result from the sale 
of the reports. Under this law the reporter, while nominally 
a state official, was forced to assume personally the risk and 
expense of publishing the reports, although, as will be seen, 
state assistance was sometimes extended.14 
Available information indicates that the only two active 
candidates for the new position were Charles H. Steware5 
and Ebenezer Burke Harrington. The latter, a young lawyer, 
was selected by the court: Much of Harrington's early life is 
obscure. He apparently left the home of his parents in 
Michigan while still a youth, learned the trade of a cabinet­
maker at Jamestown, New York, then later studied law at 
Whitestown in the same state. 16 Before he returned to Michi­
gan in I 836 he had been one of the compilers of Barbour's 
and Harrington's Equity Digest for the state of New York.17 
10 Mich. Rev. Stat. (I 8 3 8) ,  p. 4 I 4· For a brief sketch of the office of re­
porter by Justice James V. Campbell, who was a contemporary and had business 
connections with at least two of the reporters (Walker and Douglass) , see his 
opinion in People ex rei. Ayres v. State Auditors, 42 Mich. 422 at 43 I-435> 
4 N. W. 274 (r88o) . . 
""'In soliciting the support of William Woodbridge for the office, Stewart 
claimed that he had received favorable expressions from most of the Detroit bar, 
including A. D. Fraser. An inclosure from Fraser stated the opinion that Stewart 
would make an excellent reporter. Dec.·4, I8J8, WooDBRIDGE PAPERS (Burton 
Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library) . 
18 "Daniel B. Harrington," 5 MICHIGAN PIONEER CoLLECTIONS IJ8 at 
I4I-I42 (I 884) . Authorities differ on whether Harrington's first name was 
"Ebenezer" or "Edmund." The above article, along with r MICHIGAN BIOGRA­
PHIES 374 (I 924) (Michigan Historical Commission) and I JENKS, ST. CLAIR 
COUNTY, MICHIGAN: ITS HISTORY AND ITS PEOPLE I96 (I912) , use the former 
name, but the supreme court journal calls him by the latter. SuP. CT. JoURN., ISt 
eire., vol. I, pp. 299, 350. In I836 he signed his name as "Ebenezer" (Fisk v. 
Leroy, Sup. Ct., Ist eire., file No. 5) , which should be conclusive unless he had 
it legally changed. A short biographical sketch of Harrington can be found in 
R. B. Ross, THE EARLY BENCH AND BAR OF DETROIT 85 (I907 ) .  
17 An article had appeared i n  the Detroit ADVERTISER, Sept. 2I, I838, pur­
porting to be an extract from the American Jurist, which charged that Harring­
ton had acted as no more than a clerk in the compilation of the Equity Digest. 
Harrington replied in a letter to the editor of the Free Press that the charge was 
false, that a contract had been made by Barbour and by himself, providing that 
both their names should appear on the title page, and that he had actually done 
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He was reputed to have been admitted on October 20, I 8 3 6, 
to the bar in the circuit court of St. Clair county, and then to 
have opened a law office in the village of Desmond, Michi­
gan/8 During the next few months he edited and published 
the Lake Huron Observer at Port Huron, made a venture 
in real estate speculation which was a complete failure, and 
then moved in I 8 3 8 to Detroit, where he practiced law as a 
partner of James A. Van Dyke.19 Governor Stevens T. Mason 
appointed him and E. J. Roberts to edit and superintend the 
publication of the revision of Michigan laws made in I 838 .20 
A practical politician, he was a delegate from St. Clair county 
to the Democratic state convention at Ann Arbor, July 20, 
I 83 7, and was nominated and elected state senator from the 
fourth district in IS38 .21 He continued to hold his senatorship 
through the I 8 3 9 session and was called "as useful a legisla­
tor, as any man in the senate."22 Moreover, he was in I 840, 
while still state reporter, the prosecuting attorney for 
Michilimackinac county.2 3 These activities, in addition to his 
continuous services as an attorney and counselor at law, would 
seem to indicate that the duties of reporting were not then 
very onerous. 
The exact date of Harrington's appointment as reporter 
has not been determined, but it was probably about February 
more work on it than had Barbour because the latter was at the same time the 
chancellor's clerk. See the FREE PRESS (Detroit), Dec. 25, I838. 
18 
I JENKS, ST. CLAIR COUNTY, MICHIGAN: ITS HISTORY AND ITS PEOPLE 
I96·I97 (I912). 
19 Id. ; I MICHIGAN BIOGRAPHIES 3 74 (I 924) ; "A Good Chancery Lawyer 
but Unlucky in Real Estate," newspaper clipping, undated, in 2 C. M. BURTON, 
SCRAPBOOK 106 (Burton Coli.). Harrington laid out a "paper town" on Lake 
Huron north of Port Huron in I 8 3 7 but failed to sell any lots. 
"'Mich. Rev. Stat. (I838), p. 3· 
21 FREE PRESS, July 24, I837 ; Sept. I9, I838 ; Nov. 24, I838. In the Senate 
he was a member of the committee on the judiciary. SENATE JouRN., I839, p. 7· 
22 MACOMB DEMOCRAT, quoted in the FREE PRESS, March 28, I839• 
_ 23 See the notice (July 10, I84o) and the subpoena (July 2o, I84o) in 
, the examination of A. R. Davenport, "· . .  Inspector of Fish for Michilimack­
inac County." WooDBRIDGE PAPERS, folder July u-201 I84o (Burton Coli.), 
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20, I 8 3 9· 24 "To handsome talents and much legal learning 
and experience, Mr. Harrington unites habits of industry 
which. well qualify him for the proper discharge of the duties 
of the office," was the comment of the D.etroit Free Press.25 
In view of the fact that the only volume of reports which 
he edited was that of the court of chancery, and that no 
opinions of the supreme court were published while he was 
in office, the question whether Harrington adequately ful­
filled his duties as reporter may well be raised. Existing 
manuscript opinions prove without doubt that he did edit 
several opinions, complete with headnotes, statement of facts, 
arguments of counsel, and revisions of the original drafts of 
opinions written by the justices of the supreme court. In­
cluded in the files of the court are six opinions in cases de­
cided at the January terms of r 838, held at Detroit and Ann 
Arbor, all of which are in the handwriting of Associate 
Justice Epaphroditus Ransom. They are accompanied by 
other drafts of the same opinions written by Harrington in 
the form of reports.26 Some of these contain a penciled annota­
tion, "not to be reported," written by an unidentified person, 
probably a later reporter ; there are also short memoranda 
penned by Harrington for both the majority and dissenting 
opinions delivered in a case decided in r 8J9.2 7 However, the 
.. There is no entry in any of the extant Journals of the Supreme Court 
indicating the date of appointment, but H. N. Walker, Harrington's successor 
as reporter, stated that it was in February 1839. See the preface to MICHIGAN 
CHANCERY REPORTS (Harrington). The leading Democratic newspaper of the 
state did not announce the appointment until May 22. FREE PREss, May 22, 
1839. However, there is documentary proof that his salary must have begun 
�ometime in February, because on April 23 he was paid $r62, more than 'a 
quarter of a year's salary. DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN (hereafter cited as SENATE Docs.), I84o, I, 518 • 
.. May 22, r 839. 
""Burhans v. Reynolds, Sup. Ct., 2d eire., file No. II 6o (Index of 1902) ; 
Calhoun v. Cable, Sup. Ct., Mich. ·Terr., file No. 1491; Hubble v. Burch, 
Sup. Ct., rst eire., file No. 70; Mundy v. Sargent, Sup. Ct., 2d eire., file No. 
II 58 (Index of r 902) ; Norris v. Hawks, Sup. Ct., 2d eire., file No. 66; 
Whitcomb v. Porter, Sup. Ct. 1st eire., file No. 88. 
"'Henretty v. City of Detroit1 Sup. Ct.1 rst circ.1 file No. 159· 
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remaining manuscript opinions, most of which were written by 
Chief Justice Fletcher, show no marks of editing by the 
reporter. 
This paucity of existing opinions reported by Harrington 
does not by itself constitute sufficient evidence to censure him 
for neglecting his duties ; because of the incomplete status of 
the files, and the probability that many of his reported opin­
ions were never in the official files, it would be unjust, without 
more positive evidence, to make such a charge. Moreover, 
there are strong grounds to believe that he intended as early 
as r 840 to publish a volume of chancery court and supreme 
court reports. 28 
Formal notice of the delay in publishing the reports was 
taken by the state senate in I 841, which adopted a resolution 
directing Harrington to inform the senate in the near future 
"the number of cases decided by the supreme court, designat­
ing the title of the cause, what judges have furnished him 
with a written opinion, and the time when furnished, and in 
what circuit the cause has been decided, and also the same, as 
near as may be, in the court of chancery, and at what time a 
volume of reports of the decisions of the supreme court, or of 
the court of chancery will be published. "29 
Harrington's reply to this legislative request is most 
instructive. He claimed that since the date of his appoint­
ment as reporter he had attended nearly all the terms of both 
the supreme court and the chancery courts, that he had kept an 
accurate list of cases with notes on their principal points, and 
""A notice appeared in the newspapers requesting the clerks of the several 
counties to send to Harrington at Detroit the names of attorneys in their 
counties, because he is "now preparing the first number of reports of the cases 
decided in the court of chancery and supreme court of this state, which will 
be published during the ensuing winter, and is desirous of ascertaining the 
number of Attorneys in the State, that he may the better judge how large an 
edition will be necessary." FREE PRESS, Nov. 28, 1839; MICHIGAN STATE 
JouRNAL (Ann Arbor) ,  Jan. 11 1840. 
29SENATE JouR., 1841, p. 74· Adopted on Jan. 15. 
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that he had examined the papers in over seven hundred 
causes. However, it was his contention that the justices of the 
supreme court had directed him to report only seventy-three 
decisions. According to Harrington, up to I 841 only one 
member of the court, Justice Ransom, had sent in his opin­
ions ; these, the reporter asserted, he had prepared for the 
press, but he had been informed by the chief justice that 
opinions had been written in most of the cases in "schedule 
B" and were then ready for the reporter. Furthermore, Har­
rington stated that in September, 1 840, he had cont�acted 
with Dawson and Bates for the printing of one volume of 
reports for each court, that this printing had begun in Oc­
tober, and that about three hundred pages of the chancery 
volume were finished and about one hundred more pages 
ready to be printed. "The cases in the supreme court will be 
printed and ready for delivery by the fifteenth of June next 
[ I  841 ] .nao 
The following year, when the advisability of maintaining 
the office of reporter was questioned by the new economy­
minded governor, John S. Barry/1 the legislature proceeded 
30 SENATE Docs., I84I,  No. 3 8 ,  pp. I 47-I 48. On the last day of the 
legislative session in I 84I,  a resolution was offered that Dawson and Bates 
should be paid the sum of $9 1 2  for printing the first volume of chancery 
reports, provided that the reporter should relinquish all his right and title to 
any profits from the sale of the reports, but it was not adopted. SENATE JouR., 
I 84I,  pp. 489-490. However, it appears that Harrington proceeded with his 
plans and published a pamphlet volume of chancery reports which extended 
through I 840 and was ready for sale in the summer of I 84 r. See the DAILY 
ADVERTISER (Detroit) , July 7, I 84 I .  
•• In his annual address ( 1 84z) Governor Barry repeated most of the 
information which Harrington had conveyed to the senate in I 84 I, but said 
that enough opinions had been received from Justice Ransom to make about 
Ioo pages and none from the other justices. "These facts naturally suggest the 
inquiry whether, under the present legislation upon the subject, the public are 
likely to receive an adequate benefit for the expense incurred in providing a 
reporter." He said that the subject required the attention of the legislature, and 
that either the reporter should be abolished or more effectual means should be 
provided to publish supreme court decisions. JOURNAL OF THE HousE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (hereafter cited as HOUSE 
JOUR.) , I 84z, p. 48 .  
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to investigate the whole subject. A petition by Harrington 
asking for relief in return for the printing of three hundred 
and seventy-two pages of chancery reports was rejected on 
the recommendation of the house committee on claims, which 
held that the law giving the reporter a salary and allowing 
him profits from sale of reports rendered such relief un­
necessary.32 In reply to inquiries sent by the house committee 
on the judiciary to the members of the supreme court to 
ascertain their views upon the subject and to learn the "true 
reasons" why the reports had not been published, letters 
were received from each of the four justices.33 
Chief Justice William A. Fletcher's answer was a condi­
tional one : "If the present judicial system is to continue, I 
think some other means of publishing the reports, as they can 
be prepared, might be adopted which would be attended with 
less expense."34 Justice Ransom stated that the creation of a 
reporter was entirely premature, that in 1 838 there had been 
few cases pending which, when decided, would settle the law, 
and that the benefits derived from reporting them would not 
equal the expense to the treasury. He suggested that instead 
of abolishing the office, it would be necessary only to repeal 
the law providing for the reporter's salary, as the incumbent 
would thereupon resign ; by this procedure the office would 
be left in existence so that when a reporter was needed one 
could be provided by merely restoring the salary. He also 
suggested that until a new reporter should be appointed, the 
opinions of the supreme and chancery courts ought to be filed 
.. Id., pp. IZ7, 327· 
33 DoCUMENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF 
MrcHIGAN (hereafter cited as HousE Docs.) ,  1842, No. 21, pp. 85-94. The 
j udiciary committee included the letters of the justices in full in their report 
because of the complete information they contained and because "they so 
perfectly exculpate those functionaries from what a cursory reader of the 
governor's message might suppose a censure upon them," but asserted that 
the only desire of the governor was "to discharge his whole duty to the people 
of this state." I d., 8 7. 
"'Id. 
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with the secretary of state, who should publish a synopsis of 
each case in the newspapers at no cost to the state. 35 Justice 
Charles W. Whipple wrote that 
". . . under existing circumstances, the office of re­
porter is of but little practical importance, and might 
well be dispensed with. In expressing this opinion, I 
am not insensible of the great importance of perfecting 
the judgments and opinions of the highest judicial 
tribunal in the state ; but under the present system, this 
cannot be done. m6 
Of the four justices, the only one who believed that it was 
proper for the position of reporter as constituted to be con­
tinued was George W. Morell, who stated that the business 
of the supreme court had accumulated and in the near future 
would be increasing sufficiently to justify retention of the 
office.3 7 
Although a majority of the court seemed to have been 
inclined to doubt the necessity for an official reporter, the 
fundamental reason for their stand clearly arose from the 
belief that they did not have enough opportunity (because of 
their burdensome task of presiding in the circuit courts) to 
perform the research and to spend the time necessary for the 
writing of adequate opinions. Each one of them stressed this 
point emphatically in his letter to the house judiciary com­
mittee. For example, Chief Justice Fletcher wrote that 
" . . . we have not time, under the present system, 
to do that which we think the interest of the public 
requires, ' to draw up with care, opinions in the great 
variety of cases which are presented, many of them 
involving new and important principles, and which 
opinions are to become written law." 38 
.. Id., p. 89. 
86 Id., p. 91.  
• •  Id., p. 94· 
as Id., p. 8 8 .  
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Associate Justices Ransom, Whipple, and Morell ex­
pressed similar views, all of them blaming the requirement of 
circuit duty as the chief obstacle to thoughtful consideration 
and preparation of opinions in the majority of decisions.39 
With the exception of Ransom, none of them intimated the 
belief that the quality of causes which had been adjudicated by 
the supreme court since the appointment of a reporter in I 8 3 8 
was of so minor a character that written and published 
opinions were not justified or desirable, at least in many cases. 
Even the statement of Ransom on this point (referred to 
above) appears to be rather singular in the light of the fact 
that he himself had written at least six opinions for the year 
I 8J 8.40 Moreover, Justice Whipple very pointedly called 
attention in a later decision to the handicap that resulted from 
a lack of published opinions before I 843,4 1 and neither 
Fletcher nor Morell was opposed to the principle of printing 
reports of the supreme court's decisions. Nevertheless, the 
judiciary committee of the house recommended, as Ransom 
had advised, the repeal of the law which had provided for 
the salary of the reporter,4 2 and a joint resolution to that effect 
was adopted by the legislature and approved by the governor 
on February I 6, I 842.43 
-
.. ld., pp. 90, 9I-92, 93-94· Whipple suggested another justice be added 
to the supreme court, which would help both the supreme and the circuit courts 
and allow the members more time to write opinions. 
"' See note 26 above. 
41 In the case of Robinson v. Steam Boat Red Jacket, I Mich. I 71 at I 7 3 
(I849), Whipple wrote: "The learned counsel for the plaintiff was not advised, 
until the argument of the case, that a construction had been given to the 
statute in question by this court-the opinion never having been published 
[referring to Moses v. Steam Boat Missouri, decided Jan. I 842]. Had the fact 
of its promulgation been known, it must have narrowed a discussion which 
assumed a wider range in consequence of the prominence given to a question 
which it was supposed had not been judicially determined." 
'" HousE Docs., I842, No. 2I, p. 94· 
.. Mich. Pub. Acts (I842) , J. Res. 28, p. I68. For legislative proceedings 
on this Joint Resolution, see HousE JouR., I842, pp. 3I3, 36I, and SENATE 
JouR., I 842, p. 254. 
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Perhaps more important than the fate of either Harring­
ton or the office of reporter is the question how many opinions 
were written by the justices of the supreme court prior to 
I 843 and what happened to them. To summarize briefly, 
opinions from thirty-seven cases which date from that period 
are known to be in existence!4 All these cases are listed in a 
table of cases, infra p. Iii. The opinions in twenty-eight cases 
are published for the first time in the present volume, two 
others for which the manuscripts are still in the court files 
have been printed, and the remaining seven can be found 
only in later published reports. The assertions by Harrington 
noted above concerning his intentions to publish a volume of 
supreme court reports during 1 840- 1 84I were of a prospec­
tive nature and can be relied upon only as an indication that 
he expected to have collected enough opinions by those dates 
to constitute a volume, but the signifi.cance of his statement 
that the supreme court had directed him, by I 841 ,  to report 
seventy-three cases cannot be waived lightly. If true, it would 
mean that nearly two years before 1 843 the supreme court 
had selected twice as many cases to be reported as now exist 
for the whole period, and had, presumably, 
'
assigned them to 
the various members to be written. Even more striking is the 
fact that of the thirty-seven opinions now extant which were 
delivered before I 843, seventeen bear the date I 842, so that 
for the years in which the Supreme Court intended at least 
seventy.:.three cases to be reported we have opinions in only 
twenty cases. 
It is certain that as late as 1 842 many of the opinions were 
still in the hands of the justices who wrote them and not in 
the possession of the reporter. For in:5tance, Whipple stated 
.. Of these, one case is represented only by a dissenting opinion (Infra, 
p. 36) and another only by a long quotation in a later case (Infra, p. 69). 
In one case (Infra, p. 85) there is both a majority and a dissenting opinion. 
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that all of the opinions which he had delivered were in written 
form and were ready to be given to the reporter, who had 
been advised of their availability but had neglected to collect 
them.45 Truly mysterious are the circumstances involving the 
Morell opinions. Justice Morell's own words testify that he 
wrote them, as well as to the fact that they were mainly 
dissenting ones, 4 6  but most of them have completely disap­
peared. Morell's wife, daughter, and son, after the justice's 
death in r 845, accused Justice Ransom of having called at 
their home and taken away the supreme court opinions of 
their husband and father, but Ransom vigorously denied the 
charge and countered with the statement that no such opin­
ions ever existed.4 7 However, another authority who cannot 
be entirely disregarded maintained directly the opposite view. 
He said : 
" . . .  Judge Morell always wrote out in full his im­
portant opinions, and a full series of his manuscripts 
was found, but they could not well be published with-
.. HousE Docs., I 84z, No. z I, p. 9z • 
.. According to Morell, Chief Justice Fletcher was to have prepared his 
opinions in the cases he thought proper to report and give a list of them to 
the reporter, who was to submit it to Morell for his examination. If Morell 
approved the list he was to give the reporter his own decisions in cases they 
thought advisable to report, but he claimed that no such list had been furnished 
him. "The reporter was informed long ago, that my decisions, (which are most 
all dissenting ones,) would be furnished at a moment's notice, whenever he 
got the opinions of a majority of the court, for I supposed it would hardly 
be admissable [sic] to publish a minority decision before publishing that of 
the majority. The fact is, that I have had so many legal opinions to give and 
write out, in cases arising alone in the county of Wayne, that I have had but 
very little time to draw up opinions for publication in the Supreme Court, and 
as my brethren are willing to spread their opinions upon the record, I was 
perfectly willing to accommodate them." HousE Docs., I84z, No. ZI, p. 93· 
c Epaphroditus Ransom to S. T. Douglass, Kalamazoo, Dec. I, I 845, 
HERBERT BOWEN PAPERS (Burton Coli.) . Ransom said in this letter that he had 
at one time examined some opinions delivered by Morell in Wayne Circuit 
Court, but that he had returned them immediately, and that the only time he 
had visited the Morell home since I 843 was at attend Morell's funeral in I 845. 
He claimed that Morell had not drawn up or delivered a written opinion in a 
single case . during the year prior to the expiration of his term, except at 
Kalamazoo in I 843, when he delivered two or three opinions. 
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out the rest [of the court's opinions] .  The Reporter 
[Douglass] therefore, although his friend and admirer, 
was reluctantly compelled to begin his work at a time 
when the materials were more complete ; and our series, 
for this reason, contains but a few of his opinions, and 
these all belong' to the later years of his judicial ca­
reer."48 
The full significance of these words can be understood better 
if it is remembered that their author, Justice James V. Camp­
bell, had been from I 845 to I 8 50 a law partner of Samuel T. 
Douglass, who was without doubt the "Reporter" to whom 
Campbell referred; and that a few years later Douglass, by 
his marriage to Campbell's sister, became his brother-in-law. 
These circumstances would make for an intimate acquaintance 
both in business and personal affairs between the two men and 
add credence and authenticity to Campbell's words. Certainly 
Douglass had made efforts to locate Morell's opinions, for 
he wrote to Chief Justice Ransom in I 845 asking for them/9 
and, if we are to believe what Justice Campbell said, Douglass 
found but did not print them. Only two opinions written by 
Justice Morell are known to exist today, both delivered in 
I 843, and both have been published.50 
In addition to the above-mentioned six manuscript opin­
ions of I 8 3 8 by Ransom, we have but one other of his previ­
ous to I 843 .51 Nine of Justice Whipple's opinions before I 843 
are extant, five of which have been printed.5 2 Chief Justice 
I 
.. Justice James V. Campbell's address delivered at the acceptance of Judge 
Morell's portrait by the Supreme Court in 1 8 8 o, printed in 4 3 Mich. xviii 
( 1 88o) . 
•• See note 4 7 a hove. 
50 Beach v. Botsford, 1 Doug. 1 99 ( 1 8 4 3 ) ; Taylor v. Kneeland, 1 Doug. 
67 ( 1 84 3 ) .  
51 Owen v .  Farmers' Bank o f  Sandstone, 2 Doug. 1 34, note ( 1 841 )  . 
.,. Davis v. Ingersoll, 2 Doug. 3 72 ( 1 840) ; Godfrey v. Beach, Sup. Ct., 
1 st eire., :file No. 1 8 8 ;  Caswell v. Ward, 2 Doug. 374 ( 1 842) ; Slaughter v. 
People, 2 Doug. 3 34, note ( 1 842) ,  and also with the BY-LAws AND ORDI­
NANCES OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, 1 842 in the Burton Historical Collection, 
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Fletcher before his retirement in I 842 wrote nineteen opin­
ions, or nearly two-thirds of all those prior to I 843 which are 
still available, but only two of his have been included in later 
reports. 53 Moreover, it should be noted that of Fletcher's 
nineteen opinions, only eight were written before the year 
( I  842) he resigned from the bench : two in I 8 3 9, one in I 840, 
and five in I 84 I .54 The very fact that Chief Justice Fletcher, 
in the few months of I 842 during which he was a member of 
the supreme court, wrote nearly as many opinions as did any 
one justice during any full year of the whole period between 
I 8 3 6 and I 8 57 permits the inference that he probably drew 
up more opinions than eight during the five years he served 
on the bench prior to I 842. We know that as early as the June 
term, I 8 3 7, he had taken the papers from a certain file with 
the intention of writing an opinion in that particular case. 55 
Although it has been stated that some of Fletcher's opinions 
were printed in contemporary newspapers/6 the present 
writer has found none in any of the newspaper files which he 
has searched. 5 7  
Detroit; Royce v. Bradburn, 2 Doug. 3 7 7  ( r 84 z ) .  In Campbell, Appellant, 
2 Doug. 1 44 ( r 845 ) ,  Justice Ransom quoted a long paragraph that supposedly 
was an excerpt from an opinion written by Justice Whipple in the case of 
Godfroy v. Brooks. He undoubtedly meant Godfrey v. Beach, above. See 
infra, p. 69 • 
.. Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 Mich. 463 ( r 84 r ) ;  Chamberlin v. Brown, 2 
Doug. no, note ( r 842) . A manuscript copy of the latter opinion in the 
handwriting of Harrington is also extant, but it is not identical with the 
printed report. See Sup. Ct., r st eire., file No. 1 95 . 
.. See opinions, infra. 
'"' See note r 2 above . 
.. Both R. B. Ross and G. B. CATLIN, LANDMARKS OF DETROIT, Burton 
rev. ed., 3 94 (1898 ) ,  and R. B. Ross, EARLY BENCH AND BAR OF DETROIT 
64 ( I 907 ) ,  make such statements. The latte1· quotes Alpheus Felch as having 
supposedly said the following :  "Some of his [Fletcher's] opinions, however, 
found their way into the newspapers of the day; and many are treasured up 
in the memory of early members of the bar. The latter were often cited by 
them in Court, and even at this late day they are sometimes quoted, and always 
regarded as high authority." 
"' Their nonexistence in the newspapers is corroborated by another worker 
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In spite of the fact that his salary as reporter was sus­
pended by the legislature on February I 6, I 842, Harrington 
did not stop his attempts to report the cases of both the 
supreme and the chancery courts. His interest in the decisions 
and in their publication was so genuine that he continued his 
work, providing the public press with abstracts of many 
chancery court opinions and presumably of some supreme 
court opinions. In a letter to the editor of the Detroit Free 
Press he explained his position admirably: 
"The Legislature of this state have made no provi­
sion for the preservation or publication of the judicial 
decisions of our Supreme Court or Court of Chancery. 
Although these decisions form an important part of 
the law they are only known to the judges themselves, 
and those who are in constant attendance upon the 
courts. Many of these opinions have been written out 
with care and placed in my hands as Reporter for pub­
lication, and I have prepared them for the press, but 
I am unable to publish them without compensation. 
I will hereafter furnish you with the headnotes for 
publication from time to time as my leisure will per­
mit."5 8 
The headnotes of at least ninteen chancery court cases 
were printed in the Free Press between December I 5, I 842 
and July 2 5, I 843;  59 unfortunately none has been found for 
supreme court cases. 
Early in I 843 Governor Barry formally recognized 
Harrington's continued services as well as the need for pub­
lication of the supreme court and chancery court opinions. 60 
who has searched for them. PO'ITER, ADDRESS AT THE UNVEILING OF A 
MARKER ERECTED TO THE MEMORY OF WILLIAM AsA FLETCHER 9-1 0  ( 1 93 5 )  . 
.. FREE PRESS, Dec. r s ,  1 842 . 
.. Dec. 1 5 ,  1 842, four cases; Dec. 29, 1 842, five cases; July 2 5 ,  1 843, ten 
cases. 
eo Barry noted that the salary of the reporter had been suspended but said 
that the incumbent had continued to discharge the duties of the office. "It 
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Apparently the governor's attitude had changed considerably 
since his first annual message; nevertheless he still expressed 
hope that "if such reports were judiciously prepared under 
well digested regulations of law, the proceeds from their sale 
would nearly, if not altogether, reimburse the expense of their 
publication."6 1 The legislature, however, was not willing to 
carry out completely the governor's recommendations and 
adopted a compromise scheme. According to the new law it 
was provided that in any matter adjudicated by the supreme 
court, the justices thereof must pronounce an opinion and 
prepare an abstract of it in writing. These abstracts were to 
be filed by the first Monday in January of each year with the 
secretary of state, who was to have them published in one 
newspaper of each judicial circuit with the printing costs 
borne by the state. When enough abstracts .of opinions had 
been accumulated to compose a volume of about three hun­
dred and fifty pages, the secretary of state was directed to 
have them edited and to have one thousand copies printed at 
state expense and offered for sale, any profits derived there­
from to go to the state.6 2 As a consequence of this statute, the 
task of reporting what condensed opinions the justices might 
seems to me that the best interest of [the] state requires the decisions of its 
courts to be published, and that much other printing is now required which is 
of less importance and less beneficial. Indeed I consider the reports of decisions 
which give construction to the statutes, as important as the statutes themselves, 
and as necessary to be distributed among the citizens of the state for their in­
formation and guidance." HousE JouR., 1 843, p. 1 6. 
"' Id. 
. 
.,. Mich. Pub. Acts ( 1 843) ,  pp. 1 69-1 70. This act was approved by the 
governor March 9; 1 8 4 3, and given immediate effect. On Feb. 3 ,  1 843,  a state­
ment made by Harrington had been presented to the house of representatives by 
Justus Goodwin of Calhoun County, and as a result the question what would 
be the best method and means of procuring reports of the decisions of the 
supreme court and the court of chancery was referred to the judiciary com­
mittee. HousE JOUR., 1 843,  p. 2 2 5 . Further action on the bill can be found in 
id., 1 84 3 ,  pp. 5 34, 5 3 5 ,  5 3 7, and in SENATE JouR., 1 843,  pp. 268, 2 8 1 ,  422, 
429, 4 3 0, 43 1 .  A second bill which provided for the publication of the reports 
was adopted by the senate but not by the house. See id. 1 843,  pp. 3 63 ,  3 74-3 75; 
HousE JouR., 1 843,  pp.  495, 499· 
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furnish was added to the regular duties of a state officer who 
had little connection with the courts and who might not 
possess any interest in their decisions. It is not surprising 
that, as far as can be learned, there were never any tangible 
results from this act ;63 certainly it was not an adequate solu­
tion of the problem. 
Great influence must have been exercised upon the legis­
lators by the very able report made in the house of representa­
tives early in 1 844 by H. N. Walker, a member of the house 
from Detroit who, after a few months, succeeded Harrington 
as reporter. Petitions by Harrington concerning publication of 
the opinions had been presented in both the senate and the 
house, and the latter body referred the matter to a select 
committee of which Mr. Walker was the chairman.6� As a 
result of their deliberations, the representatives composing 
this committee concluded that the decisions of the highest 
state courts were too important a part of the law for their 
publication to be neglected. They believed that the establish­
ment of legal principles, the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions, and the construction of important laws, all of 
which in their reasoning were essential to the administration 
of justice, could not be understood by the people without 
printed opinions. Other points the committee emphasized 
were that requiring written opinions would insure careful 
attention and examination by the courts to the questions before 
them, and that their publication would create a guide for 
future courts which would make for uniformity in practice 
and procedure. 
68 Not one such abstract has ever been found in any of the newspapers 
searched by this writer. Moreover, it was stated in the house of representatives 
in I 844 that this act had never been complied with and that it never could be 
"with any benefit or advantage to the state." HoUSE JouR., I 844, p. I I  8 .  
"' S .  M .  Green, later a justice o f  the supreme court, presented the petition 
in the senate and Mr. Walker presented it in the house, both on Jan. I S ,  I 844• 
See SENATE JouR., I 844, p. so, and HousE JouR., I 844, p. sz. 
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Rather strangely, the committee adopted the view that 
published court decisions would be a means of preserving the 
separation of powers guaranteed by the state constitution, and 
would thus constitute a "guard against encroachments by the 
j udiciary upon other departments, and the assumption of 
powers which do not belong to them. . . .  " The statute of 
1 843 which required justices of the supreme court to prepare 
abstracts of their opinions and which provided for the publi­
cation of these abstracts in various newspapers at the expense 
of the state was scoffed at in the committee report. It was 
pointed out that the cost of such an undertaking would equal 
that of the regular form of reports, and that "the publication 
of an abstract of an opinion of the court without the state­
ment of the case, and without the care and attention of a 
proper and competent person to correct the proof, would be 
of no more authority in legal proceedings than any other 
article found inserted in a newspaper would be evidence of the 
facts therein contained.' . . . "65 Consequently, the committee 
introduced a bill to provide for publication of the decisions 
of the supreme court and of the court of chancery; after 
much discussion and several amendments, 66 the bill was passed 
by both houses and approved by the governor on February 
29, 1 8#. 6 7  
With one exception this new law established the reports 
and the office of reporter on a basis similar to that set forth 
in 1 838 by the Revised Statutes. By virtue of its provisions 
the justices of the supreme court and the chancellor, or any 
85 The entire report of the select committee is in the HousE JouR., 1 844, 
pp. 1 1 6-1 1 9· 
68 The greatest amount of controversy over the bill occurred in the house, 
- where the question of salary to be paid the reporter was much disputed, but the 
senate made several amendments and set the salary at $6oo per year. See 
HousE JouR., 1 844, pp. 1 1 9, 1 95, 209, 279-2 8o, 297, 3 1 4-3 1 5, 3 1 9, 3 2 4, 
35 3> 3 5 9, 364, 3 89 ; SENATE JOUR., 1 844, pp. 2 3 0, 245, 246, 2 5 1 .  
"' Mich. Pub. Acts (1 844) , pp. 1 9-2 1 .  
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three of them, were authorized to select the reporter, who 
would hold office entirely at their pleasure. For those cases 
which were considered to be of enough importance, they were 
directed to send full notes of the decisions to the reporter, who 
was to prepare them for publication, along with condensed 
arguments of counsel, in volumes of approximately six hun­
dred pages. Of the one thousand copies ordered to be printed, 
nine hundred were to be sold at a price not over three and 
one-half dollars each in Michigan or five dollars each out of 
the state ; the remaining one hundred copies were to be sent 
to the secretary of state, whose duty it was to distribute two 
of them to the Library of Congress, one to each of the state 
libraries of the United States, one to each county clerk in 
Michigan, and the remaining ones to the Michigan State 
Library. A very fundamental change, however, was made by 
the fourth section of the law, which relieved the reporter of 
the risk of publishing the works at his own expense. This 
desirable removal of responsibility was to some degree 
neutralized, however, by the requirement that payment to 
him for cost of publication was to be made only after comple­
tion of a volume. In addition the reporter's compensation was 
reduced to five hundred dollars annually; however, he was 
still entitled to any profits from the sale of reports. 6 8  
Although this act was given immediate effect, the justices 
and the chancellor, apparently anticipating by one day their 
powers thus conferred, reappointed Harrington as reporter on 
February 28 ,  1 844. 69 This action constituted definite endorse­
ment of his services as reporter since 1 839, but it was not 
'"' Id. The act specifically repealed those provisions of the Revised Statutes 
of I 83 8  and of the law of 1 843 which concerned the reports and the reporter. 
60 SUP. CT. JouR., Ist eire., vol. I ,  p. Z99· The appointment was dated 
Feb. z8, I 844, but the entry does not appear to have been made in the Journal 
until May 3, I 844. It is possible but not certain that the appointment was not 
made until the later date, but was effective retroactively to the former. Justices 
Ransom, Whipple, Felch, and Goodwin and Chancellor Manning signed the 
appointment. 
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destined that Harrington should live to vindicate himself of 
the last vestige of suspicion concerning the adequate perform­
ance of his duties ; he died in early August, I 844, a little over 
five months after his second appointment and before a single 
volume of reports, either of the supreme court or of the court 
of chancery, had been issued to the public.70 
In addition to the evidence already presented to indicate 
that the justices of the supreme court before I 843 wrote more 
opinions than are known to be extant, there is good proof that 
Harrington himself possessed many more opinions of that 
period than we now have. For instance, it was said as early as 
January 2, I 843, that "All the present justices of the supreme 
court, have furnished to the reporter their written opinions in 
cases decided by them previous to the January term of I 842, 
which, together with the opinions now in the hands of the late 
chief justice for revision, will make a volume of reports of 
that court." 71 
Again in I 844 it was stated that the reporter had sufficient 
manuscript opinions delivered by the supreme court justices 
to make a volume of about six hundred pages, which, along 
with the volume of chancery court reports (the publication 
of which had already been commenced), would "embrace all 
the decisions of the supreme court a.nd court of chancery, of 
" The Proceedings and Resolutions on the death of Harrington, adopted 
by the Bar of Detroit on Aug. s, 1 844, may be found in SuP. CT. JouR., 1 st 
eire., vol. 1, 350 ( 1 8 4 5 ) ,  and in the FREE PRESS, Aug. 6, 1 844. J. A. Van 
Dyke, Harrington's law partner, expressed his great respect for the deceased, 
and H. N. Walker and G. C. Bates were appointed members of a committee 
to write the resolutions of the bar. It was resolved in part that "we cherish 
the highest respect for the professional learning of the deceased, for the purity 
and uprightness of his public and private character, for his uniformly honorable 
and correct deportment in every relation of life, and for the many excellent 
qualities which belonged to him as a man." Id. 
n Annual Address of Governor Barrv, HousE JouR., 1 843, p. 1 6. The 
"late chief justice" referred to was W. A: Fletcher, who, it would seem, still 
had in his possession several opinions to revise. Possibly some or all of them 
were the eleven Fletcher opinions delivered in 1 842 which are now in the :files 
or in later reports. 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION xxxiii 
sufficient importance to report from the organization of the 
state government down to the present time.m 2 Some time 
previous to June 22, r 844, Harrington had made overtures 
and had received a proposition for the publishing of a volume 
of supreme court reports/3 but there is no proof that any had 
been printed before his death. The wide discrepancy between 
the number of opinions which would have been necessary to 
constitute a volume of supreme court reports of approximately 
six hundred pages74 and the number of opinions which are 
known to e�st-many of which ·are, indeed, quite brief­
makes it appear that, even if the decisions which never came 
into the possession of the reporter are disregarded and not 
counted, the j ustices of the state supreme court wrote opinions 
in more cases during the first seven or eight years of their 
incumbency than the thirty-seven which are now in the files 
or included in later volumes of reports. 
In September, r 844, Henry N. Walker was appointed by 
the supreme court justices and by the chancellor to be the 
second state reporter.75 Mr. Walker, a graduate of the 
Academy at Fredonia, New York, came to Michigan in r 835, 
entered the office of Elon Farnsworth and A. D. Bates as a 
law student, and was admitted to the bar, becoming Bates' 
partner after Farnsworth was appointed chancel1or.76 Walker 
•• Report of H .  N. Walker from the select committee to consider the 
petition of E. B. Harrington, HousE JOUR., I 844, p. I I 8. 
" A  memorandum written by Harrington on June z z, I 844, assured the 
firm of Wilcox and Harsha that they could depend upon publishing the second 
volume of his chancery reports "according to the proposition to publish the 
Suprem� Court Reports . . . .  " E. W. MoRGAN PAPERS (Burton Coll.) .  
" There were nearly sixty opinions, delivered between I 843 and I 845, 
printed in the first volume of Douglass' Michigan Supreme Court Reports, and 
several of them were of great length. 
15 FREE PREss, Sept. 1 0 ,  I 844. 
76 See the obituary of Walker in 9 'MICHIGAN PIONEER COLLECTIONS 88-89 
( I  886) . This law partnership of Bates and Walker was changed during the 
late thirties and early forties first to Bates, Walker, and Douglass, then to 
Douglass and Walker, and finally to Walker, Douglass and Campbell, the two 
new members being S. T. Douglass and J. V. Campbell, both of whom later 
became justices of the supreme court. 
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had been elected to serve in the I844 session of the legislature, 
where, it will be recalled, he introduced and supported in the 
house the bill, which later became law, providing for restora­
tion of the reporter's salary and for publishing the reports of 
the supreme court and court of chancery. 7 7  Quite likely his 
legislative work on this bill had some influence on his selection 
by the justices and the chancellor. Walker's efforts to obtain 
the position indicate that he desired it and that it was neither 
unwanted nor thrust upon 'him without notice:78 His appoint­
ment was approved by th� Democratic press of the state and 
probably by the bar in general.79 
Undertaking his duties immediately, the new reporter 
soon brought out the first large volume of reports of the 
decisions of any court in Michigan's history, those of the court 
of chancery under Chancellor Elon Farnsworth, I 8 3 6-I 842. 
It was fittingly termed Harrington's Chancery Reports, inas­
much as practically all of the work on it had been done by the 
first reporter and not by Walker. In fact, as early as I 84I 
nearly three hundred pages of chancery opinions had been 
printed by Harrington at his own expense. 80 Although the 
"' See notes 64 and 6 5 above. 
78 On Aug. 24, I 844, he wrote to Lucius Lyon that the supreme court was 
about to appoint a reporter, that his (Walker's) name had been presented as 
a candidate, and that he wished Lyon to write to Chief Justice Ransom in his 
favor because of Lyon's "strong influence" with the Chief Justice. LYON 
LETI'ERS (William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan) . 
.., "The high legal attainments and untiring industry of Mr. Walker render 
him peculiarly well qualified for the proper discharge of the duties of the 
office in question." FREE PREss, Sept. 10, I 844. 
80 Harrington's bill for printing ($8J I ·43) was not allowed by the legisla­
ture because the reporter had been required to publish the volumes at his own 
expense, although the statute had not been very clear on the question. See 
HousE JouR., I 843, p. I 6, and id., I 844, pp. I I 7-I I 8. A committee of the 
house recommended in I 844 that Harrington should be reimbursed for the 
reports already printed and should be paid reasonable compensation for his 
services (id., I 844, p. I I 9) , and an act of the same year authorized the state 
treasurer, auditor general, and secretary of state to settle his claim. Mich. Pub. 
Acts ( I  844) , pp. 20-2 1 .  In the "Annual Report of the Auditor General" dated 
Nov. 30,  I 844, an item shows, that the sum of $2,J2J.66 had been paid for the 
supreme and chancery courts' reports, including the salary of reporter, but 
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burning of the printing office destroyed a portion of the rest 
of the manuscript, the volume was prepared almost entirely 
by Harrington and the last half of it was partly in press 
when Walker assumed office.81 A contemporary newspaper 
notice stated that "A portion of the volume is composed of 
the pamphlet volume of reports published sometime prior to 
Mr. Harrington's decease, and the remainder has since been 
made up from his manuscripts and notes,"82 which would in­
dicate that some of the sets of pages printed by Harrington in 
I 84I and I 842 were perhaps bound into pamphlet form 
before the full volume was issued. However, no copy has 
been found, nor even any confirmation that one ever existed. 
Although Walker was appointed attorney-general of 
Michigan by the governor and the senate on March 24, 
I 845,S3 this date does not mark the end of his activities as 
reporter ; at least, the preface he wrote to the second volume 
of chancery reports, published under his auspices, bears the 
date April 10, I 845,84 and his successor was not named until 
the following July. However, in the preparation of this 
second volume Walker was aided by Chancellor Manning, 
there is no indication of how much of this went to Harrington or his estate, 
to the printer, or to Walker. }OINT DoCUMENTS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (hereafter cited as JOINT 
Docs.) , I 845, No. 2, p. I o. 
"' See the preface by H. N. Walker to HARRINGTON, MICHIGAN CHANCERY 
REPORTS. 
82 FREE PRESS, March 1 3, I 845. There is evidence that in the summer of 
I 84I the first portion of the volume, containing decisions through I 84o, was 
bound up in some fashion and offered for sale at three dollars per copy. See 
the advertisement in DAILY ADVERTISER (Detroit) , July 7, I 84I .  No copy of 
this volume has been seen or located by this writer. 
88 FREE PREss, March 25, I 845. 
"' Governor Barry claimed too optimistically on Jan. 6, I 845, that the 
second volume of chancery reports was already in press and would be published 
the ensuing month. "Annual Message of the Governor," }OINT Docs., I 8 45, p. 
6. Walker authorized J. V. Campbell to act as his agent in the sale of the 
volumes. See the power of attorney and the agreements for sale made by 
Campbell, March 5 and 6, I 845, in H. N. WALKER PAPERS (Burton Coli.) . 
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whose decisions between April, I 842 and March, I 845 were 
recorded therein, and who personally inspected the work, 
offered suggestions, and even wrote some of the headnotes. 85 
In addition, it is probable that Harrington before his death 
had labored to some extent upon the manuscript which later 
constituted this volume,86 but the major credit must be given 
) 
to Walker. Both volumes of chancery reports were well 
executed for their time, but they have been superseded for 
most practical purposes by later annotated editions. 57 It is not 
to be supposed that Walker confined himself in his capacity as 
reporter solely to the decisions of the court of chancery; on 
the ·other hand, no reports of supreme court cases were pub­
lished while he was in that office, and the only discovered 
contemporary reference located from which could be inferred 
any intention on his part to publish such reports lacks authori­
tative support and appears to be erroneous. 58 
Upon Walker's tranfer to the office of attorney-general, 
several candidates for the position of reporter appeared and 
an active campaign was carried on for at least two months be­
fore an appointment was made. The three men most promi­
nently mentioned as worthy of holding the post were Samuel 
T. Douglass, Andrew Harvie, and G. V. N. Lothrop, with 
"" MICHIGAN CHANCERY RE;PORTS (Walker) , Preface ( I 845) . 
80 Harrington wrote that a part of the manuscript for his second volume 
of chancery reports would be ready by the first of August I 8 44. E. B. Harring­
ton to Wilcox and Harsha, June zz, 1 844, in E. W. MoRGAN PAPERS (Burton 
Coll . ) .  
"' In I 87z and I 878  second editions, edited by T. M. Cooley and J .  V. 
Campbell respectively, were p ublished. 
88 It was stated by Governor Barry on Jan. 6, 1 845, that the first volume 
of reports of supreme court decisions was in the hands of the printer and that 
there was hope that it would be completed before the session of the legislature 
ended. "Annual Message of the Governor," JOINT Docs., 1 845, p. 6. Actually, 
the first volume was not printed until 1 846. It is interesting to note that the 
governor anticipated "most salutary results" from the publication of the reports, 
because "A judicial construction will thus be given to the statutes, and a uni­
formity secured in the administration of justice in the various circuits, and in 
courts of inferior jurisdiction throughout the state, which could not otherwise 
be obtained." ld. 7 ·  
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Douglass apparently having the greatest number of advocates. 
Among the prominent supporters of Douglass were George 
Miles, who soon became a justice of the supreme court, Jeffer­
son G. Thurber, who later was speaker of the house of repre­
sentatives, and James B. Hunt, a representative in Congress 
from Michigan ( r 843-r 847) ; however, Douglass was op­
posed quite bitterly by the former attorney-general, Peter 
Morey.89 Douglass himself was not above soliciting support ; 
following the example of Walker (his law partner) he re­
quested Lucius Lyon, an influential personage in Michigan 
politics at that time, to recommend him to the justices and to 
the chancellor for the position.90 His comments in his letter to 
Lyon are illuminating: 
"The office will necessarily be filled by someone re­
siding here. It is not worth at the most as far as I can 
judge over $700 & will occupy nearly all of a persons 
[sic] time for the next two years at least and always a 
great part of it. My acceptance of it will be a pecuniary 
sacrifice but a sacrifice which I feel willing to make for 
the sake of the more active life it would enable me to 
lead, requiring as it would my attendance upon the terms 
of the Sup : & Ch : cour [t ] 's in the several circuits.-It 
is my intention in case I receive the appointment to 
retire from my present business connexion. My health 
suffers too severely from my present confinement."91 
'"' In letters to Justice Alpheus Felch, Miles wrote on April z8 ,  I 845, that 
Douglass had the two very important requisites of accuracy and great industry ; 
Thurber wrote on May 3 1 ,  1 845, that Douglass was a gentleman of integrity, 
ability, good legal acquirements, and an irreproachable character ; and Hunt on 
Sept. 23 [ ? ] ,  1 845, wrote that Douglass was a sound lawyer, a good Demo­
crat, and would give general satisfaction. On the other hand, Morey wrote 
Felch on May I ,  I 845, that he believed Harvie was the best fitted for the 
position ; he also protested against "the principle of permitting Mr. Walker 
to transfer the office of Reporter to his partner [Douglass]" and stated that 
"Douglass is a Whig every inch of him." These letters may be found under the 
appropriate dates in the ALPHEUS FELCH PAPERS (Burton Coll . ) .  
90 S. T. Douglass to  L .  Lyon, Detroit, June 1 3 , 1 845, LYON LETTERS 
(William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan) .  
81 I d. 
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Why the reporter would have to reside in Detroit is not 
clear, unless Douglass meant that the largest share of the busi­
ness of the supreme and chancery courts was done in the first 
circuit, but the argument was proved unsound by the fact that 
both of the next two reporters were not residents of Detroit.92 
Presumably Douglass believed that only two hundred dollars 
in profits could be made annually from the sale of the reports, 
because the salary of the reporter was still five hundred 
dollars per year, and, as he stated, anyone who gave up a 
lucrative business to accept the office of reporter would entail 
a "pecuniary sacrifice." However, it should be noted that, 
contrary to his expressed intentions, Douglass did not retire 
from his law partnership when he received the appointment, 
but continued in active practice of his profession throughout 
the period of his incumbency as reporter.93 His appointment, 
announced in Detroit on July 7, I 84S/4 was probably made 
at the July term of the second circuit of the supreme court 
held at Ann Arbor. 95 
Although Samuel T. Douglass was born in Vermont in 
I 8 I 4, his parents moved to New York state when he was still 
a young child. There he was educated at Fredonia Academy, 
and later studied law in the offices of James Mullet and of 
Esek Cowen, both noted attorneys. He came to Michigan in 
I 83 7, was admitted to the bar in I 8 3 8, and, after a few 
months spent in Ann Arbor, settled in Detroit, where he 
.. Randolph Manning of Pontiac and George C. Gibbs of Marshall. 
93 See 8 DoUGLASS, WALKER, and CAMPBELL, LETTERPRESS BooK, 1 847-
I 85o, in the Michigan Historical Collections, University of Michigan. 
"' The FREE PRESS, July 7, 1 845, commended the appointment highly : 
"The selection is an excellent one. Mr. Douglass is a sound, well read and 
industrious lawyer ; and both in professional and private life has, in an unusual 
measure, secured the confidence and respect of his fellow citizens." Justice 
Ransom called Douglass his "own much esteemed friend . . . to whom I am 
strongly attached, & whom I regard as one of the most valuable & promising 
men of his age, in our profession-." E. Ransom to H. N. Walker, Aug. 22, 
1 846, H. N. WALKER LETTERS (Burton Coli.) . 
"' Inasmuch as the JouRNAL for the second circuit of the supreme court, 
I 8 3 6-1 85 I ,  is missing, we have no official record of the appointment. 
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entered the law firm of Asher B. Bates and Henry N. 
Walker. When Bates retired in I840 a partnership was 
formed with Walker under the name of Douglass and 
Walker, and in I 845 James V. Campbell was added as a part­
ner. Douglass. held the offices of city attorney of Detroit and 
of president of the Detroit Young Men's Society in I 843. 
Somewhat interested in science and geology in addition to the 
law, he accompanied his cousin, Douglass Houghton, the first 
state geologist of Michigan, on at least two of his j ourneys 
to the Lake Superior regions. A Democrat in politics, but not 
strongly partisan, he was highly regarded both legally and 
personally, and, until he was elected to the bench in I 85 I, 
his law firm ranked among the best and most prominent in 
Detroit.96 
Soon after his appointment Douglass exhibited vigor in 
the prosecution of his duties as reporter, taking steps to secure 
and edit the opinions delivered by the justices of the supreme 
court.97 By October 7, I 845, he wrote that he was so hard at 
.. These facts have been gathered from the following biographical sketches 
of Douglass : Buel, "The Bench and Bar of Detroit," 3 MAG. WEST HIST. 
669 at 700-704 ( I 8 86) ; Chaney, "The Supreme Court of Michigan," 2 GREEN 
BAG 3 7 7  at 385-386 ( I 89o) ; CYCLOPEDIA OF MICHIGAN I 70-I 7 I  ( I 89o) ; 
FARMER, THE HISTORY OF DETROIT AND MICHIGAN, biog. ed., I I I 5-I I I 6 
( I 889) ; I MICHIGAN BIOGRAPHIES 249 ( I 924) ; 2 W. W. PoTTER, CouRTS 
AND LAWYERS OF MICHIGAN I I 66-I I 67 (unpublished MS., I 936) ; G. I. 
REED, BENCH AND BAR OF MICHIGAN 244 ( I  897) ; R. B. Ross, THE EARLY 
BENCH AND BAR OF DETROIT 48-5 3 ( I  907) ; Walker, "The Detroit Bar," 2 
MICH. L. ]. I at I 2- l 3  ( I 893) ; MICHIGAN, NISI PRIUS CASES (Howell) 
342-343 ( I 8 84) ; 0. Kirchner, I 2 I  Mich. xxxv-xliv (I 899) . Some discrepancy 
exists in the dat-es cited by these as to the year when Douglass was admitted 
to practice, Farmer, Potter and Reed stating that it was I 837, but the Cyclopedia 
of Michigan and a "Roll of Michigan Lawyers" in the Appendix of Reed's 
Bench and Bar, both cite I 8 3 8. The last named source seems to be the best 
since it supposedly was copied from the original roll of attorneys kept in the 
office of the clerk of the supreme court. 
97 Felch sent his earlier opinions to Douglass on Sept. 29,  r 845, but re­
served the remainder for use and reference in the circuit courts. A. Felch to 
S. T. Douglass, Sept. 29,  I 845, FELCH PAPERS (Burton Coli.) . C. W. Whipple to 
S. T. Douglass, Pontiac, Dec. r, 1 845, HERBERT BowEN PAPERS (Burton 
Coli.) . Whipple said that he wrote an opinion in the case of Ketchum v. Pierce, 
(Sup. Ct. Calendar, 3d eire., No. 7 2  [r 844] ) which he was unable to find at 
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work that he could not find even an hour's leisure time.98 
Douglass seems to have entertained some thought of pub­
lishing the opinions of the supreme court which had been 
written before I 843, but Ransom, chief justice since I 843, 
counseled against such a move, stating that "a report of them 
would be neither useful to the publik or the Profession, nor 
very creditable to the Court. The truth is, that while Judge 
Fletcher was on the Bench, most of the decisions were 
announced orally, by him, & the opinions written out-I 
speak of those held by myself-were but hasty & imperfect 
sketches of the decision.m9 It is quite probable that Douglass, 
through his predecessor and law partner, Walker, fell heir to 
the papers, notes, and opinions gathered by the first reporter, 
Harrington. At least we know that Walker employed Har­
rington's manuscript for nearly all of the first, and part of the 
second, volume of chancery reports, and there is little reason 
to suppose that Walker did not turn over to Douglass all of 
the materials pertaining to the office of reporter. 
No opinions before I 843 were included in the first volume 
(I 846) of reports published by Douglass, but in his second 
volume (I 849) there are six, one of which had been delivered 
in I 84o, one in I 84I , and four in I842.100 He himself ex­
plained as follows the failure to print more of them : 
"No complete series of the decisions of the court 
prior to I 843 can now be obtained, and the recent re-
a later date. C. W. Whipple to S. T. Douglass, Pontiac, Aug. 2 I ,  I 846, HER­
BERT BoWEN PAPERS. It has never been published or located. 
98 S. T. Douglass to Silas H. Douglass, Detroit, Oct. 7, I 845, S. H. DouG­
LASS LETTERS (University of Michigan Library) . 
99 E. Ransom to S. T. Douglass, Kalamazoo, Dec. I ,  I 845, HERBERT 
BOWEN PAPERS (Burton Coli.) . 
100 All six were printed as footnotes to later cases in which similar questions 
were involved. They were : Davis v. Ingersoll, 2 Doug. 3 72 ( I  840) ; Owen 
v. Farmers' Bank of Sandstone, 2 Doug. I 34 ( r 84I) ; Caswell v. Ward, 2 
Doug. 3 74  ( I 842) ; Chamberlin v. Brown, 2 Doug. I 20 (I 842) ; Royce v. 
Bradburn, 2 Doug. 3 7 7  ( r 842) ; and Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug. 334 
( I 842) . 
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vision of the statutes has rendered many of those which 
have been preserved, of comparatively little value. Some 
of them, however, are of permanent interest, and these, 
together with the decisions made subsequently to the 
time when the above mentioned volume closes, will be 
published in another volume now in the course of prep­
aration, and which it is hoped will be issued from the 
press during the next summer."101 
Of the six earlier opinions printed in volume two, a manu­
script copy of only one of them is known to exist /02 this fact 
suggests the possibility that Douglass might have possessed 
many more manuscript opinions which never were filed with 
the clerk of the supreme court. As late as I 848 Douglass 
wrote that a manuscript opinion in a certain case decided in 
I 842 "is now before me.moa 
Governor Alpheus Felch, who had been a justice of the 
supreme court from I 842 to I 845, in January I 846 estimated 
that probably three volumes would be required to report the 
supreme court cases already decided; in actuality, however, 
less than a volume and a half were filled by the decisions 
which, by a strict interpretation, should have been compre­
hended in the period mentioned by Felch.104 Although the 
101 FREE PRESS, Jan. 20, I 847· . 
102 Chamberlin v. Brown, Sup. Ct., I st eire., file No. I 95· 
103 S. T. Douglass to H. C. Wright, Detroit, Feb. 22, I 848, in 8 WALKER, 
DouGLAss, and CAMPBELL, LETTERPRESS BooK 263 (Mich. Hist. Coli., 
University of Michigan) . The case was that of Moses v. Steamboat Missouri, 
which was printed in I 852  in I Mich. (Manning) 507 Appendix ( I 842 ) . 
1 .. "Annual Message of the Governor," JoiNT Docs., I 846, p. 6. Governor 
Felch also called attention to the great importance of publishing the decisions, 
and said that Douglass intended to present during the year I 846 the reports 
of all important cases in both the supreme court and the chancery court. Id. 
No opinions of the court of chancery between March I 845 and March I 84 7, 
when the separate chancery court"'eeased to exist, have ever been printed. 
Manning remained chancellor until the Revised Statutes of I 846 (which 
provided for the abolition of the r.ourt in I 847) were adopted, when he re­
signed ; former chancellor Elon Farnsworth was reappointed to �he post in 
June I 846, and served for the remaining months of the court's existence. 
Nothing has been found except the reference by Felch that Douglass intended 
to publish a volume of chancery reports. 
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governor may have been mistaken or misinformed, his reputa­
tion for accuracy and truthfulness permits one to conjecture 
upon the possibility of the existence of many other opinions 
that were not printed. It is certain that when Douglass in 
I 8 50 delivered the manuscript opinions to his successor in 
the office of reporter, Randolph Manning, only those after 
I 845 and none prior to I 843 were included.105 Nevertheless, 
a search of the available Douglass papers has failed to dis­
close any supreme court opinions.106 
Douglass had planned to issue a third volume in August 
or September of I 8 so, but he retired from the office before 
that time/07 It appears that he was instrumental in the selec­
tion of Randolph Manning, former chancellor, 108 as the new 
1 .. Douglass drew up an inventory which listed, according to the year and 
to the justice who delivered them, all of the manuscript opinions which he was 
turning over to his successor. When Manning received them on July r r , r 85o, 
he had to acknowledge by his signature that the opinions were in his possession. 
Although it is not important in the present study, this list is significant because 
it proves that many supreme court opinions were written after r 843 that were 
never included in the printed reports. Nearly forty opinions, composed between 
r 8 46-r 8 5o, that have not been published and are not known to exist in manu­
script, were cited by Douglass. 8 WALKER, DouGLAss, and CAMPBELL, LETI'ER­
PRESS BooK 847-852 (Mich. Hist. Coli., University of Michigan) . Douglass 
himself wrote that he had an opinion for the case of  Stowell v. Walker (Sup. 
Ct., r st eire., file No. 3 1 8) decided in 1 844, but ' that he was not publishing it. 
See r Doug. 524, note ( r 845) . 
108 While searching through a part of Douglass' papers in his old home­
stead on Grosse Ile, the writer and Mr. Henry Brown of the Michigan 
Historical Collections located five of the eight volumes of letterpress books kept 
between 1 837 and r 85 o  by the law firm of which Mr. Douglass was a member. 
Volume 8 has proved most helpful. 
101 GRAND RAPIDS ENQUIRER, Jan. r 6, r 85 o, quoting the DETROIT FREE 
PRESS. There must have been some public interest in the reports, because Doug­
lass wrote the editor that he had received many inquiries as to when the third 
volume would be published. Douglass offered his resignation at the May 1 850 
term of court and it  was accepted by the supreme court in July. FREE PRESS, 
July 6, r 85o. 
108 Biographical sketches of Manning may be found in the following: 
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF EMINENT AND SELF-MADE MEN: 
REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF MICHIGAN, part VI, p. 49 ( 1 878) ; Baldwin, 
"Judge Randolph Manning," 1 4  MICHIGAN PIONEER AND HISTORICAL CoL­
LECTIONS 41 8-421 ( r 8 9o) (Michigan Historical Commission) ; Felch, "Michi­
gan's Court of Chancery," 2 1  id. 325 at 329 ( 1 894) ; 2 MICHIGAN BIOGRA­
PHIES 73-74 ( 1 924) ; G. I. REED, BENCH AND BAR OF MICHIGAN I 2  ( 1 897) ; 
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reporter.109 Manning's appointment was conferred the first 
week in July, when the supreme court was in session at Jack­
son.110 His first and only volume of reports was not published 
until I 8 52.  It is important here to note only that in the ap­
pendix he included one opinion which had been written and 
delivered before I 84J.111 Since this opinion had been in the 
possession of Douglass in I 848 112 but was not cited in the list 
of those which Douglass had turned over to Manning in 
I 8 so, one might be tempted to draw the hasty conclusion that 
Douglass had transferred all of the decisions of the supreme 
court which he possessed, while making a record of only those 
dating after I 845. However, because inquiries had been made 
about this particular opinion, it seems more logical to suppose 
that Douglass himself had determined to publish it in the 
third volume of reports which he had contemplated issuing 
in I 8 so, in consequence of which Manning had acquired it 
along with any other work Douglass might have done on 
volume three. The entire matter is highly conjectural and 
with present sources cannot be determined with finality. 
It is not known definitely whether Manning resigned or 
was removed from the office of reporter ; at any rate George 
C. Gibbs of Marshall113 was appointed to the position on 
R. B. Ross, THE EARLY BENCH AND BAR OF DETROIT I 3 I- I 3 3  ( I 907) ; 
MICHIGAN, NISI PRIUS CASES (Howell) 343 (I 884) ; remarks by A. C. 
Baldwin, A. B. Maynard, Chief Justice Sherwood, and Justice Campbell in 
65 Mich. li-lix ( r 889) . 
109 Manning wrote to Douglass that he knew of nothing "to prevent my 
accepting the appointment mentioned by you, should the Judges of the Supreme 
Court think proper to confer it on me." Pontiac, May I S ,  r 8so,  HERBERT 
BowEN PAPERS (Burton Coil.) . 
11° FREE PREss, July 6, I 85o. As the Journal for the second circuit, 1 8 3 6-
I 8 5 1 ,  is missing, no official record of the appointment has been found. 
m Moses v. Steamboat Missouri, I Mich. 507 ( 1 842) . 
112 8 WALKER, DOUGLASS, and CAMPBELL, LETTERPRESS BOOK 263  (Mich. 
Hist. Coil. University of Michigan) . , 
113 For a sketch of Gibbs' life, see I MICHIGAN BIOGRAPHIES 3 2 3  ( I 924) . 
A contemporary said of Gibbs that "A discriminating mind, accurate education, 
habits of thought and industry, and above all a courteous hearing, fully qualify 
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January 6, I 8 53.114 During the four years in which he held 
the office, Gibbs published as many volumes (three) of su­
preme court reports as had his four predecessors in twelve 
years or as had his two immediate predecessors in seven years, 
but in none of them did he print any opinions that had been 
written before I 843. There is no evidence that he possessed 
such material, or that any manuscripts had been transferred 
to him by Manning. However, the next state reporter, 
Thomas M. Cooley, obtained and printed in I 86o an opinion 
in a case that had been decided in I 84I ! 115 It would seem that 
until a law of I 8 55 made it the duty of the reporter to have 
accurate copies of the supreme court opinions made and the 
originals returned to the proper offices for filing, 116 the' re­
porters had been in the habit ot retaining the original manu­
scripts in their personal possession, at least until the end of 
their term. 
In view of the fact that the early supreme court records 
are incomplete117 and that the available opinions are not 
numerous, it is to be regretted that the newspapers of the day 
did not devote more space to the business of the court and to 
its decisions. Prior to I 84 7 the discussion in the press of su­
preme court cases was very spasmodic, limited mainly to de­
cisions which were of great public moment or in which the 
editors themselves might have had a personal or political 
interest.118 Only one instance has been found before that date 
him for the discharge of the responsible duties of the station." FREE PRESS, 
Jan. 8, r 853 .  Just why a "courteous bearing" should be important for the 
office of reporter is not clear. See also the MICHIGAN ARGUS (Ann Arbor) , 
Jan. 1 2 ,  1 85 3 .  
114 2 SuP. CT. JouR., rst eire., 26o (r 85J) . 
'" Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 Mich. 463 ( r 84 r ) . 
116 Mich. Pub. Acts ( r 8s s ) ,  pp. 46-47. 
117 For a description of the supreme court calendars, journals, and :files 
known to be extant, see Norton, "Missing Supreme Court Documents," 26 
MICH. HISTORY MAG. 5 1 8  ( 1 942) .  I 
118 For example, discussion of individual cases appeared in the MICHIGAN 
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in which an attempt was made to list even so much as the 
names and judgments of all cases decided at a particular term. 
However, that one article proved most helpful because the 
journal is not extant for that session of the court.119 Not until 
I 845 did any Michigan newspaper, as far as is known, print 
a copy of a full opinion delivered by a justice of the state 
supreme court.120 
If we discount the headnotes of chancery opinions pub­
lished through the efforts of Harrington in I 842 and I 843/21 
no systematic account of superior court decisions appeared in 
the newspapers until Samuel T. Douglass, as reporter, under­
took the task of providing one in I 84 7 ;  122 during his remain­
ing years in office he supplied the Free Press, the main organ 
of the Democratic Party, with abstracts of many of the 
supreme court opinions, lists of judgments, and names of 
justices who delivered opinions in the cases not abstracted.123 
This practice was followed by later reporters, while in addi­
tion the same newspaper often published synopses of decisions 
and proceedings in court written by some attorney or staff 
member who was present at the session.124 
ARGUS (Ann Arbor) , May I O  and May 3 I ,  I 843, and May 27 ,  I 846 ; in the 
MICHIGAN STATE JouRNAL (Ann Arbor) , Feb. 28,  I 844 and Oct. I ,  I 84s ; 
in the FREE PREss, Oct. 7, I 8 3 7> March 3, I 843, and Feb. 1 2, I 6, and 2 3, 
1 844 ; in the PONTIAC COURIER, May I 8 ,  I
.
8 38 .  
110 The MICHIGAN ARGUS (Ann Arbor) , Jan. 24, I 839,  listed eight de­
cisions given by the supreme court at its Jan. term, I 839, in Ann Arbor. No 
other record is known to exist for three of the cases-Culver v. Raney, Carter 
v. Clark alias Turrill, and Davidson v. Smith-and the exact judgment of the 
court was not known for three of the others. 
"" FREE PREss, April 2, I 845, published Felch's opinion in Cahill v. 
Kalamazoo Mutual Ins. Co., 2 Doug. I 24 ( I 845) . 
121 See note 59 above. 
"" FREE PRESS, Jan. 20, I 847. 
123 Abstracts of opinions or lists of the j ustices who delivered opm10ns 
will be found in the FREE PRESS for the following dates : Jan. 2o, March 24 
and 26, April 2, 3,  6, 24, 27, and 30, May I, June 2, July 22, 23, and 2 7, 
Aug. 7, Dec. 7, I 84 7 ;  Jan. 24, Feb. 1 4, March 2, 6, and I 8, May 3, 4, and 
5, I 848 ; March 23 and 29, I 849 ; March 7, 1 9, and 2 I ,  May I I , 1 85o. 
"" See the FREE PRESS for Jan. 20, 24, 2 8, 30, and 3 I ,  Feb. I I , April I ,  
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Some of the weeklies throughout the state occasionally 
copied the information given in the Detriot papers about the 
January terms, but rarely did they take the initiative to print 
such news originally, even when the supreme court was 
holding its term in their particular localities.125 It is ex­
asperating to note how, year after year, the journals of Ann 
Arbor, Jackson, Pontiac, Kalamazoo, and Adrian, all towns 
in which the supreme court met annually at different times, 
rarely did more in their pages than to call attention to the 
fact that the court would soon begin its session, or had just 
closed its term, or had admitted certain persons to the bar ; 126 
seldom before I 84 7 did they print so much as a list of cases 
on the docket or of the decisions rendered at any particular 
term. 
Conclusion 
It should not be supposed that the Supreme Court of 
Michigan between I 8 J 8  and 1 843, or between 1 843 and 
I 857, delivered written opinions in the majority, or even 
one-half, of the causes which they decided during those years. 
As a matter of fact, opinions are available for but a little more 
than one-tenth of the total number of cases disposed before 
I 843, and for about one-fourth of those disposed before 
I 8S r ;  March 1 3, I 8S2 i March 1 2  and I4, I 8S 3 i Jan. I I ,  I 4, I S, 27, 28 ,  and 
3 I ,  Feb. I, 2, 3 ,  s, 7, 8,  and I o, March s, and ro, I 8S4 i Jan. 3, 9, 1 3, I 6, 
I 8, I 9, 2o, and 3 I ,  Feb. 2, March 8, 9, I 4, I 6, I 7, and 20, July I I ,  I 8ss ; 
Jan. u, 26, 27, Feb. 6, 7, 8, 23,  27, March I 4, I S, I 8 s 6 ;  Jan. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,  
I I , q, I S ,  and 3 I ,  March I o, I 8S 7· 
125 See the OAKLAND GAZETTE (Pontiac) , Jan. 2 7, I 847 ; PoNTIAC JACK­
SONIAN, Dec. 2s, I 8s o ;  PoNTIAC GAZETTE, March 24, I 8SS,  and Feb. 7, I 8S 7 ;  
LANSING REPUBLICAN, March 1 8  and 26, April I ,  I 8s o ;  MICHIGAN EXPOSITOR 
(Adrian) , July I I , I 8S7· However, the ADRIAN WATCHTOWER en July 1 2, 
I 8S 3 >  carried a rather full and very useful account of the court's session held 
there earlier in that same month. 
126 See the STATE JoURNAL (Ann Arbor) , Jan. 12 ,  I 8  3 7 ;  PoNTIAC JACK­
SONIAN, Jan. 2 r ,  I 842 ; KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, Sept. 9, 1 842 ; MICHIGAN 
STATE JOURNAL, Jan. 2S, I 84 3 ;  PoNTIAC JACKSONIAN, Jan. 2o, I 843 ; OAK­
LAND GAZETTE (Pontiac) Jan. 20, I 847• 
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I 858 .121 In the early years it was quite common for many 
decisions to be given orally or for no formal opinion in addition 
to the judgment of the court to be rendered.128 There is proof 
that as late as I 84�, if a case was of no great importance, the 
court might not direct an opinion to be written for it.m Not­
withstanding, the evidence seems incontrovertible that many 
more decisions were written by the .justices of the supreme 
court before I 843 than those which were published or which 
still remain in the files. Although it is not pertinent to the 
present inquiry, it might be mentioned that a total of fifty-six 
other opinions for which no copies are available have been 
cited in various contemporary sources as having been de­
livered between I 843 and I 858 .130 
The fate or present whereabouts of these and other 
opinions which probably were written cannot be answered 
satisfactorily. Thomas . M. Cooley intended in I 8 58 to publish 
at least some of them.131 Although he was forced to relinquish 
that plan, 132 he did include in one of his later volumes two 
127 See NoRTON, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN, r 8 3 6-r 8 5 7, Table XXII, Appendix, p. 3 1  (1 940) . 
128 E. Ransom to S. T. Douglass, Kalamazoo, Dec. r , 1 845, HERBERT 
BoWEN PAPERS (Burton Coli.) . 
329 The reporter stated in r 849 that he had been informed by Judge Wing 
"that no written opinion was delivered by the Supreme Cour_t in the license 
case, at Jackson, the case having been decided upon a point not deemed of any 
practical importance . . . .  " S. T. Douglass to [ ? ]  Smith [? ], Detroit, Sept. 
1 4, 1 849, 8 WALKER, DoUGLASS, and CAMPBELL, LETTERPRESS BOOK 6 7 1  
(Mich. Hist. Coli., University of Michigan) . 
130 See NORTON, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN, r 83 6- r 8 5 7, Table XXIII, Appendix, p. 3Z ( 1 940) . 
""' A  note in the front of Cooley's first volume of reports (5 Mich . ) ,  dated 
at Adrian, December, r 85 8, stated : "The unreported decisions of the late 
Supreme Court, it is hoped, may be collected and included in the next volume. 
There are, among them, some cases of importance which the profession would 
doubtless be glad to have preserved in an accessible form." 
""' A  note in the front of his second volume ( 6 Mich.) explained why he 
failed to report them as he had contemplated : "The hope was expressed . . •  
that the unreported decisions of the former: bench could be collected, and 
included in this volume. It has, however, been found impracticable to obtain 
the most important of those decisions, and the intention to publish any is 
therefore abandoned." This statement would seem to indicate that Cooley 
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opmwns, dated I 84I and I 8 57 respectively, giving as his 
reason for doing so the fact that many inquiries had been 
made about them.133 The certainty that Cooley had access in 
I 86o to an opinion which had been written as early as I 84I 
may or may not be of great significance. If he obtained it from 
the official files, there is little cause for worry; but, if it was 
only one of many more which he might possibly have in­
herited by virtue of his office as reporter, that fact would be 
most disheartening and disconcerting to anyone searching for 
more decisions of the supreme court, because many of Cooley's 
earlier papers were destroyed about I 894.134 There is no 
doubt that the justices of the supreme court frequently bor­
rowed from the reporter, previous to their publication, various 
opinions that had been written either by themselves or by 
their brethren on the bench ; 135 likewise, it is certain that the 
reporter in turn withdrew the opinions from the files of the 
court for the purpose of reporting.136 With such a system of 
record-keeping it is conceivable that many original manuscript 
opinions might have found their way into the private papers 
of any one of twenty-five or more contemporary dignitaries 
and have been lost, destroyed, or interred in some unknown 
depository. 
knew about the existence and the location of at least several opinions which, 
for some reason, he could not obtain for publication. 
m Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 Mich. 463 (I 84I ) ; Jackson v. Evans, 8 Mich. 
4 7 7  ( I 85 7 ) .  
, .. "Most of m y  letters prior to I 8 8 z  were destroyed Jan. z ,  I 894." Index 
to Scrapbook, p. A, CooLEY PAPERS (Mich. Hist. Coll., University of Michi­
gan) . 
1"' For example, see a series of letters by Justice George Miles to the re­
porter, S. T. Douglass, requesting the loan of several different opinions. Aug. 
I I and I 7, Sept. u, I 847, and Aug. 6, I 849, HERBERT BowEN PAPERS (Bur­
ton Coll.) .  
136 Gibbs in I 856 wrote to E .  Hawley, clerk of the court at Detroit, asking 
Hawley to send him three opinions field by Justice Copeland "subsequent to the 
time I [Gibbs] called for the opinions of last Jan. term, I presume. If filed will 
you have the kindness to forward to me by express." Marshall, Feb. 71 I 8 5 61 
Sup. Ct., Miscellaneous files. 
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In respect to the publication of its highest court decisions, 
the state of Michigan was unfortunate during the first years 
of its existence. The first volume of reports did not come from 
the press until I 846, and, during the whole twenty-one year 
period from the appointment of the first justices to the 
establishment in I 8 58 of the so-called "independent" su­
preme court, there were but six volumes of supreme court 
cases and two volumes of chancery court cases issued. Only 
a few supreme court opinions delivered before I 843 have 
previously been printed, while many of those which were 
rendered both before and after that date are not available 
at present. The men who were selected as reporters, all 
of whom were able, industrious; and well qualified for the 
position� were not solely at fault for the delay and omissions ; 
the legislature, and even a few of the justices of the supreme 
court, exhibited at times much lethargy in their support of 
the reports and the reporter. Furthermore, it must not be 
forgotten that the history of reporting in many other states 
had been quite similar to that in Michigan, that often private 
individuals rather than public officials had undertaken the 
publication of opinions, and that Michigan is not unique in 
the lack of full, complete reports. But to any student who is 
interested in judicial history and the development of law, 
this deficiency, while possibly excusable, is extremely regret­
table. 
The long-existing incompleteness in early Michigan court 
reports has not in the past presented a mere academic question 
of no practical importance. Ignorance of these formerly un­
available opinions of the supreme court has not been confined 
to the layman, or even to the attorney; on occasion no less a 
figure than a member of the highest state bench could have 
profi.ted if it had been possible for him to examine the unpub­
lished opinions of former justices. For instance, Justice 
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Warner Wing, in a decision rendered in I 849,137 while 
referring to a case which had been decided more than ten 
years previously/38 wrote that "The opinion of the supreme 
court was not reduced to writing, and, therefore, we can only 
state the fact handed down to us by tradition."139 As a matter 
of fact, the opinion in the earlier case had been written by 
Justice Ransom, is still extant in the files of the court, and is 
printed in this volume for the first time/40 The present pub­
lication of all the known supreme court opinions before I 843 
will partially fill a heretofore unfortunate gap· in Michigan 
legal records. 
Sept�mber, I 944· CLARK F. NoRTON 
137 Scott v. Smart's Executors, I Mich. 295 ( I 849) . 
138 Calhoun v. Cable, Sup. Ct., r st eire., Chancery Calendar (I 8 3 8 ) ,  case 
I J, p. 25. 
139 I Mich. at 298 ( 1 84 9 ) . 
140 Mich. Terr. Sup. Ct., file No. 149 I ; see infra, p. 4· 
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 
William A. Fletcher, July r 836-April r 842 
George Morell, July 1 836-July r 843 
Epaphroditus Ransom, July 1 836-December r 847 
Charles W. Whipple, April 1 839-0ctober r 855  
Alpheus Felch, April 1 842-November r 845 
Fletcher was chief justice. Upon his retirement 
Morell became chief justice. 
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Opinions 
EDITOR's NoTE : The original manuscripts of  the following opinions, 
together with other records of the Michigan Supreme Court prior to 
1 8 5 7, are now in the Legal Research Building at the University of 
Michigan. The notes following the opinions have been prepared from 
data gathered by Dr. Norton, author of the Introduction, in the 
course of his study of the early history of the court. 
EDWARD MUNDY versus JOHN SARGENT 
January 9, 1 838  
1 .  A person may not be sued in a justice's court in a county 
other than that of his residence except when the action is 
commenced by warrant and it appears that the defendant is 
about to REMOVE from the county or the plaintiff is in 
danger of losing his debt. {Terr. Laws of r833, pp. r95, 
2 09.) 
2. Where the only bas�s for issuing a warrant against a non­
resident was the fact that he was about to LEAVE the 
county, the justice erred in not sustaining a plea in abate­
ment. 
Supr�me Court, Second Circuit. Certiorari to a justice of 
the peace, Jackson County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judgment 
reversed. 
Edward Mundy, in propria persona. 






2 MICHIGAN UNREPORTED OPINIONS 
[OPINION] 
Edward Mundy 
vs. � Sup. Ct. Second Cir. Jan. Tr. 
John Sargeant r 8J8 .  
Certio. to  Justice of  the Peace. 
By return of Justice it appears-
That original action was commenced by warrant Feb. r 834 
before Justice Thompson, Co. of Jackson, on application of 
Justice Goodwin-
Both parties resided out of Co. of Jackson­
Plf. & Deft. resided in Co. of Washtenaw-
The Deft. plead in Abatement "that he was a resident of 
Washtenaw Co. Mich. that he was sued out of the Co. in which 
he resided without proof to the Justice, that the Plf. was in 
danger of losing his debt or that Deft. was about to remove 
from the Co. of Jackson. 
The plea overruled-] ustice decided on the ground that 
Deft. residing out of Co. in which action was brought, was a · 
non resident, within meaning of the Statute-
A question was also made, touching authority of Goodwin, 
to appear for Plf. Not necessary to decide that question here­
First point perfectly clear-
By our Statute, no person may be proceeded against, except 
by warrant, out of the Co. in which he resides-
By 41 .  Sec. Justice Act. it is provided that no person who is 
a resident of Michigan shall be sued out of the Co. in which 
he resides, unless it be by warrant obtained on the same proof 
as warrants are obtained where both parties are residents of 
same Co.-
By �th Sec. same Act it is provided that any person his 
Ate &c applying for warrant, shall prove to the satisfaction of 
the Justice-One of two things, that the Deft. is about to 
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remove from the Co. or that the Plf. will be in danger of 
losing his debt &0 unless the process agst Deft. be by war­
rant-
The Stat. evidently, requires the same proof in cases where 
warrants are applied for agst Deft. out of Co. in which he 
resides, as would be, where he proceeded agst in Co. in which 
he resides-
The reason is apparent-were otherwise might be con­
tinually embarrassed by arrests, when going out of their Cos 
on business-
The same reasons apply to both cases-
The reason, for which a warrant is granted is in our case, 
when Deft. is about to remove-is that Plf. may not be put 
to inconvenience of going into another County or out of the 
State perhaps, to collect his debt of Deft. The Plf. need not 
lie by & see Deft. remove his person & effects, out of Co. 
So, if Deft. be making such disposition of his property, as 
would endanger Plf's debt unless he proceed forthwith, he is 
enabled by the Stat., to take warrant, & arrest the Deft. at 
once-
Was there proof in this case of either fact which authorizes 
Justice to issue warrant ? 
Goodwin as agt of Plf. applied for warrant, & on oath testi­
fied to Justice, that he was not afraid of Defts. responsibility 
but that ·he was about to leave the Co. not remove. 
The Justice decided on the ground, that the Deft. not living 
in Co. of Jackson where action was brought, was a [.eel  non 
resident'' he so returns expressly-
This was· clearly erroneous-the j udgt of the Justice must 
therefore be reversed & the Plf. in Error recover his costs-
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice 
Ransom, was found in file No. 1 1 5 8  (as renumbered in 1 902 ) 
Supreme Court, Second Circuit. A draft of a report by Harrington 
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is also in the file. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court 
from the territorial Superior Circuit Court, W ashtenaw County. 
The Judgment Record of the Supreme Court, Second Circuit, con­
tains : p. 1 27 ( March 5 ,  1 834) affidavit of Mundy; p. 1 29 (April 
4, 1 834) writ of certiorari ; p. 1 29 (July 8, 1 834) return of ]. P . ; 
p. 1 3 1 (Jan. 9, 1 838 ) judgment of reversal. 
A. B. CALHOUN versus DAVID CABLE, A. H. 
STOWELL, and CALEB CROSS 
January 13,  1 83 8  
I .  The schedule of the Constitution of I835, declaring that 
all writs, actions, etc., pending in the territorial courts 
shall continue, preserves these matters until the legislature 
acts. After the legislature has acted, any matter not pro­
vided for abates. 
2. The act of March 2 6, I836 (Pub. Acts, I 813s-36, p. 3o) , 
which provided that civil suits AT LAW and criminal prose­
cutions be transferred to the state supreme court or to a 
circuit court of the state, did not authorize the transfer of 
suits in equity. 
3· The act of March 2 6, I8;36 (Pub. A cts, I835-36, p. 38), 
which provided that suits in equity be transferred to the 
state court of chancery, excluded cases in which the 
chancellor had served as counsel. 
4· This suit, being one in which the chancellor served as 
counsel, and no provision having been made for its trans­
fer, has abated. 
5· As the legislature has no power to revive suits which have 
abated, the act of February I I, I8:37 ( Pub. Acts, r8g7, 
p. I I) directing that suits in which the chancellor is inter­
ested be transferred from the territorial supreme court to 
the state supreme court is invalid. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. In chancery. Motion to 
strike from docket. Opinion by Ransom, J. Stricken from 
docket. 
H. N. Walker, for the motion. 
A. S. Porter, contra. 
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A. B. Calhoun 
vs. 
David Cable et als. 
In Chancery 
cause from the docket. 
[INDORSEMENT] 
[ None]  
l 
[ OPINION] 
Supreme Court-First Circuit 
Jan. Tr. 1 83 8  
On motion to strike the 
This action was ori&inally commenced in the Sup. Court 
of the late territory of Michigan & was there pending when 
that Court was abolished by the Act of the State legislature, 
approved March 1 83 6. 
When the territorial Courts ceased to exist, all matters 
therein pending, also expired, unless continued in life by 
some legislative enactment. 
That causes pending in any court are abated by the expir­
ing of that court, seems not to be questioned. 
Does the Act of March, 1 8 3 6, wrest this cause from the 
operation of the common law principle just attended to ? 
I think, most clearly it does not. By the 8th Sec. of that 
Act, all civil suits at law & criminal prosecutions, appeals 
indictments & all cases where there might be a trial by j ury, 
then pending in any of the courts of record-All writs 
warrants & process whatever relating to any civil suit at law, 
or criminal prosecution, which had issued & then existed, or 
which shoul� be issued before the 4th day of July then next­
were transferred & made returnable to the Supreme or Circuit 
Court of the State, as they severally might have juridiction 
thereof. 
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And by the same section all the dockets records documents 
writings & proceedings of causes, civil & criminal, are in like 
manner transferred to the Supreme or Circuit Courts. And 
those courts are empowered to hear, try & determine 
all such causes & matters so transferred &c. Stat. of I 8 3 6 
P. 3 I-J2. 
What class of cases did the legislature intend to transfer 
from the territorial courts to the State Courts, by that Act? 
Evidently, all suits at law, civil & criminal & no others. 
It is said in argument, that inasmuch as all the dockets, 
records, documents, & proceedings of causes, civil & criminal, 
making no express reservation of the dockets &c. &c. per­
taining to the cases in chancery, are, by the Act, transferred 
to the Supreme & Circuit courts, that this court may assume 
jurisdictiol). of this cause. 
If that be the legitimate construction of the Act of I 8 3 6, 
all the causes, as well, in chancery as at law, pending in the 
territorial Courts, at the time of their extinction, were, by 
that act transferred to the Supr�me and Circuit Courts of the 
State. 
A construction so broad in its application, it seems to me, 
can hardly be contended for, indeed such a construction is 
entirely precluded by the provisions of the Act to establish 
a court of chancery, enacted cotemporaneously with the act 
creating the Supreme & Circuit Courts. 
By the second Section of the Act establishing the Court 
of Chancery, exclusive original jurisdiction, in all matters 
properly cognisable by courts of chancery, is conferred on the 
Chancellor, by the 3d Section, all the powers & jurisdiction 
conferred on the Supreme Court of the late territory of 
Michigan by a certain Act, are conferred on the Court of 
Chancery, and by the 9th Sec. all suits & matters in Chancery 
pending in any of the territorial courts-all writs or process 
whatsoever, which then had issued &c. concerning matters 
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in chancery, and all the dockets, records, documents, writings 
& proceedings in said suits & matters, are in like manner, 
transferred to the court of chancery. 
The legislature obviously intended to confer j urisdiction 
of all matters at law & such only, on the Sup. & Circuit 
Courts, and of matters in chancery on the Court of Chancery. 
-But in the same 9th Sec. of the Act last alluded to, it is 
expressly provided, that no suit or matter, in which the 
Chancellor may have been interested, as Counsel or otherwise, 
shall be transferred to the Court of Chancery, but that such 
suits & matters shall be proceeded in by the Courts in which 
the same originated-
If then, by the Act, creating the Supreme Court, no 
suits or matters in chancery be transferred to that tribunal, 
and if also, by the Act establishing the Court of Chancery, all 
causes in which the Chancellor was interested, be excluded 
from his jurisdiction, it necessarily follows, that when the 
Supreme Court of the territory was abolished by the Act of 
March r 8 3 6, this cause, being one in which the Chancellor 
was interested as counsel, was abated. 
Now the question arises whether the legislature by a 
subsequent Act could revive, and confer on this or any other 
Court, the power to rehear & try, a cause, which by operation 
of law was abated and consequently determined? 
Suppose a suit was abated for 'any ordinary cause, would 
it be competent for the legislature by subsequent enactment 
to declare that such suit should be revived, and the parties 
compelled, in violation of the settled rules of law to proceed 
to a trial of the merits? That will not be pretended-
Does this case differ from the one supposed? I confess, 
I am unable to discover any distinction. 
But it is insisted again in argument, that the Act of the 
legislature in this case only affects the remedy, not the rights 
of the parties. 
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The argument is correct in principle, but as it strikes me, 
wrong in application. 
If this cause were abated & determined by the abolition of 
the Court in which it was pending the rights of the parties 
were thereby fixed, and in any view could not be disturbed 
by any subsequent legislation. 
The constitutional provision, relied upon, does not affect 
this case-By the first Section of the Schedule of the Con­
stitution it is declared that all writs, actions &c shall continue 
as if no change had taken place in the government-Suppose 
no change had taken place in the government, and the 
territorial legislature had abolished the then existing courts 
& substituted others, making the same provisions the state 
legislature has done, would not this cause have been abated? 
Unquestionably it would-
The constitution preserves the matters pending in the 
territorial courts, for the future action of the state legislature, 
-that action has been had, and the purpose of the constitu­
tion fully accomplished. 
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice 
Ransom, was found in file No. 149I (as re-numbered for Trans­
actions of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Micmgan, Blume, 
ed. ) .  A draft of a report by Harrington · is also in the file. Volume I 
of the Journal of the Supreme Court, First Circuit, contains the fol­
lowing entries: p. 28  (Jan. 2, 1 838) defendants move to strike from 
docket ; p. 3 1  (Jan. 5, 1 838)  motion argued and submitted ; p. 40 
(Jan. 13, 1 838) stricken from docket. For later proceedings in this 
case see p. 70, infra. In 1 849 the act of February 1 1 , I 837, was 
held valid. Scott v. Smart's Exrs., I Mich. 295· 
HuBBLE v. BuRCH 
NATHAN HUBBLE versus ETHEL BURCH 
January 1 3, r 83 8. 
9 
r .  The justice did not err in permitting an attorney at law 
to appear for the plaintiff on the trial, without express au­
thority, the attorney having appeared many times without 
objection. 
2. Where the defendant has pleaded the general issue and 
a special plea and the return of the justice states that issue 
was joined, the appellate court will presume that plaintiff 
added a similiter to the general issue and traversed the 
special plea. The omission of a similiter is a mere matter of 
form which is aided by verdict. 
3 ·  In an action for the escape of a person taken in execution it 
is not necessary that the jury find specially that the officer 
consented or was negligent. A general verdict is sufficient. 
4· In an action against a sheriff for an escape, the sheriff's 
deputy who released the prisoner on an insufficient bond 
was interested in the event of the action, and, therefore, 
properly rejected as a witness. 
S· In an action for an escape, it is error to reject as a witness 
the escaped prisoner when called by the defendant. If 
interested, his interest is against the party calling him. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to a justice of the 
peace, Monroe County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judgment 
reversed. 
P. R. Adams and R. McCleland, attorneys for plaintiff 
in certiorari. 
A. Felch, attorney for defendant in certiorari. 
( INDORSEMENT] 
Ethel Burch Deft. 
in Error 
vs-
N a than Hubble 
Plf. in Error. 
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Ethel Burch Deft. 
in Error. 
v-
Nathan Hubble Plf. 
in Error 
[OPINION] 
I Sup. Court, First Circuit JanY Tr. I 8J 8 .  
Certiorari to a Justice of the Peace. 
This cause is brought into this court upon a writ of 
certiorari to a Justice of the Peace. 
By the return of the justice it appears that the Deft. in 
Error, on the 6th day of Oct. I 8 32, before P. P. Ferry a 
j ustice of the peace, recovered a judgment against one 
Couture for about $74 which judgt he afterwards assigned 
to H. B. Hopkins-that on the first day of March 1 834 an 
execution was prayed out on the judgt and delivered to John 
Mulholland, (a deputy of the Plf. in Error Hubble, who was 
then sheriff of the County of Munroe),  to levy serve & 
return-That on the 2 1st day of April then next, Mulholland 
arrested Couture, and proceeded with him to the common 
jail of the County-that Couture with a view to obtain the 
benefit of the prison limits, gave a bond, to H. B. Hopkins, 
conditioned that P. P. Ferry should not depart without the 
prison limits &c. and that upon the delivery of that bond to 
the keeper of the prison, Mulholland permitted Couture to 
go at large-
That afterwards on the 2 8th day of June 1 834 a suit was 
instituted by Burch against Hubble, before Justice Curtis­
that on the return day of the writ, the PH. declared against 
Hubble in debt, upon the escape of Couture, in one count for 
a voluntary escape & in another for a negligent escape, suf­
fered by Mulholland-that to this declaration the Plf. in 
Error, plead the general issue, and specially also that Couture 
had been committed to prison on the Plf's execution & having 
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given a limit bond pursuant to the Statute, was admitted to 
the benefit of the prison limits-that issue was joined and the 
cause continued from time to time till the 4th day of Aug. 
I 8 34 when it was tried by a jury, a. verdict for $69. 2. 1  Dams 
returned for the Plf. and judgment rendered on the verdict. 
It further appears that this suit was commenced in the 
name of the Plf. Burch, by A. Felch Esq. an Attorney duly 
admitted to practice law, in the courts of this state-that 
said Felch had appeared & answered to the suit, without 
objection being made by the Deft. until the day of the final 
trial, when the Deft. obj ected to Felch's being permitted 
to prosecute the suit farther without proof of authority from 
the Plf.-the objection was overruled by the justice-on the 
trial of the cause the Deft. Hubble, to prove the issue on 
his part, offered as witnesses, the said Couture & Mulholland, 
they were obj ected to by the Plf. on the ground of interest 
& rej ected by the Justice. 
To these proceedings the Plf. in Error, takes exceptions­
he contends-First-that the justice committed error in 
permitting Felch to appear & prosecute the suit without ex­
press authority from the Plf. Burch. But without deciding 
that question, it is sufficient to say that this case is relieved 
from all difficulty upon that point, by the fact, that Felch had 
been perciitted to appear for the Plf. many times, without 
objection, and we think the magistrate correctly decided that 
the objection, if tenable under any circumstances, came too 
late in this case. 
Another objection is that no issue was made, which the j ury 
could properly try-
Technical nicety or legal precision is not required in 
Justice's Courts, when this court can reasonably intend that 
the merits have been fairly tried, we will not test by technical 
rules, the formality of the pleadings. 
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It would seem, however, in this case, the pleadings were 
sufficiently formal. Whenever one of the parties concludes 
to the country, he refers the trial to the jury & the issue is 
j oined & ready for tdal, by the adverse party's adding the 
similiter, and the similiter being no part of the pleadings, 
but a mere matter of form, it would seem that its omission 
should be aided by verdict. 
The Justice's return here shews that the general issue 
was plead & also a special plea in bar, and upon those plead­
ings issue was joined-we feel bound to presume from this 
return that to the general issue tendered the Plf. added the 
similiter & traversed the special plea in bar, making a material 
& proper issue for the j ury. 
The third exception taken, is, that, agreeably to the 
declaratory act concerning the escape of prisoners in certain 
cases, no judgt could be rendered against the Deft. in this 
case-that it should appear from the record that the jury 
expressly found that the debtor escaped with the consent, or 
through the negligence of the Deft. or that he might have 
been retaken & that the Deft. neglected to make immediate 
pursuit. Had the debtor been in custody upon mesne process, 
the objection would be well founded-but the statute ob­
viously creates a distinction, between escapes of debtors 
arrested upon.mesne process & those taken in execution. 
By a proviso to the act just referred to, any sheriff or 
other officer, who shall have taken the body of any debtor in 
execution, & shall wilfully or negligently suffer such debtor 
to escape, is made liable to the execution creditor, in an action 
of debt, for the amount of the execution-this case is clearly 
within the contemplation of the proviso-and a general 
verdict of the jury sufficient. 
Again it is said the Justice erred in rej ecting the witnesses, 
Mulholland & Couture, offered by the Deft.-We think 
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Mulholland was properly rejected, being directly responsible 
to his principal, Hubble, for the amount of any j udgt that 
might be recovered against him for the escape of Couture­
Since it is apparent from the return that Mulholland failed 
to comply with the requisitions of the Statute in the service 
of the execution-he neither committed the e:J[i debtor to the 
keeper of the prison nor did he take a proper limit bond, be­
fore discharging him from custody-But the rejection of the 
debtor, Couture was manifest error, if interested at all in 
the event of this suit, his interest was against the party calling 
him he was therefore a competent 
witness and should have been permitted to testify-
The judgt of the justice must be reversed therefore, and 
the Deft. Hubble recover his costs. 
EorroR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice 
Ransom, was found in file No. 70, Supreme Court, First Circuit­
Law. A draft of a report by Harrington is also in the file. The case 
was transferred to the Supreme Court from the territorial Superior 
Circuit Court, .. Monroe County. Volume I of the Journal of the 
Supreme Court, First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 30 
(Jan. 4, 1 838) argued and submitted ; p. 40 (Jan. 1 3, 1 838)  
judgment reversed. Also see Calendar, First Circuit, Vol. I ,  case 
No. 70. 
HIRAM WHITCOMB versus IRA PORTER 
January 13,  1 83 8. 
1 .  In a summary proceeding against an officer for failing to, 
levy or return a writ of execution {Terr. Laws of z833, p. 
200) a justice of the peace does not exceed his jurisdiction 
by rendering a judgment for more than $z oo. 
2.  A renewal of an execution at the instance of the officer 
without the request or consent of the plaintiff will not 
defeat a claim against the officer for failing to levy or 
return the writ in time. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to a j ustice of the 
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peace, St. Clair County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judgment 
affirmed. 
E. B. Harrington, attorney for plaintiff. in certiorari. 
A. D. Fraser, attorney for defendant in certiorari. 
[ INDORSEMENT] 
Ira Porter Deft. in Error 
vs-
Hiram Whitcomb Plf. in Error 
[OPINION] 
Ira Porter Deft. in Error l 
vs- Sup. Ct. first Circuit JanY Tr . 
. Hiram Whitcomb Plf. r 8 3 8 
in Error 
Certiorari to a Justice of the Peace. 
By 'the record certified to this Court by the justice, it 
appears that on the 29th Dec• 1 83 5, the Deft. in Error, Porter 
recovered a j udgt before Justice Baker against one Chamber­
lin, for $ 8 8.2o--execution was stayed pursuant to the Statute, 
on the 20th day of Jany 1 837  Porter prayed out an execution 
upon the j udgt which was renewed by a proper endorsement, 
by the Justice on the 2 1st May 1 83 7, and on the same day 
placed in the hands of Whitcomb, then a constable of the town 
of to levy serve and return-On the 2 9th 
day of the same May, Whitcomb, having made no levy or 
return of the execution, and the time having elapsed in which 
it could be levied, the creditor moved the Justice that judgt 
be entered in his favor against the constable, Whitcomb, for 
the Am t of the execution, with damages, interest & cost -On 
the same day the justice issued a citation to Whitcomb to 
appear before him on the 7th June then next, and shew cause 
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why he should not be held to pay the Amt of said execution 
with damages interest & costs agreeably to the statute. 
And it further appears, that both parties appeared before 
the Justice on the said 7th day of June-Whitcomb admitted · 
that he had reed the execution for collection and that he had 
not levied the same-Collected the money thereon, nor com­
mitted the debtor, Chamberlin to prison, and showed no cause 
satisfactory to the Justice, why j udgt should not be entered 
against him for the Am t of the execution &c. 
. 
Whereupon the said Justice entered a judgt against said 
Whitcomb for the said $ 8 8 .20 the Amt of said ex" with twenty 
five per cent. damages on the original judgt interest & costs­
computed at $32.06, Amounting in the whole to $ 1 20.36-
To these proceedings the Plf. in Error objects-First­
That the execution alluded to, had been renewed by the 
Justice on the 22d day of May 1 83 7  & consequently had not 
expired at the time the judgt was entered against him-
It does not appear by the return, that any evidence was 
offered on the hearing before the Justice, upon the said mo­
tion- of such renewal of the ex" the Justice certifies that on 
the sd 22d of May a renewal was endorsed on the ex" at the 
instance of Whitcomb, without the request or consent of the 
creditor. 
Had that fact been proved before the justice it could not 
have availed the party-
When the execution expired in the hands of the officer, 
without a levy or return being made, the right of the creditor 
to a j udgt against the officer or his sureties, immediately vested 
& could not be defeated or delayed by a renewal of the ex" 
made by the procurement of the officer himself-
Again it is insisted the proceeding is erroneous, because 
the Am t of the judgt entered against the officer exceeds the 
sum $ r oo. beyond which, it is contended a Justice's j urisdic­
tion does not extend-
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We think this obj ection is not well founded, the Statute 
provides a two fold remedy for the creditor, in case the officer 
neglect to serve or return the execution-he may bring an 
action of debt against the officer himself, or his securities in 
which case he must resort to a court having jurisdiction of 
the Amount, of the j udgt sought to be recovered. Or, if he 
choose to rely on the responsibility of the officer alone, on 
his own motion, the j ustice may cite the officer before him, 
to shew cause why he should not be held to pay the Amt of tlie 
Ex" And unless good cause be shewn execution shall issue 
against him for the Amt of the original ex" with 25 pr. ct. 
dam" interest & costs. 
This is a summary proceeding provided for this class of 
cases alone, the justice derives his power to act in the matter, 
from the particular section of the Act creating this remedy, 
not from the first section which confers his general jurisdic­
tion. 
It can hardly be said that the magistrate performs a 
judicial act in these cases, the facts of which he is to enquire 
are whether the ex" has been served & returned, �r discharged 
by the creditor, which must generally appear by his own files 
& records-he is the mere agent thro. which the law declares 
its judgt-the measure by which the Amt of the judgt is 
determined, is fixed by the statute-the justice is simply to 
make the computation. 
The judgt below must be confirmed with costs. 
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice 
Ransom, was found in file No. 88, Supreme Court, First Circuit­
Law. A draft of a report by Harrington is also in the file. Volume I 
of the Journal of the Supreme Court, First Circuit, contains the fol­
lowing entries : p. 35 (Jan. 9, 1 838) argued and submitted ; p. 4 1  
(Jan. 1 3, 1 838)  judgment affirmed. Also see Calendar, , First 
Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case No. 88. 
BuRHANS v. REYNOLDS 
ISAAC BURHANS versus ABNER REYNOLDS 
January 1 9, r 838  
r .  Where labor is performed under a subsisting special agree­
ment, recovery may not be had under the common counts. 
But if the agreement has been fully performed by the 
plaintiff or rescinded by mutual consent, the rule is other­
wise. From the contradictory evidence in this case it is 
difficult to determine whether the labor was performed 
under a special agreement, but it is unnecessary to decide 
because of other error. 
2. In justices' courts jurors are judges of the law as well as 
of the facts. The justice in this case erred in directing the 
jury that inasmuch as the defendant had proved that the 
plaintiff had received one-half of certain crops, the jurors 
were bound by their oaths to allow credit for the same. 
3 ·  The above direction was not harmless as being in favor of 
the plaintiff in error {defendant below) because the jury 
might not have found against the defendant at all but for 
such direction. 
Supreme Court, Second Circuit. Certiorari to a justice of 
the peace, Washtenaw County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judg­
ment reversed. 
0. Hawkins, attorney for plaintiff in certiorari. 
J. Kingsley, attorney for defendant in certiorari. 
(INDORSEMENT] 
Isaac Burhans Plf. in Error 
· vs-
Abner Reynolds Deft Er. 






� �up. Ct. Sec' Cir. Jan. Tr. 1 83 8 .  
Certio. t o  Justice o f  the Peace. 
I .  By return of Justice, it appears that the parties some 
years since entered into an agreet to work together on Burhans 
land, in clearing & raisi.ng grain-were to continue to work 
there, three or six years- and were to divide all grain raised, 
equally between them-That the parties went on under sd 
agreet until they had cleared twenty eight acres of land­
about one & half years-
That Reynolds performed other labor for Burhans in erect­
ing log houses & upon the highway-
Disagreements arose between the parties, and the contract 
to clear land &c together, was abandoned Reynolds then 
brought his action against Burhans to recover pay for his 
labor in clearing the land together with other services per­
formed by himself & boys for Burhans, and for money lent 
Bur hans-Reynolds declared in gen 1 indebitatus Assumpsit 
for work & labor, & money lent-
Bur hans plead gen1 issue & gave notice of set off 
The cause was tried by jury in May I 8 34· 
Counsel of Burhans insisted & requested court to charge the 
jury, that, it appeared in evidence that the labor performed 
by Reynolds was done under a special agree t-and that he 
could not recover upon the Common Counts should have de­
clared on special agreet 
Justice refused so to charge the jury-
After the cause was submitted to j ury & they had retired 
-the justice was sent for by jury, and his opinion asked, 
upon a point of evidence-viz : Whether they could allow 
BuRHANS v. REYNOLDS I 9  
Burhans anything for corn & wheat which Reynolds had rec4 
Justice told jury "that inasmuch as Burhans did prove that 
Reynolds had one half the crops they were bound by their 
oath. to allow him for the same according to the testimony 
given them in Court" 
Jury returned a verdict of $ r 29.6o-
Remititer [ Remittitur J was entered by Reynolds to $29.60 
-J udgt rendered for $roo-
To these proceedings, two objections are urged-
r .  That, inasmuch as it appeared on the trial that the labor 
of Reynolds was performed under special agreet should have 
declared upon it--cannot recover in the gen1 counts-
2. That the Justice erred in going into jury room & giving 
his opinion in a matter of fact, after cause was submitted-
It is a general rule of law, that when labor is performed, 
under a special agreement the terms of which at the time of 
action brought, subsist in full force, a recovery cannot be 
had under the Common Counts-the party performing the 
labor, cannot waive the contract & resort to to an implied 
assumpsit-the special agreet should be set forth in the 
declaration, that the Deft. may be apprised of the contract 
he is charged with violating, and may have an opportunity 
to shew the want of performance, on the part of the Plf. of 
those stipulations, which may have been the consideration 
of the promise made by the Deft. But if the terms of a special 
agreet have been fully performed on part of the Plf. or if 
the contract be rescinded by mutual consent, after part 
performance by Plf.-he may recover the value of the work, 
in an action of gen1 indeb. Assumpsit, and need not set forth 
the special contract-
In this case it is insisted by Plf. in Error, that there was a 
subsisting contract, between the parties, under which the 
labor was performed-
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Deft. in Error, contends that the contract was mutually 
rescinded & abandoned by both parties-
The testimony returned by the justice is so contradictory 
& uncertain, that it is difficult to determine, what the precise 
facts of the case were, and we deem it unnecessary to decide 
upon this point, inasmuch as the case may be determined on 
the other point made by the Plf. in Error, which we think 
free from all difficulties. 
-The justice committed manifest error, in directing the 
jury, as to matters of fact, after the cause was submitted to 
them by the parties-In justice's Courts, the j ury are judges 
of the law as well as of facts, and the justice had no authority, 
whatever, after the cause was submitted, to direct the j ury 
how to find-we think it would be dangerous to tolerate such 
a practice-
It was urged in argument at bar, that what was said to the 
jury, by the Justice was in favor of the Plf. in Error, & that 
therefore he cannot take exceptions to it-but that was well 
answered by Plfs. Counsel, "that the j ury might not have 
agreed upon a verdict, at all, against the Plf. but for the 
direction of the j ustice-
The judgt of the justice must be reversed & the Plf. in 
Error recover his costs-
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice 
Ransom, was found in an unnumbered file of the Supreme Court, 
Second Circuit. A draft of a report by Harrington is also in the file. 
The case was transferred to the Supreme Court from the territorial 
Superior Circuit Court, Washtenaw County. The Judgment Record 
of the Supreme Court, Second Circuit, contains : p. I 32 (Oct. 2 7, 
I 834) writ of certiorari ; p. I33 (July I 3, I 835)  return of J. P. ; 
p. I 38 (Jan. I 9, I 838) judgment of reversal. The writ of certiorari 
and other papers will be found in File I I 6o (as renumbered in I 902) .  
NoRRIS v. HAwKs 
MARK NORRIS versus CEPHAS HAWKS, 
JAMES HUTCHINSON and MARCUS LANE. 
January 1 9, 1 83 8  
2 1  
1 .  Payment of rent to one of three joint owners -is a discharge 
of the joint claim. 
2. Where a justice of the peace had been informed by one 
joint owner that rent sued for in the names of three joint 
owners had been paid, the justice erred in rendering judg­
ment against the defendant in his absence at the instance 
of another of the joint owners. 
Supreme Court, Second Circuit.  Certiorari to a justice of 
the peace, Washtenaw County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judg­
ment Reversed. 
0. Hawkins, attorney for plaintiff in certiorari. 






Lane et al. 
(OPINION] 
Marcus Lane et al. 
� Sup. Ct. Sec' Cir. Jan. Tr. 1 83 8  
-------------------
Certio. to Justice of the Peace. 
Plf. in Er. & Defts. Lane & 
Hawks 
By a stipulation of the parties, the affidavit is substituted 
for the return--it is agreed that the facts set forth in the 
affidt shall be the facts in the case on which the court decide--
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By affit it appears, that Defts. in Error, were joint owners 
of certain real estate, called Brewery property-that Plf. in 
Er. occupied said Brew. prop. under a lease or agreet of the 
Defts.-
Plf. in Er. paid the rent, amounting to about $ ro.oo to 
Lane one of joint owners-
In July last, Hutchinson, one of the joint owners of the 
sd property, commenced an action agst Plf. in Er. in name of 
all the Defts. in Er. for recovery of the rents, which had 
accrued-
After the commencet of the suit, & before the return day 
of the writ-Lane informed PH. in Er. that the suit should 
be discontd & that he need not give himself any trouble 
about it-
. 
In pursuance of this agreet Lane, before the return day of 
the summons-directed the Justice to discontinue the suit­
informed the Justice that the suit was brought in his name 
contrary to his wishes, and that the Plf. in Er. had fully 
accounted to him for the rents, to recover which the action 
was brought-
The Plf. in Er. did not appear before the justice, to defend 
the suit, in consequence of the agreet of Lane to discontinue­
At the instance of Hutchinson, one of the Defts. in Er. 
Justice proceeded to hear the cause and rendered J udgt for 
Plfs. to recover $9.85 Dams & their costs That there was no 
evidence of a privity of contract, between the parties, on the 
hearing before the Justice 
Plf. in Er. excepts to this proceeding, insisting, that the 
rents for which the action was brought having been paid to 
one of the joint owners of the leased property, that Plf. was 
thereby forever discharged from liability to either & all the 
Defts-
And that this fact having been made known to the Justice, 
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& he directed to discontinue suit committed Error, in pro­
ceeding afterwards to render judgt in the case-especially in 
absence of Plf. and without proof of privity of contract, 
between parties-
· 
The payts of the rents by the Plf. to one of the j oint 
owners, was unquestionably a finale & complete discharge �f 
the Plf's. liability to the j oint claim of the Defts-
Judgt being rendered for Defts. to recover amt of debt, 
after the lease had been fully paid & discharged-is erroneous 
-& the judgt must be reversed & the Plf. in Er. recover 
his costs-
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice 
Ransom, was found in file No. 66 ( Nos. 1 1 53 and 1 1 57  as re­
numbered in 1 902) of the Supreme Court, Second Circuit. A draft 
of a report by Harrington is also in the file. The Judgment Record 
of the Supreme Court, Second Circuit, contains: p. 1 5  8 (Aug. 9, 
1 837 )  writ of certiorari ; p. 1 5 9  (Jan. 16, 1 838) return of J. P. ; 
p. 160 (Jan. 1 9, 1 838) judgment of reversal. 
JOSIAH R. DORR, WILLIAM B. ALVORD, and 
JAMES STETSON versus CHRISTIAN W. DREYER 
August 30, I 839 
I .  A ll objections to process are waived by a general appear­
ance. 
2. Testimony by a person claiming to be agent that he was 
"authorized by the DEFENDANTs to . . .  employ workmen 
for them" is sufficient basis for infe"ing that the defend­
ants, sued as "traders under the style of the Detroit 
Iron Co.," constituted such company. Furthermore, it does 
not appear that the point was raised in the lower court. 
3· Where there is "some evidence'' to support the judgment 
of a justice of the peace, the supreme court "will not stop 
to enquire whether it was so full or ample as to render the 
case entirely free from doubt." 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to a justice of the 
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peace, Wayne County. Opinion by Whipple, J. Judgment 
affirmed. 
G. E. Hand, attorney for plaintiffs in certiorari. 
B. F. H. Witherell & Buel, attornies for defendant in 
certiorari. 
[ INDORSEMENT] 
Dorr, Alvord & 
· Stetson 
Josiah R Dorr 
William B Alvord & 
James Stetson 
VS 




Sup Court : r •t Circuit 
July term I 839-
Certiorari : 
The plaintiff below sued out process against the defend­
ants as "traders under the style of the Detroit Iron con in a 
plea of Trespass on the case, and declared generally for 
"work, labor, damages &c" & at the same time filed a bill of 
particulars: the defendants, as appears by the return of the 
Justice appeared by Hand their Attorney" and plead "non­
assumpsit." The Justice after hearing and considering the 
cause rendered judgment in favor of the plff for $52.25 
damages & $2.56 costs of suit ; to reverse which judgment 
a certiorari was sued out by the pHis' in Error: 
The following are the principal points relied upon by 
the plffs to reverse the judgment. (here insert brief) No,s 
I-2-
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I : It i s  a well settled rule that objections o f  the nature 
suggested in the first point must be taken advantage of on 
the return of the process by a motion to quash or by plea 
in abatement : the defendants below having appeared by an 
agent and pleaded generally to the declaration waived all 
objections to the process. 
2 :  Upon an examination of the return of the Justice, it 
appears, that the Detroit Iron CO pr F A Willis by a written 
authority autqorized one A. W Wood "to engage two or 
three good, steady, faithful & temperate men, to work at 
finishing in their establishment, and that to such men con­
stant employment and good wages payable every Saturday 
night would be given." Wood produced & proved the execu­
tion of the authority, which he states was given to him by 
Willis by the direction of Alvord, one of the plffs in error, 
who remarked that it (the authority) was correct : Wood 
further testified that by virtue of this authority he engaged 
the plff below, Dreyer, at Rochester, N Y ;  that he was such 
a man as he was authorized to employ, having been recom­
mended to him as a temperate man and a good workman: 
that Dreyer came to Detroit with his wife & two children, 
the latter part of August I 8 3 7, pursuant to the engagement : 
and further that he had seen Dreyer at work, and that $2 per 
day were the wages paid for finishers :-The witness also 
testified that the charges for travelling expenses were reason­
able, altho' there was no understanding that such expenses 
would be paid: Another witness Gorman, testifies that Dreyer 
was a good workman, that he was discharged sometime in 
the beginning of Oct I 8 3 7-and that he knew no reason 
for his discharge : Upon being recalled Wood further stated 
that Dreyer's work w�s trimming & filing: that he saw him 
at brass work, & that it was well done : The plff below having 
rested his case, the defendants below introduced one George 
Brundit, who testified that Dreyer worked at the foundry 
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at finishing; that he was no chipper & ignorant of the use of 
the lathe : did not know why he was discharged-that he was 
good enough at filing and further, that workmen are paid $2 
per day : Geo A Fletcher another witness testified, that he 
worked at the foundry & in the same room with Dreyer ; 
"that his filing was done very well," but that it might have 
been done sooner :-thinks his services worth I 2  or 13s per 
day ; and that he did not seem to understand the use of the 
lathe." 
Upon a review of the above, which seems to have been 
all the testimony introduced on the trial below, it is difficult 
to perceive how this court can sustain the obj ection taken 
by the plff in error that the evidence does not shew any 
undertaking or assumpsit on their part : The testimony of 
Wood is conclusive on this point : he exhibited the authority 
by virtue of which he had hired Dreyer which authority was 
subsequently recognized by permitting Dreyer to enter & 
work in the foundry : he further states that he commenced 
work the latter part of  August and it is in proof that he 
continued until some [time] in the beginning of Oct. when 
he was discharged, but for what cause, none of the witnesses 
were enabled to state : There is an apparent discrepancy in 
the testimony of the witness with respect to the skill of 
Dreyer as a finisher, but all concur that his work was well 
done : But it is objected, thirdly, that there was no evidence 
to establish the fact that the defendants below constituted the 
Detroit Iron CO. The return of the Justice by which we are 
bound, does not support this allegation, for it is expressly 
stated by Wood, that he was "authorized by the defendants 
to go to New York and employ workmen for them :" from 
this testimony the Justice had a right to infer that the CO 
was constituted of the plff's in Error. Besides it does not 
appear from the return that the obj ections stated in the brief 
of the plff's were made at the trial of the cause below: it has 
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been repeatedly decided by this Court, that in order to avail 
himself of irregularities or errors in the court below, objec­
tion must be made at the proper time during the progress 
of the trial, otherwise this Court will not give a party the 
benefit of such irregularities or error. 
Upon the whole, it appears that there was, to say the 
least, some evidence to support the judgment, & this Court 
will not stop to enquire whether it  was so full or ample as 
to render the case entirely free from doubt. 
Hand for plff in Error. 
Buel for deft in Error. 
Judgment affirmed-
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice 
Whipple, was found in file No. 1 06, Supreme Court, First Circuit­
Law. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following 
entries : p. 47 (Jan. 2, 1 839) motion to quash certiorari ; p. 5 7  
(Jan. 9 ,  1 839) continued ; p. 8 4  (Aug. 30, 1 839) judgment 
affirmed. Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case No. 
106. 
JOSEPH W. BROWN versus EZEKIEL G. MOORE 
and AMASA JACKSON 
September 4, 1 839. 
1. In an action against an indorser of a promissory note, the 
certificate of a notary public that he presented the note for 
payment, that payment was refused, and that he mailed 
notice of protest, is not admissible under the common law 
to prove these facts. 
2. The statutes relative to notaries public (Terr. Laws of 
r833, p. 2 44; Revised Statutes of r8.38, p. so) have not 
changed the common law in the above respect. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Error to Circuit Court, 
Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Judgment re­
versed. 
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Daniel Goodwin, attorney for plaintiff in error. 
H. N. Walker, attorney for defendants in error. 
[ IIIlDORSEMENT] 





! Memo of Opinion 
Aug. I 8 3 9-J udgt reversed and 
venire de novo ordered-
Goodwin for Plff in Error 
H N. Walker-Deft. 
(OPINION] 
Joseph W. Brown � 
vs. Writ of Error to Wayne Circuit. Ezekiel J. Moore 
& Amasa Jackson ----------�-------
The Bill of exceptions, forming a part of the record in 
this cause, sets forth the only ground, upon which error is 
now alleged-
The Plff in error was the Deft below, and was sued as 
the indorser of Fargo & Boughton on their promisory note 
dated I4 July '3 7 for $ I 223. 14  payable in 6 mo at the Bank 
of Tecumseh 
To prove presentment for payment and refusal thereof 
at the Bank, and notice thereof to the Deft below as in­
dorser-The plaintiff below offered in evidence an official 
certificate in due form of Geo. W. Jermain, a notary public 
of the County of Lenawee setting forth that on the day &c 
he duly presented the said note to the Bank for payment and 
that the same was refused; and that he caused notice of said 
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protest to be put in the post office at Tecumseh, directed to 
the Deft &c- The attorney for the Deft below objected to 
the [a] dmissibility to prove these facts-, but the objection 
was overruled, and the evidence received. 
There was no other evidence to prove these facts-The 
only question therefore is whether the evidence was properly 
admitted? 
It was contended by the counsel for the Defts in Error 
that by the provisions of our Statute relative to Notaries 
public have enlarged the authority of a Notary public, and 
that his official certificate is made competent evidence in 
other cases than those recognized by the Com. Law. The 
only provision relied on for this purpose is that which de­
clares due faith shall be given to all the protestations, attesta­
tions and other instruments of publication of notaries public-. 
(The Rev. Stat. is in other words-ack:. of deed, adm. oaths, 
and perform such other official acts as have been customarily 
performed by N. P. · 
f . 1 d b'll 
6 Wheat. I 46. Young vs. Bryan f & t · t 
l A protest o an m an 1 
. . o ex. pro. no e IS no 
1d. 572 Umon Bank vs. Hyde . . . 
'd 6 N' h 1 W bb 
necessary, nor 1s 1t eV1-
8 1 . 3 2 • 1c o as vs. e d ence. 
Chit. Bills 405. Rule at Com. law, only in case of Foreign­
"But a protest made in England must be proved 
by the notary who made it, and by the subscribing 
. 'f [ "] Wit., 1 any . 
6 Serg & R. 484 Brown vs. Philadelphia Bank 
" " 3 24 Stewart vs. Allison 
Where it was held that under the act of the Leg. of Penn. 
of I 8 I 5 the official certificate of a notary was competent evid. 
to prove notice of non pai to the indorser of an inland note­
By the act referred to it is declared that the official acts, pro­
tests and attestations of notaries public certifi.ed according to 
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law under their respective hands and seals of office may be 
received in evidence. 
· 
The Stat. of Penn. goes farther than our own, it makes the 
official acts &c evidence generally when duly certified 
But the safer course, and indeed the only, is to follow the 
established rule-unless &c &c-
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Ch. J. 
Fletcher, was found in file No. 1 37,  Supreme Court, First Circuit­
Law. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following 
entry : p. 89 (Sept. 4, 1 839)  judgment reversed. Also see Calendar, 
First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case 1 37.  
OLIVER ROSE versus SOLOMON SIBLEY 
September 4, 1 839· 
I .  Where a case is submitted to a trial court on an agreed 
statement of facts which does not "contain all the facts 
necessary to turn the case into a question of law," the trial 
court's determination of the fact$ is conclusive if the state­
ment contains evidence tending to prove. the facts found. 
2. In this case the evidence tended to prove that the plain­
tiff's flgent knew that the money claimed by the plaintiff 
was being collected by the defendant's former partner af­
ter the · defendant had retired from the practice of law, 
hence the finding for the defendant is conclusive. 
3 ·  In the absence of statutory authority, an agreed statement 
of facts is not a part of the court's record and, therefore, 
cannot be considered on a writ of error. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Error to Circuit Court, 
Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Judgment 
affirmed. 
H. S. Cole & A. S. Porter, attornies for plaintiff in error. 





RosE v. SIBLEY 
[ INDORSEMENT] l 1st Circuit 
Memo of opinion- . 
Aug. 1 8 39-
J ugt affirmed ------------------
[ OPINION] 
Oliver Rose � 
vs. 
Sol. Sibley Survivor 
of himself & A. G. Whitney 
3 1  
This cause is before this court on Writ of Error brought 
to reverse a J udgt rendered in the Circuit Court for the 
County of Wayne. 
The suit was originally brought in the Circuit Court by 
Rose the present Pl:ff in Error against the Deft, Survivor of 
himself, and Andrew G. Whitney, deceased, late partners,­
in the profession and practice of law.-
The Pl:ff declared specially on the undertaking of Deft, 
and also on the common money counts, and an account stated, 
to which the Deft pleaded the general issue. The Counsel 
for the parties afterwards waived the trial by jury, and upon 
the facts set forth in a case made and stated between them, 
submitted the whole matter to the decision of the Court. 
The material facts stated in the case are the following: 
Mark H. Sibley of Canandaigua, the Attorney of 'Oliver 
Rose transmitted to Sol. Sibley in Jany 1 8 1 9 an exemplifica­
tion of a Judgt rendered in the State of New York in favor 
of Rose vs. Wm G. Taylor-When this claim was reed by 
Sol. Sibley he was in partnership with Mr. Whitney-Sibley 
and Whitney in their joint names prosecuted the claim to and 
obtained judgt thereon in the Sup. Court in October 1 822, 
for the sum of 452·56 :  
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--On the I O  Sept. I 82J, a fi. fa. was issued by S. & W., 
but nothing was made thereon. 
The Deft. Sol. Sibley was appointed a Judge of the Sup. 
Court of the Territory of Michigan on the I I  th Feby I 824, 
and continued in commission until after the J udgt in this 
Suit below, and wholly ceased practice as an Ate & Counsel­
lor at law during that time. Sibley and Whitney, as between 
themselves settled their partnerShip business, leaving all un­
closed business of their clients in the hands of Whitney, who 
was generally considered a good lawyer, a vigilant collector, 
responsible and punctual in paying over money. 
By the agreement between them, the fees which had 
accrued up to the time of the appointment of Sibley as judge 
were to be equally divided between them, all fees accruing on 
any unfinished business after the said appointment, were to 
accrue to the benefit of Whitney. 
On the I 2  April, I 824, Whitney filed a praecipe for a 
Ca. Sa. on the said judgt signed by himself for the late firm 
of Sibley & Whitney which was issued, which was returned 
non est. Mark H. Sibley was the agent of Rose, and had an 
interest in the j udgt obtained in the State of N. Y. against 
Taylor. 
On the 25 Nov. r 824 Whitney filed a praecipe signed by 
himself alone, for an alias fi. fa.-upon which there was 
made the sum of $263 . 8 8, which was paid over to Whitney 
in November I 825, and after deducting fees, costs, and 
charges, there remained in Whitney's hands $2 I 6. 73, which 
was deposited by him in Bank to his individual credit. Mark 
H. Sibley was in the City of Detroit in the Summer of r 825 
on a visit. Mr. Whitney died in September I 826-and the 
money collected as above stated, was never paid over. 
No other money was collected on the original judgt of 
Rose vs. Taylor. Mr. Whitney's estate was represented in-
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solvent-and no claim on the part of Rose was ever exhibited 
against the estate, and the time for presenting claims against 
the estate expired before the commencement of this suit 
below. 
There are also several letters from Sibley and Whitney 
to Mark H. Sibley reporting the progress of the suit against 
Taylor, and a letter from Mark H. Sibley, all of which are 
annexed to, and made a part of the case submitted, but to 
which it is not necessary particularly to advert at present. 
Upon this statement of facts it was submitted to the 
judges of the Circuit Court, whether the Deft Sol. Sibley 
was liable in this action for the Payt of the [ $ ]  2 I 6. 73 col­
lected by Whitney.-if the court should be of the opinion 
that he was liable then judgt to be entered against him for 
that sum & interest thereon.-And if not judgt was to be 
entered for the Deft for costs. 
The arguments before this court, as to the liability of 
the Deft, have been, by the Counsel of both sides, based upon 
the facts set forth in the case submitted to the Circuit Court.-
The principles of law relating to copartners, and their 
liabilities, have been adverted to, as applicable to the present 
case ; but the view which we have taken of this case renders it 
unnecessary to determine any of the points raised upon this 
subject. The case agreed upon, and submitted to the judges 
of the Circuit Court, did not contain all the facts necessary 
to turn the case into a question of law. 
Some facts were required to be found by the Court, before 
it could be determined whether the Deft was liable in this 
case as a retiring partner, · and as there was evidence con­
tained in the case submitted, tending to prove those facts, 
the determination of such facts by the Court to which the 
cause was submitted, must be final and conclusive. 
On looking over the evidence submitted it is manifest 
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that it tended to prove that Mark H. Sibley had a knowledge 
that the Deft had wholly retired from the practice of the 
law, and that Mr. Whitney was proceeding in his own name 
to collect the money on execution, and although it does not 
appear upon what grounds the Court below decided the case, 
yet there can be no doubt that the evidence submitted had a 
material bearing upon the merits of the case and the decision 
of the Court. Upon this part of the case this court cannot 
decide, having no authority, as a court of errors, to review 
the determination of the Court below settling the facts upon 
the evidence submitted-
But there was another objection taken by the counsel 
for the Deft, that this court, on a writ of error, has no 
authority to revise the decision of the court below on a state­
ment of facts submitted to that court ; however clearly and 
well ascertained the facts may be which are contained in the 
case, and properly presenting a case, to which the rules of 
law may be conveniently and well applied. It was contended 
that by no principles of the Common [Law] could this court 
take jurisdiction of such a case on writ of error : that it was 
like a submission to arbitration, where the arbitrators deter­
mine the facts and the law, and whose decis [ ion] is final and 
conclusive-In support of this position no authorities were 
cited by the Deft's counsel,-But on examining the authori­
ties many case [ s]  are found sustaining the objection. 
a. 3 Peters 369. b. 2 Greenl. R. 336. c. 7 Mass. R. 
3 80. d. 9 do. 329. 
These decisions go to establish the proposition, that where 
the facts are not determined and spread upon the record in 
virtue [of] some Statutory regulations, or according to the 
principles and usages of Courts proceeding according to the 
course of the common law, they cannot be reviewed on writ 
of error, by reason that the court into which the record is 
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removep. has n o  jurisdiction of such matters o f  fact, or the 
determination thereon. The statement of facts agreed on in 
the court below was sufficient to give jurisdiction to that 
Court of the matters submitted, but it forms no part of the 
record so as to authorise its removal to this court on a writ 
of error. It is not therefore so much the undoubted certainty 
of the :facts, as it is the mode and manner of authentication 
which will confer jurisdiction Upon this court to revise and 
correct the proceedings of subordinate courts on writ of 
error. This was the assumed principle in the case in 3 Peters, 
-The point of difference between the judges of the Circuit 
Court which alone gave the Sup. Court of the U. S. jurisdic­
tion, not being certified according to the Act of Congress, 
although it might easily have been ascertained by inspection 
of the whole record-the Court refused to entertain juris­
diction So also in 2 Greenleaf, where the parties assented to 
the facts stated in a Bill of Exceptions, but which was not 
regularly certified by the judge who tried the cause. And 
in the 9 Mass, where in the statement of facts submitted to 
the Court of Com. Pleas, the parties further agreed that it 
should form a part of the record, and be removed by either 
party, to the Sup. Court on writ of error, the Sup. Court say 
that the consent of parties cannot give that court jurisdiction 
in a case where it is not conferred by law-and that if either 
party intends or expects to bring a writ of error and wishes 
the facts spread upon the record it will be necessary to have 
the facts found by the jury in a special verdict, according to 
the English practice. 
5 Cowan R. 58 7 Rensselaer Glass Factory vs. Reid in 
Court of Error. Case referred by the Court to Refferees, 
and on their report being made, objections were made and a 
statement of .facts agreed upon by the Atty and certified 
and signed by the presiding Judge-and by writ of error 
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was removed to the Court of Errors, it was then objected by 
the Counsel for Deft in Error that the case made and certified 
was no part of the record, and could not therefore be removed 
and revised on writ of error. 
Sanford, Chancellor and Colden & Spencer Senators in 
giving their opinions tacitly admitted that if the case were 
voluntarily made by the parties that the objection would have 
been valid-But they overruled the objection solely on the 
ground that the reference of the cause was directed by the 
court under the Act of the Legislature and not by consent 
of parties-and that the Legislature did not intend in this 
mode to put it out of the power of either party to have his 
case reviewed in the Sup. Court of Errors-. 
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Ch. J. 
Fletcher, was found in file No. 14 5 1  (as renumbered for Transac­
tions of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan, Blume ed. ) . 
The case was transferred to the state Supreme Court from the 
Supreme Court of Michigan Territory. Volume I of the Journal, 
First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 38 (Jan. 1 2, I 83 8 )  
continued by consent; p. 49 (Jan. 3,  I 839) argued and submitted ; 
p. 89 (Sept. 4, I 839) judgment affirmed. Also see Transactions of 
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan r825-r836, Blume 
ed., Vol. I, p. I 48. 
FRANCIS HENRETTY versus CITY OF DETROIT 
September 2 8, r 8 39. 
Section 2 of the ordinance under which the defendant was 
convicted (providing that ccno person shall sell meat except 
in the stalls rented from the corporation") is invalid, being 
unreasonable and in restraint of trade. 
(Opinion of one judge) . 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to Mayor's 
Court, City of Detroit. Opinion (not found) by Fletcher, 
Ch. J. Dissenting opinion by Whipple, J.  Judgment affirmed 
insofar as it imposed fine and costs ; reversed insofar as it 
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ordered that plaintiff in certiorari be imprisoned until fine and 
costs are paid. 
C. Tryon, W. Woodbridge & Backus, attornies for plain­
tiff in certiorari. 









City of Detroit 
Opinion of 




! Supreme Court : First Circuit. 
Cer1 to Mayors Court of the City of Detroit. 
The plaintiff in error was prosecuted in the Mayor's 
Court of the City of Detroit for an alleged violation of an 
ordinance of said City entitled "A law to regulate public 
markets :" The complaint was founded upon the r•t & 2nd 
Sections of the ordinance, which provides in substance that 
"all public markets in said city shall be held at the market 
houses therein" and secondly; that "no person shall sell meat 
except in the stalls rented from the corporation." The ih 
Section prescribes as a punishment for a violation of any of 
the provisions of the ordinance, "a fine not exceeding $so, 
and imprisonment not exceeding ten days, or either." Upon 
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a plea of not guilty being interposed a jury was empannelled, 
who after hearing the evidence returned a general verdict, 
of guilty: whereupon a judgment was entered in the words 
following: "Said Mayor's Court then & there fined the said 
Francis H enretty, for said offence, of which he was found 
guilty by the jury, as aforesaid in the sum of fifty dollars and 
the costs of prosecution and ordered that he should stand 
committed until the fine and costs should be paid." The de­
fendant feeling himself aggrieved by the judgment & pro­
ceedings in the Mayor's Court, made the necessary affidavit, 
upon which a certiorari was allowed and subsequently issued 
to remove the cause to this court. 
The points made by the Counsel for the pl:fi. in error and 
upon which they rely for a reversal of the judgment below 
are of the gravest character, involving questions which have 
never before been adjudicated upon by the judicial tribunals 
of this State or of the late Territory of Michigan; and which, 
if sustained by this court would affect most vitally the in­
terests not only of the City of Detroit in its corporate ca­
pacity, but a very large class of private individuals. The im­
portance, therefore, of the question at issue taken in connec­
tion with the magnitude of public & private interests at stake, 
have induced me to give to the cause, a careful and deliberate 
examination, the results of which I shall now proceed to state ; 
and I may here remark that the opinion now to be expressed 
will contain little else than the conclusions of my mind upon 
the various points argued at the bar, without entering very 
much at large into the course of reasoning by which I have 
been conducted to these conclusions : contenting myself for 
the present, with a statement of such reasons in support of 
my conclusions as appear to me most obvious and striking, 
without referring to others which may have influenced but 
not controlled my judgment. 
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I shall consider the various points argued by the Counsel 
for the plff. nearly in the order in which they are stated in 
the very elaborate brief with which I have been furnished. 
I : It is contended that the Legislative Council of the late 
Territory of Michigan had no authority to pass the law 
entitled "An A ct relative to the City of Detroit." This propo­
sition tho' the same in substance, is different in terms from 
that stated in the very ingenious written argument of one 
of the Counsel, where the word charter is frequently adopted 
and as I think misapplied:  In the argument of this question 
a much wider scope was indulged in, than was necessary for 
its determination; which depends upon the true construction 
to be given to the powers granted to the Legislative Council 
by the Act of Congress of March 3rd, I 823 : What then were 
the powers conferred upon that body? In the Second Sec of 
the Act it is provided "that the same powers which were 
granted to the governor, Legislative Council, the House of 
representatives, of the North Western territory, by the 
ordinance of Congress, passed on the I Jth day of July I 787, 
&c are hereby conferred upon, and shall be exercised by the 
governor and Legislative Council." What, then, were these 
powers? By reference to the ordinance it appears that "the 
Governor, Legislative Council, and House of Representa­
tives" had "tJtUthority to make laws, in all cases, for the good 
government of the district, not repugnant to the principles 
and articles in this ordinance established and declared." The 
question now recurs had that body, by virtue of the broad 
powers conferred upon them "to make laws, in all cases, for 
the good government of the district," authority to pass the 
Act cited in the proposition I am now considering: To solve 
this question it will be necessary to define what is to be 
understood by a municipal or public corporation : Without 
discussing the propriety of the metaphysical and quaint defi-
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nitions given by some of the ancient legal authors, I propose 
to adopt one which for simplicity and comprehensiveness, 
appears to me to be the best I have met with : I refer to the 
one given by Willcock who defines a public corporation to 
be "the investing of the inhabitants of a particular place with 
its local government." From this definition the nature & 
objects of such a corporation may be ascertained: Its nature 
& general characteristics are familiar to every lawyer ; its 
objects the government of a portion of the state, & to this 
end it is endowed with a portion of political power: Is it not 
then manifest that the general authority to make laws for 
the government of the District includes the authority to in­
corporate subordinate communities for the government of 
a portion of that District? : I think it does : In expressing the 
opinion that the Legislative Council were inve�ted with au­
thority to pass the law in question, I desire it to be understood 
that it is not my purpose to affirm or disaffirm the views 
expressed by Counsel respecting the powers conferred upon 
the Govr & judges while performing the functions of a Legis­
lative body: that question is not involved in this case, and 
does not, therefore call for a decision. 
Secondly : admitting the authority of the Legislature to incorpor­
ate the City of Detroit, it is contended that all rights acquired 
by the City, ceased on the formation of the State Government 
unless expressly preserved: 
The erection by Congress, of the Territorial Government, 
was certainly for temporary purpose·s : the ordinance of 1 787, 
which was the fundamental law of the whole Northwestern 
Territory, contemplated a state of things when the people of 
the several Territories, which were to be carved out of that 
immense extent of Country, should throw off the Colonial 
condition, and assume the more imposing attitude of a state 
of the Confederacy, clothed with all the attributes of sov­
ereignty & independence which belonged to the original 
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states: The people of the Territory of Michigan availing 
themselves of the rights secured by the ordinance, did, in the 
month of June, I 835, meet together, by their representatives, 
in Convention, and formed a Constitution & state govern­
ment, which was to take effect upon its ratification by the 
people : that the Legislative Council could not establish or 
ordain political or public corporations, which should outlive 
the temporary government, is very true, and that the Con­
vention which formed the state Constitution representing the 
people in their sovereign capacity had ample authority to 
annul all charters of the nature referred to is equally true : 
The question then arises was the act incorporating the City 
of Detroit preserved by the Constitution of the State : This 
question turns upon the construction to be given to the 2d Sec 
of the schedule which ordains that "all laws now in force in 
the Territory of Michigan, which are not repugnant to this 
Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their 
own limitations, or be altered or repealed by the Legislature." 
Was then, the -law- incorporating the City of Detroit in 
"force" at the time of the adoption of the Constitution? It 
certainly was: Were any of the provisions of that law "repug­
nant" to the Constitution? It is contended by the counsel for 
the plff in error, that the act of incorporation was repugnant 
to the Constitution in this that the members of the Council 
Council are clothed with Legislative & Judicial powers, · 
whereas the Constitution declares that "The powers of the 
government shall be divided into three distinct departments: 
the legislative, the executive, and the judi�ial; and one de­
partment shall never exercise the powers of another, except 
in such cases as are expressly provided for in this Constitu­
tion." This provision, it is believed, is incorporated not only 
in the Constitution of the United States, but in the Constitu­
tions of the several States of the Union : indeed it has become 
a settled maxim in the science of government, that it is 
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essential to liberty, and to the harmonious action of the whole 
to keep separate the three great departments by which the 
government is administered & that each should move within 
the sphere prescribed by the fundamental law and never 
assume to exercise power granted exclusively to the others. 
Does then, the authority conferred upon the Common Coun­
cil of the City of Detroit in their legislative capacity to enact 
laws, and then to sit as judges when their validity is drawn 
in question, and also try those charged with their infraction, 
involve a violation of the article of the Constitution j ust 
quoted? I think it does not: The "government" mentioned in 
the Article, means the STATE GOVERNMENT; the three "de­
partments" referred to, means the three great departments of 
this state government: The Constitution prescribes and limits 
the powers of each of these three great departments, and in 
the article above quoted, it was the intention of the framers of 
the Constitution to guard against the Exercise by one of these 
three departments, of the powers conferred upon either of 
the other departments : To illustrate this position : Sec r ,  
art VI o f  the Constitution provides that "The Judicial power 
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such other 
Courts as the legislature may from time to time establish." 
Pursuant to the powers conferred upon the Legislature by 
this Article, they proceeded to establish a Supreme Court, a 
· Court of Chancery, and a Circuit Court : These Courts are the 
administrators of the Judicial authority of the State, or of 
one of the three great departments of which I have been 
speaking: Now: if one or the other of these courts should 
attempt the exercise of legislative power, their act [would] 
be void, because i t  would violate the fundamental principle 
to which I have adverted : If I have succeeded in giving to 
the Constitution a just construction it will follow, that the 
exercise of a limited legislative and judicial authority by a 
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body constituted like the Common Council of the City of 
Detroit, is not repugnant to the Constitution : Like powers 
have been conferred by almost every Legislature in the 
Union, and the highest evidence of the validity of such a 
grant of power, is to be found in the fact that it never has 
been seriously questioned; and that if invalid, it should to this 
day have escaped the observation of the most eminent judges 
and lawyers who have adorned the Bench and the Bar in this 
Country. But while I admit the validity of the law conferring 
legislative and judicial powers on the persons composing the 
Common Council of the City of Detroit, I cannot permit 
the occasion to pass, without the expression of an opinion 
that such a combination of power in the same persons, violates 
in spirit, the very principle recognized in our Constitution, 
which I have endeavored to illustrate : If it is impolitic & 
dangerous and contrary to all our notions of government, to 
invest the Supreme Judicial Tribunal of the State with legis­
lative powers, why should it be thought politic, safe, and con­
sistent with correct principles to permit such powers to be 
exercised by an inferior jurisdiction? It is impossible that a 
body of men clothed with such authority, can gain that 
confidence & conciliate that respect so necessary to impart 
to their adj udications that moral influence without which 
judicial decisions are of little value :  To grant legislative 
powers to a body of men, and at the same time invest them 
with the authority of judges to decide on their validity and 
to enforce obedience to them is putting into their hands an 
instrument of power which may be wielded for the worst 
purposes : In voting for the passage of law, it is fair to pre­
sume that the law maker is satisfied with respect to its validity, 
for his mind up to this period is open to conviction,-he 
weighs with impartiality all the arguments in favor & against 
it :  Let the same lawmaker sit in the capacity of a judge, and 
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let arguments drawn from the Constitution be directed 
against the very law of his own creation,-his pride of  
opinion i s  a t  once awakened,-he construes the argument 
into an attack upon the correctness of his judgment,-upon 
his wisdom as a legislator,-these combined produce a state 
of mind unsuited to the character of a judge :-who should 
be free from all influences but such as may tend to clear the 
way for a full, fair, impartial, and enlightened administration 
of law & justice : The views I have thus expressed, it must 
be understood, are directed against the structure of the 
Tribunal called the Mayor's Court, and not against the indi­
viduals who have heretofore, or who now, constitute that 
tribunal : the best evidence of their respectability and char­
acter is to be found in the fact that their fellow citizens have 
called them to the discharge of duties, so honorable & re­
sponsible. 
Having, thus far, endeavored to prove that the Legisla­
tive Council had the authority to pass the law incorporating 
the city of Detroit, and that it has not been expressly or im­
pliedly repealed, I shall now proceed to consider whether 
the enactment of the by law in question was a competent 
· exercise of power on the part of the Common Council. It 
was urged with becoming zeal, and much ability that the by 
law is void because: I "t There is no authority for prescribing 
that "all public markets in said city shall be held at the 
market houses therein" and 2 11, "That no person shall sell 
meat except in the stalls rented from the corporation" 
To determine these questions we must look at the act 
incorporating the City of Detroit, which is its constitution. By 
that act the Common Council are empowered to "establish 
keep & regulate one or more public markets" and "to make 
by laws relative to the public markets." Under this grant of 
power had the Com Council authority to ordain that all pub-
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lie markets should be held at the market houses in the City 
of Detroit ;  Corporations have such powers and no others 
than those given them by the laws which give them a legal 
existence : they can take nothing by implication. Applying this 
rigid & inflexible rule to the present case I yet think the 
power claimed for the Com Council can be sustained: The 
public health, & the public convenience, two objects of pri­
mary importance, especially in a populous town or city im­
periously demand some regulation as to the time & place 
when & where public markets should be held: These facts 
which are unquestionable, should be looked to in giving a 
construction to a power granted in terms so general as those 
employed in the act of incorporation. But it is insisted upon 
with much force that the grant of power set forth does not 
authorize the corporation to restrain all persons from selling 
meat cc except in the stalls rented from the corporation." 
It was argued that such a regulation is in restraint of 
trade, and that, as a consequence the authority to pass such a 
by law cannot be fairly inferred. After giving to this question 
the most patient investigation I have come to the conclusion, 
founded on principle and authority that the second section 
of the by law which imposes the restraint I have just sug­
gested is void: It is void because it is both unreasonable, and in 
restraint of trade : To test the correctness of this opinion let 
us look to the practical effects of such a restriction if rigidly 
enforced. And firstly: It precludes all persons from selling 
meat except such as the Common Council may choose to 
rent a stall, and to such only as have the ability to pay the 
rent that may be exacted: Secondly :  the effect of such a 
restriction is to create a monopoly, and if the act was rigidly 
enforced such a monopoly as would preclude many at some 
seasons of the year from obtaining animal food: Thirdly : it is, 
in effect prohibitingthe inhabitants of the City from purchas-
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ing meats, except from the few who may have been so fortu­
nate as to obtain a stall, & fourthly, it puts the whole com­
munity in the power of the few who have rented stalls so 
far as regards the supply of meats and the price to be paid: 
For these reasons I think the by law so far [ set] forth un­
reasonable, unnecessary and I must say oppressive : It will 
follow from what I have already stated that according to 
my conception, the Second Sec of the by-law, is also in re­
straint of trade. It was argued by the able counsel for the 
defts, that the restraint imposed was not general but particu­
lar : that it merely fixed the place where meats were to be 
sold; this is very true, but is it not apparent that such regula­
tions both with regard to time & place may be so restrictive 
in their character as to be obnoxious to the general principle 
that all laws in restraint of trade are void: To illustrate my 
meaning: let us suppose that the Common Council should 
pass a law prohibiting the sale of meats except in one of the 
stalls of the public market, and that such sale should be made 
but once a week: now this regulation would regard time & 
place, yet it would hardly be contended that it could be sus­
tained, because of its unreasonableness, and because the effect 
would be to restrain trade : But let us suppose a case which 
frequently occurs, & to which I took the liberty of directing 
the attention of the Senior Counsel for the defendants during 
the progress of his argument : Farmers residing out of the 
limits of the city and in adjoining counties are daily seen in 
our streets during the winter season with wagons laden with 
fresh beef, pork, mutton, veal & venison : Now according to 
the 2d Sec of the by-law in question, they could not sell their 
meats unless in the stalls rented from the Common Coun­
cil :-without subjecting themselves to fine and perhaps im­
prisonment : But it may be said, that no notice would be 
taken of such a violation of law, or that the law was not 
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intended to apply to such cases : The learned Counsel is the 
Recorder of the City of Detroit, and usually presides at the 
Mayor's Court and I should do injustice to his ability as a 
judge, if with the plain provision staring him in the face 
declaring that "no person shall sell meat except in the stalls 
rented from the Corporation," he should charge the jury 
impannelled to try the case that the law was not intended to 
apply to such cases: Would he not rather say, that the law 
was so plain as to admit of but one construction : that where 
the meaning of a law was obvious & apparent, it was not the 
province of a judge or jury to intend, that the law makers 
did not mean what they have clearly expressed: This would 
undoubtedly be the language of the Recorder, unless like 
myself he should think the law unreasonable & in restraint 
of trade : 
The suggestion that the provision of the by law I am 
considering would never be enforced, cannot influence the 
decision of the case : I am bound to suppose that it is enforced : 
But without resorting any further to those principles by 
which the validity of by laws of corporations are tested, I 
shall conclude this branch of the case by referring to one 
reported in the I O  of Wendell p 99 : I shall notice it with 
some particularity as it not only sustains the views I have 
expressed upon the point under consideration, but fully con­
firms some of the positions I have laid down in the progress 
of this opinion : One Webster was sued for a violation of one 
of the by laws of the Village of Buffalo, which made it un­
lawful for any person during certain months to hawk about 
or sell by retail any kind of fresh beef, pork, lamb or mutton 
for the consumption of the inhabitants of the Village, except 
at the public markets, or within certain limits around the 
same: The defendant agreed with a grocer to let him have 
a quarter of lamb and to receive in payment goods out of his 
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grocery, and the sale & payment accordingly took place : On 
this evidence the Justice who tried the case imposed a penalty 
of five dollars ; The judgment was removed to the Court of 
Common Pleas where the judgment of the Justice was re­
versed. Whereupon the Trustees of the Village sued out a 
writ of error from the Sup Court : Chief Justice Savage 
delivered the opinion of the Court as follows : "By the act 
incorporating the Village of Buffalo the trustees are au­
thorized to make such prudential by-laws, as they may deem 
proper, relative to the public markets &c and the only question 
is whether the by-law is valid :  At the Common Law corpora­
tions have power to make by-laws for the general good of 
the corporation. they must be reasonable & for the Common 
benefit : They must not be in restraint of trade, nor impose a 
burden without an apparent benefit. A by-law for the restric­
tion of trade and imposing particular restraints as to time & 
place is good, but general restraints are bad : For example, a 
by-law that no meat should be sold in the Village would be 
bad, being a general restraint ; but that meat should not be 
sold except in a particular [place] is good, not being a re­
straint of the right to sell meat, but a regulation of that 
right : Laws relating to public markets must necessarily em­
brace the power to require all meats to be sold there, not that 
every man who sells meat shall rent a stall; nor is there any 
such objection to the present law; any one may sell meat in 
the street adjacent to the markets." This opinion which I 
have quoted literally establishes the following proposition : 
I"t : That the power to regulate public markets embraces the 
power to require all meats to be sold there : so far this de­
cision affirms the right I have claimed on behalf of the Com 
Coun. to require all public markets in the City of Detroit to 
be held at the market houses :  21r : By-laws must be reasonable 
& for th� common benefit : 3 1r : that general restraints are 
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bad,-particular ones good: 41r: that a by-law requiring every 
man who sells meat to hire a stall would be bad: 
Now the 2d Sec of the by law of the City of Detroit pro­
hibits any man to sell meats except in the stalls rented from 
the corporation : If so, it follows that in order to enable a 
man to sell meat he must first hire a stall from the corpora­
tion : Such a by law, altho' a mere regulation of trade, a 
particular restraint is according [to]  Chief Justice Savage 
bad, & for the plain reason, that it is manifestly unreasonable 
and not for the common benefit: It being essential to the 
validity of a by law that it should be reasonable, and for the 
common benefit-not for the benefit of the few. 
The counsel for the clefts cannot fail to perceive the analogy 
between the case I have just reviewed, and thafwhich I pro­
pounded to him during the argument of the present case: 
the right of the trustees of Buffaloe to pass the law was 
affirmed on the principle that it was reasonable to require the 
farmer who brot' his quarter of lamb to the Village to repair 
to the public market and there dispose of it, but disaffirmed 
the right to require those who thus sold meat to hire a stall. 
EDITOR's NoTE : The above dissenting opinion, in the hand­
writing of Justice Whipple, was found in file No. 1 5 9, First Circuit­
Law. A memo. by Harrington, stating that Ch. J. Fletcher delivered 
the majority opinion, is also in the file. Volume I of the Journal, 
First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 73 (Aug. 6, 1 839) 
motion to set aside writ of supersedeas ; p. 76 (Aug. 8, 1 839) order 
that writ of supersedeas be set aside unless bond filed ; p. 8 3  (Aug. 
1 5, 1 839) argued and submitted;  p. 9 1  (Sept. 28, 1 839) judgment 
affirmed in part ; reversed in part. Also see Calendar, First Circuit­
Law, Vol. I, case 1 59· Several papers pertaining to thise case will 
be found in Woodbridge Papers (Wallet for June-Sept., 1 839, 
August Folder) ,  Burton Historical C ollection, Public Library, De-
troit. 
· 
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CALEB F. DAVIS versus ISAAC W. INGERSOLL 
January I 8, I 840 . 
. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to three Justices 
of the peace, Wayne County. Opinion by Whipple, J. Judg­
ment reversed. 
J._A. Van Dyke, attorney foe plaintiff. 
EDITOR's NoTE : The opinion in this case appears in a footnote 
in 2 Douglass (Mich. ) 3 7 2  ( I  849 ) .  It deals with the substantive 
allegations necessary in an action of forcible entry and detainer. 
Volume I of the Journal of the Supreme Court, First Circuit, con­
tains the following entries : p. 7 3  (Aug. 6, I 839)  motion that 
justices make a more complete return ; p. 74 (Aug. 7, I 839) specific 
points given on which return should be made ; p. 9 5 (Jan. I 3, I 840) 
argued and submitted ;  p. I oo (Jan. I 8, I 840) judgment reversed. 
Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case I 53 ·  The original 
MS. opinion is not in the files. 
JONAH BREWSTER, MARTHA BREWSTER, 
GEORGE BREWSTER, MARY BREWSTER, and 
BENJAMIN BREWSTER versus EUROTAS P. 
HASTINGS, SHUBAEL CONANT, and 
HENRY S. COLE, Executors, etc., 
of FRANKLIN BREWSTER, Deceased. 
March 7, I 840. 
I .  A declaration made by a person in his last sickness, which 
was read over to him, approved by him, and declared by 
him to be his will in the presence of five persons who signed 
as witnesses at his request, is a NUNCUPATIVE will under 
section 3 of the statute of I 8i8 (Terr. Laws of I82o, p. 
2 0} not a WRITTEN will which is defective because not 
signed by the testator: 
2. A valid NUNCUPATIVE will which purports to dispose of 
both real and personal property does not come within the 
terms of section 9 of the above statute (providing that a 
BREWSTER v. HASTINGS 5 1  
defective 'Will in WRITING which purports to dispose of 
both real and personal property ccshall not be allowed and 
approved as a testament of personal estate only"), hence 
may be allowed to stand as to personalty. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Appeal from the Probate 
Court, Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Decree 
affirmed. 
A. D. Fraser, attorney for appellants. 
D. Goodwin, attorney for respondants. 
[ INDORSEMENT] 
Sup. Court 1 Circuit 
Brewster et al} 
vs. 
Hastings et al 
Opinion-
delivered March 7, I 84o­




Jonah Brewster et al l 
vs. 
Eurotas P. Hastings 
& Shub1 Conant � 
This was an appeal from the decree of the Judge of Pro­
bate for the County of Wayne, passed the 2d Feby 1 835, by 
which an instrument purporting to be the last will and 
Testament of Franklin Brewster, deceased, was approved and 
allowed. 
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The Appellants are heirs at law of the testator, and the 
Respondants are the executors named in the will. 
Several reasons for the appeal were duly filed by the 
appellants, but only one of them is now relied on, which is 
that the will purporting to be a disposition of Real and Per­
sonal property, and not being executed and attested so as 
to operate as a devise of the real estate, canl!ot be allowed as 
to the personal. 
The will was a nuncupative will made by the testator in 
the Summer of I 8 34 in his last sickness-! t 'was reduced to 
writing according to his directions, and read over to him, and 
approved. He then declared it to be his last will and testa­
ment in the presence of five persons who subscribed the same 
at the time, as witnesses by request of testator. The testator 
did not sign the will. 
(Read copy of the will) 
It is contended by the Counsel for the Appellants that 
this will, purporting to be a disposition of real and personal 
estate, comes within the provisions of the 9th Section of the 
["] Act Prescribing the manner of devising land, tenements 
and hereditaments," adopted July 27. 1 8 1 8 .  
The preamble to the 9th Sect. of that act is in these words 
"And as it may sometimes happen that a will respecting 
"lands and tenements and personal estate, through inattention 
"or otherwise, may be attested or subscribed by a less number 
"of credible witnesses than this act directs for devising land 
"tenements and hereditaments, which if approved and al­
"lowed as a testament of the personal estate only, might de­
"feat the original intention of the devisor respecting the 
"settlement of his estate"-Then follows the enacting clause, 
"-Be it further enacted that any will in writing hereafter 
"offered for probate, which purports a disposition of both 
"real and personal estate, that shall not be attested and sub-
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"scribed as this act directs for the devising of lands, tenements 
"and hereditaments, shall not be allowed and approved as a 
"testament of personal estate only."-
By the I8 Sect. of this act it is declared that any person 
lawfully seized of any lands, tenements or hereditaments in 
the Territory, being of the age of 2 I  years, and of Sane mind, 
shall have power to devise the same by last will and testa­
ment in writing-And by the 2d Sect. it is declared that all 
devises and bequests of any lands or tenements shall be in 
writing and signed by the party devising or by some person 
in his presence, and by his express direction ; and shall be at­
tested and subscribed in the presence of the devisor by three 
or more credible witnesses, or otherwise shall be void-This 
will is not executed so as to operate as a devise of real estate, 
not being signed by the testator nor by any other person for 
him in his presence and by his express direction. 
But the counsel for the appellants contend, [ I ]  that al­
though the will is not executed & signed as required by the 
Statute, still it is a will in writing and comes strictly within 
the prohibition contained in the 9th Section of the Act ; and 2 .  
That if i t  is not within the strict terms of that Section, it 
comes clearly within the scope of the remedy intended by the 
Legislature-and ought to be considered as within the equity 
of the prohibition-and that it cannot, therefore be allowed 
as a will of the personal estate. 
I .  "Is it a will in writing within the terms of the Statute? 
By the 3d 4th & 5th Sections of the same Stat. the right 
to make nuncupative wills is recognized under certain restric­
tions and regulations therein provided. 
A nuncupative will is a testamentary disposition of prop­
erty made by verbal or oral declaration, of the testator-And 
. are uniformly contradistinguished from written wills, signed 
and executed by the testator-The term nuncupative imports 
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merely verbal or oral declarations-And although such dec­
larations should at the time be reduced to writing, and read 
over to the testator, and fully approved by him, yet if he 
should not sign it himself or by some other under his direc­
tion it would be a nuncupative will only, and not a will in 
writing-
This distinction between a will in writing, and a nuncupa­
tive will is expressly recognized in the Stat. 29 Ch. II. Chap. 
3 ·  commonly called the Stat. frauds, and also in our own 
Statute before referred to-By the 2 9  Ch. II. it is enacted 
that no written will shall be revoked or altered by a subse­
quent nuncupative will except the same be, in the life time of 
the testator, reduced to writing, and read over to him and 
approved. By the 6th Section of our own Stat. it is enacted, 
"that no will in writing concerning any goods, chattels or 
personal estate, shall be repealed, nor shall any clause or 
bequest therein be altered or changed by any words or will, 
by word of mouth only, except the same be committed to 
writing, and read to the testator and allowed by him." &c-
This distinction has been uniformly made or recognized­
It is quite clear that this is not strictly a written will within 
the express terms of the Statute. 
2. But, although not strictly within the express words of the 
Stat. it is further contended that it comes within the scope 
of the mischief intended to be remedied by the Stat., and that 
the same reasons and principles apply to it, and that therefore 
it should be held to be within the equity of the Stat.-
In the construction of Statutes the first object is to ascer­
tain the intention and meaning of the Legislature. When 
from the terms used by the Legislature the intention is plain­
ly expressed, there is no room for construction. But when 
the intention is not manifest, every part of the Stat : other . 
Statutes upon the same subject-the general scope and object 
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of the Act ; the preamble & the title may be resorted to for 
the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature­
Is the Statute in question, therefore, as to the intent of 
the Legislature, plain and obvious, or doubtful, and still 
to be ascertained by judicial construction? 






Sections of the Act declare who may devise 
lands-and direct that the will shall be in writing and signed 
by the devisor and be attested or subscribed in his presence 
by 3 or more witnesses--or else shall be utterly void, and 




th & 5th Sections relate to nuncupative wills. The 
3d Section declares that no nuncupative will shall be good, 
when the estate thereby bequeathed, shall exceed the value 
of $ r so, that is not proved by the oath of 3 witnesses at least, 
that were present at the making thereof, nor unless it be 
proved that the testator at the time of pronouncing the same 
did bid the persons present, or some of them, to bear witness 
&c &c. 
The 4th & 5 Sections regulate the time and manner of 
proving and allowing such nuncupative wills- . 
By these provisions the right to dispose of personal 
property by a nuncupative will is most expressly recognized, 
the mind of the Legislature was directly employed in pro­
viding against the evils which might attend such a testa­
mentary disposition, either from accident or fraud-and all 
these regulations respecting the circumstances under which 
such a will may be made, how it may be made, the time and 
manner of the proof and the probate and allowance, are 
essentially different from those which are provided for a 
devise of real estate-
Having made these separate and distinctive regulations 
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upon these different subjects, the Legislature further pro­
vided in the 9th Sect. that a will in writing purporting a dis­
position of both real and personal estate, that should not be 
attested and subscribed as directed by that act for devising of 
lands, tenements and hereditaments, should not be approved 
and allowed as a testament of personal estate only. The will 
in question certainly purports to dispose of real, as well as 
personal estate-But in what part of the Stat. can it be dis­
covered that the Legislature intend to subject an unwritten 
will to the operation of the 9th Section? 
There is nothing in the terms employed by the Legisla­
ture indicating such intention-
But it is contended in general terms by the Counsel for 
the appellants that the mischief is the same in permitting an 
unwritten will purporting a disposition of real and personal 
estate, to stand as to the personal only, as in case of a written 
will, and as the Legislature intended to prevent the mischief 
in the case of a written will ; the court will extend the remedy 
beyond the strict letter of the Stat. so as to reach and correct 
the same evil which will be occasioned by the allowance of a 
nuncupative will-
Whether the evil is the same in each case it may not be 
necessary now to determine, but it is manifest that the Legis­
lature did not intend to put them on the same footing or 
subject them to the same rules and the reasons for this dis­
tinction are obvious. 
Greater formality has always been required in the disposi­
tion of real property than of personal. 
In the case of written will the testator may and most 
generally perhaps does make it in health, upon mature de­
liberation and by the assistance of Counsel-whereas in the 
case of a nuncupative will-it must be made in sickness and 
frequently without time for advice or the formal execution of 
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written instruments-It is quite natural therefore that the 
Legislature should intentionally make a difference as to the 
regulations and rules respecting a nuncupative will which 
must be made in extremis, and those respecting a formal 
instrument intended to operate as a devise of real estate-
It seems to me therefore as well from the apparent in­
tention of the Legislature as ascertained from the terms and 
manifest object of the Statute, as also from the obvious rea­
sons arising from the subject matter respecting which the 
statutory regulations are made, that by extending the pro­
visions of the 9th Sect. to an unwritten will, we should be 
directly contravening the express will of the Legislature. 
But it is further contended by the Counsel for the 
appellants, that the Stat. in question was adopted from 
Masst"-that it has reed a construction in that state, that prin­
ciples have there been established which if applied to this case 
would fully support their objection to this will-And that 
such adjudications should be adopted here as good authority, 
upon the principle that when a statute is adopted from 
another state, the construction of the Stat. which had obtained 
in such state-is also adopted-
The rule contended for is a sound and salutary rule, so 
far as it relates to open and well ascertained adjudications-
The case of Brown vs. Thorndike I 5 Pick 3 8 8 has been re­
lied upon as sustaining fully the position taken by the Counsel 
for the appellants, that the will in question should be held 
to [be]  within the spirit and equity of the 9th Sect. of the 
Stat.-
Brown vs. Thorndike I 5 Pick 3 8 8-C. Thorndike made 
his will on the 28  Feby I 825, duly excuted and attested to 
pass real estate, and purporting on the face of it to dispose of 
both real & personal estate-In June, I 829 he wrote and 
signed upon the will the following declaration. 
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"It is my intention at some future time to alter the tenor 
"of the above will, or rather to make another will ; therefore 
"be it known that if I should die before another will is made, 
"I desire that the foregoing be considered as revoked, and of 
"no effect"-
There was no subscribing wit to this memorandum. 
The testator afterwards died without having made any other 
will. 
It was contended by the counsel for the Appellant in 
support of the will that a revocation of a will although not 
expressly named in the 9th Sect. of a Statute of that State, 
(which Section is precisely like our own) yet that revocations 
are within the mischief-the same reason and principle apply­
ing to them, and therefore that they ought to be held to be 
within the equity of the Stat. 
But before this question was decided the Counsel for the 
Respondants contended that at the time of the revocation the 
testator had no real property upon which the will could 
operate, and offered to show this fact by evidence,-This evid. 
was admitted by the Court by which it appeared that all the 
real estate held by the testator at the time of making his will, 
had been aliened before the revocation. And the Court then 
say that, as the testator at the time of the revocation, had 
only personal property upon which the will could operate, the 
will should be regarded as a will of personal property only, 
and might be revoked without any attestation of subscribing 
.witnesses-They also say that the testator is to be presumed 
to h.ave a knowledge of the situation of his own property, and 
being in fact only possessed of personal property, and the 
effect of a revocation executed in the manner that one was, 
must be presumed to be known to the testator,-and that to 
give effect as a revocation of a will of personal property only, 
would advance, and not defeat the general intent and purpose 
of the testator-
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-The Court then remark in relation to the equitable con­
struction of the statute as claimed by the Appellants, that 
"to apply the provisions of the statute by any supposed equity 
"of construction, to such a case, would, we think, be going 
"contrary to the reason and purpGse of the Statute, and would 
"be not only defeating the intent of the testator, but the in­
"tent of the Legislature."-How any principle established in 
this case can be properly be urged as tending to bring the 
will under consideration within the equity of the Stat. it is 
difficult to preceive, because in that case the revocation was 
held not to be within the words or spirit of the statute. 
There is another case cited from Masst• by the Counsel 
for the Respondants, the case of Deane vs. Littlefield, I Pick. 
R. 239· 
In that case a minor made a will duly signed by him and 
attested and subscribed as required to a devise of real estate, 
and purporting a disposition of both real and personal estate. 
It was contended in opposition to the will, that it came 
equitably within the 9th Section of the Stat.-
But the Court say, "At common law 'a will which was 
good to dispose of personal estate, but not for real, might be • 0 set up for the former, though not for the latter ; and the 9 
Section of the Stat. was intended to repeal the Common Law; 
it must therefore be limited in its operation to the case in­
tended by the Legislature ; and it is very clear that the pro­
vision had respect only to such wills as should be insufficient 
to dispose of real estate only because they were not attested 
and subscribed in the manner required by the Stat. 
- In that case the will was duly attested and subscribed to 
pass real estate, which the court decide took it out of the 
9th Sect. of the Statute-and declare that it neither came 
within the words nor spirit of the Stat. 
That case is quite similar to the one before us, and de­
pending upon the same principles-
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In that case a will of a minor purporting to dispose of 
real and personal estate, was not provided for by the Legis­
lature-and was considered as standing as at the Com. Law­
In this a nuncupative will purporting to dispose of real & 
personal estate does not come within the provision of the 9th 
Section, because a written will only is mentioned, and that 
made inoperative by the Stat. only because not attested and 
subscribed as required to devise real estate. The objection to 
the will in either case is not on the ground that it was not 
thus attested and subscribed, but on an intirely different 
ground-in the case of Deane vs. Littlefield on the ground 
that the testator was not 2 r years of age, and in the present 
case because it is a nuncupative will, and cannot therefore 
operate as a devise of real estate. 
In the case of Deane & Littlefield the Court laid some 
stress on the circumstance that as the testator had by his will 
given the whole of his estate to his mother, who was his heir 
at Law, an allowance of the will as to the personal estate 
could not defeat the intention of the testator. And in the 
present case if the will should be disallowed, the whole in­
tention of the testator will be defeated, for then it will all 
pass to the father, to whom he has giv�n nothing by the will­
It is not necessary however for us in this case to give any 
weight to this consideration in this case. 
There is another difference between the two cases which 
shows still more clearly that this case ought not to be con­
sidered as coming within the equity of the Stat. In the case 
of the minor, the will was not considered as within the 
Statute because the ground of the objection did not relate to 
the insufficiency of the attestation and subscription, and the 
Court say they must limit the operation of the 9th Sect. to 
the case specified by the Legislature. 
In the case at bar the same rule must be applied because 
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the reason i s  the same-and in addition to this, there is 
another reason in this case equally conclusive, the fact here­
tofore alluded to, that the legislature have made specific 
regulations in the same Statute and entirely different in 
character, . respecting written and unwritten wills, and have 
limited the operation of the 9th Section expressly to written 
wills. 
On this ground therefore the present case is more clearly 
left to stand as at Com. Law, than the case in 1 Pick.-· 
But is was further insisted by the Counsel for the appel­
lants that at Com. Law a will purporting to dispose of real 
and personal estate, and not executed so as to operate upon 
the real estate, could not be allowed to stand as to the per­
sonal. 
This position, however, cannot be maintained. The rule 
that the will may be set up as to the personal estate, has been 
to long established to [and] too generally recognized, I think, 
to [be] now disturbed-
With these views I am of the opinion that this will be 
approved and allowed as to the personal estate only of which 
to testator died possessed-
EDIToR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. I I 2, First Circuit-Law. The 
case was transferred to the Supreme Court from Wayne Circuit 
.Court, Michigan Territory. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, 
contains the following entries : p. I I  (Jan. I O, I 83 7 )  argued and 
submitted ; p. 42 (March I ,  I 838)  moved by appellants that a real 
or feigned issue be formed and sent to Wayne Circuit Court for 
trial ; p. 43 (March 2, I 83 8 )  ordered that a real or feigned issue 
be formed and tried by jury in Wayne Circuit Court ; p. 54 (Jan. 8 ,  
I 839) moved that decree of  probate court be affirmed ; p .  s 8  (Jan. 
I o, I 8 39) argument opened ;  p. I o I (March 7, I 840) will of 
Franklin Brewster allowed and established as a good and valid 
nuncupative will ; decree of probate court affirmed. Also see Calendar, 
First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case I I  2 .  
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GEORGE HILL versus DAVID PADDOCK and 
GIDEON 0. WHITTEMORE 
January 23, I 841 . 
1 .  In the absence of evidence, a court cannot presume that a 
memorandum at the foot of a promissory note ("At I 2 
per cent int D. P.") was made when the note was made or 
that the letters "D. P." meant David Paddock, one of the 
makers of the note. 
2. Where it does not appear that a memorandum at the foot 
of a note is a substantial part of the note, proof of the note 
and memorandum is not a material variance from a plead­
ing which describes the note without mentioning the 
memorandum. 
Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit. Question reserved by the 
Circuit Court, Oakland County; certified to the Supreme 
Court. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Certified by Supreme 
Court that objection to note as evidence on the ground of 
variance was properly overruled. 
John P. Richardson, attorney for plaintiff. 
William Draper, attorney for defendants. 
[ INDORSEMENT] 
Sup. Court. Pontiac 
]anY I 84I 
Hill � 
vs. 
Paddock et al 
-
Memo of opinion 
Same term-
HILL 'tl. PADDOCK 
(OPINION) 
� On a question of law reserved & 
--------- certified to this Court by the 
Pres. Judge of the Circuit for the 
County of Oakland. 
George Hill 
vs. 
David Paddock & 
Gid. 0. Whittemore 
The action below was assumpsit on a promissory note, 
drawn in the following manner 
"One year from date for value reed we 
j ointly and severally [promise] to pay George 
Hill or bearer four hundred dollars & interest. 
Pontiac FebY I I ,  I 837 
Signed D. Paddock 
G. 0. Whittemore 
At I 2 per cent int 
D.P." 
The Plff declared upon the note without noticing the 
memo at the foot of the note. 
On the Trial the PHI proved the execution of the note 
by the De£ts, and offered the same in evid. in support of his 
said action. To this the Defts Ate objected on the ground 
of variance between the note offered in evid. and that 
described & set forth in Pl:ffs declaration, in this, that the 
memo at the bottom of the note offered in evid. formed a part 
of the note, and that it was therefore materially variant from 
that described in the declaration. 
This objection was overruled by the Circuit Court, and 
the note was given in evid. A verdict found thereon for the 
Pl:ff. 
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The Defts moved the Circuit Court for a new trial, and 
as a reason in support of their motion insisted that the 
Circuit Court erred in permitting the note to go to the jury. 
And the question now is whether there was a material vari­
ance. 
On the part of the Defts it [was] urged that there was 
a variance, because the memo formed a part of the note, and 
should therefore have been declared on-and that having 
omitted to declare on the note according to the terms of the 
note itself, there is a misdescription of the note in the declara­
tion. 
On the part of the PHI it is insisted that the memo upon 
the note is unmeaning or insensible in the absence of any evid. 
explanatory of its meaning. that neither the Circuit Court 
nor this Court can undertake to affix a meaning to the memo 
for the purpose of affecting the plain and manifest terms of 
the note-
I .  Can the Court in the absence of all evid. intend or 
presume that the letters D. P. mean David Paddock 
one of the makers of the note? or 
2. that the memo was made at the time of the execution 
of the note by the Defts-? 
This Court certainly cannot, in the absence of proof, 
affix any meaning to the letters D. P. nor can th'ey say that 
the memo was made at the time of making the note, or was a 
part of the contract. We cannot therefore regard it as a 
substantive part of the note. 
What affect might be given to this memo upon the assesst 
of dam•, whether the Plff producing the note with this memo 
upon it would not be bound by it-and thereby bring himself 
within the penal stat., giving a forfeiture where usury has 
been reserved it is not necessary now to determine-
We are of the opinion that the objection was properly 
overruled--certified accordingly-
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EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. I 9, Fourth Circuit. The 
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 6 {Jan. 
2 1 ,  1 84 1 )  argued and submitted ; p. 1 0  {Jan. 23, 1 84 1 )  certified 
that objection to note was properly overruled. Also see Calendar, 
Fourth Circuit, Case No. 19 .  
CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT versus SAMUEL GANTT 
January 23, 1 84r .  
1 .  In an action for libel (that plaintiff and three others had 
"robbed" a ballot box by taking out ballots for Crary and 
putting in ballots for Wells, leaving only I 57 for Crary), 
evidence that zoo persons had voted for Crary was in­
admissible in mitigation of damages in the absence of evi­
dence connecting the plaintiff with the "robbery." 
2. The fact that plaintiff was clerk at the polls and had law­
ful custody of the ballots at the time of the alleged "rob­
bery" does not connect the plaintiff with the "robbery." 
Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit. Question reserved by the 
Circuit Court, Oakland County; certified to the Supreme 
Court. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Certified by Supreme 
Court that the proposed evidence was properly rejected. 
G. W. Wisner, attorney for plaintiff. 
A. H. Hanscome, attorney for defendant. 
[INDORSEMENT] 
Sup. Court 4th Circuit 
Jany 1 841 . 
Pontiac-
Rosevelt 
vs. l Qu. reserved 
Gantt 
--------------------
� Oakland Circuit. 
Memo of Opinion 
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[ OPINION] 
Sup. Court 4th Circuit Jany T. 1 841 .  
Cornelius Rosevelt l 
vs. 
Sam 1 N. Gantt 
-
This case comes before this court on a question reserved 
and certifi.ed by Hon. C. W. Whipple the Presiding Judge of 
the. Oakland Circuit Court. 
The Plff sued the Deft below in an action on the case for 
a libel. 
The publication charged the Plff and 3 others with having 
robbed the ballot box, and taking· therefrom ballots for Isaac 
E. Crary, and putting in other ballots for Hez. Wells, at the 
Special election for Member of Congress, in the Town of 
Pontiac. 
The publication further stated that Plff was clerk at the 
Polls and kept the ballot box on the night after the first days 
ballotting, and charged that the robbery was committed at 
that time. It further stated that most of the principal persons 
in Pontiac believed that Plff and the others had committed 
the robbery. The Publication was signed by Benj . Irish-The 
Deft was charged with having put the papers in circulation-
The Deft pleaded only the general issue. 
After the Plff had rested his case, Deft called a Mr 
Henderson to prove that 200 persons had made affidt• before 
a Justice that they voted for Crary, (then having only 157  
ballots found for him on the canvass) and that this fact was 
known to the Deft before his publication of the libel-for 
the purpose of mitigating the damages-To this evid. the 
Plffs counsel objected, as inadmissable-The court below 
rejected the evid. and the only question made here is whether 
that rejection was proper. 
RoosEVELT v. GANTT 
We are of the opinion that the evidence was properly re­
jected-The facts offered to be proved by the witness furnish 
no excuse or palliation to the Deft, for having charged the 
Plff with the robbery-The proposed evid. does not connect 
the Plff with the robbery, and if the Deft will from such 
facts select out the Plff as the person who committed the al­
leged offence, he is certainly without excuse, so far as his 
knowledge of these facts is concerned. It is stated in the 
publication that the Plff had charge of the ballot box as 
clerk, the night on which it was alleged that it had been 
robbed, and what reason has the Deft to charge Plff with 
being the robber, merely because 200 men swear that they 
voted for Crary. 
The Plff lawfully had a lawful custody of the ballot box, 
during the time, and the proposed evid. lays no foundation for 
a charge upon him. 
· 
The utmost latitude which has been allowed under the 
most liberal rule as to mitigation in slander or libel, never has 
been carried to the extent here contended for. The report 
current or information of the Deft respecting the guilt of the 
party slandered, has been allowed in mitigation, because there 
is a reasonable ground upon which the Deft may urge his 
excuse by way of rebutting the presumption of malice, and it 
has been properly submitted to the jury in such cases, to say 
how far the Deft in making the charge has acted bona fide 
upon such report or information-
But in this case the information of the Deft that a greater 
number of persons had sworn that they had voted for Crary, 
than there were ballots found for that candidate, has no bear­
ing whatever upon the fact that the Plff committed the 
robbery-nor can 1 perceive how the evid. if it had been reed 
could have warranted the jury in presuming an absence of 
malice. 
The charge was not that somebody had robbed the ballot 
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box-the evid. offered might have been a reasonable ground 
to suppose that the box had been robbed-but it does not 
warrant the Deft in fixing it upon the Plff. 
Upon such information, if the Deft will of his own accord 
charge the act of [to]  the Plff he must justify or abide the 
result-·-
It is the opinion of this Court that the evid. was properly 
rejected-and it is ordered that this opinion be certified [to] 
the Circuit Court. 
The above was the substance of the opinion-
On looking over the case after argument Judge Whip­
ple stated that some material facts had been omitted in 
making up the case, which he thought might have a material 
bearing upon the question submitted-
After I had given the opinion of the Court he assented 
[to ] it as th"e case was made-
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 1 5 ,  Fourth Circuit. The 
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 5 (Jan. 
20, 1 84 1 )  argued and submitted ; p. 10  (Jan. 23, 1 84 1 )  certified 
that proposed evidence was properly rejected. Also see Calendar, 
Fourth Circuit, case No. 15 .  
D. W. OWEN and I.  OWEN versus the PRESIDENT, 
DIRECTORS and COMPANY of the FARMERS' BANK 
of SANDSTONE 
January [ ?  ] ,  1 841 .  
Supreme Court, Second Circuit. Error to  the Circuit 
Court, Lenawee County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judgment 
reversed. 
A. D. Fraser, attorney for plaintiffs in error. 
P. R. Adams, attorney for defendants in error. 
OWEN v. BANK 
EDITOR's NoTE :  The opinion in this case appears in a footnote 
· in 2 Douglass (Mich.) ,  I 34 ( I  849) .  It deals with the necessity of 
proving corporate existence. Several papers pertaining to this case 
will be found in file No. 57, Second Circuit. The original MS. is 
not in the file, 
MONIQUE GODFREY versus AMBROSE BEACH 
March 4, 1 84r .  
The clearing of wild land not being waste, it is proper to 
endow a widow in wild land. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Questions reserved by Cir­
cuit Court, Monroe County; certified to Supreme Court. 
Opinion by Whipple, J. Certified by Supreme Court that 
Circuit Court correctly overruled objections to certain evi­
dence, etc., and properly instructed the jury on the case. 
McClelland & Christiancy, attornies for plaintiff. 
Wing, Noble, Felch, Romeyn, attornies for defendant. 
EDITOR's NoTE :  In Campbell, Appellant, 2 Douglass (Mich.) 
I 4 I  (at p. I 44 ) ,  Justice Ransom quoted from an opinion said to 
have been delivered in I 84 I  by Whipple, J., in Godfroy v. Brooks. 
The case referred to was, no doubt, Godfrey v. Beach, which was 
an action of ejectment for dower. The MS. opinion has not been 
found. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following 
entries : p. I 05 (Jan. 7, I 84 I )  argued ;  p. I I 9 (March 4, 1 84 1 )  
certified that Circuit Court correctly overruled objections made by 
defendant to the introduction of a certain deposition, evidence, etc., 
and properly instructed the jury on the case. Also see Calendar, First 
Circuit, Vol. I, case I 88. 
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A. B. CALHOUN 'Versus DAVID CABLE, 
A. H. STOWELL, and CALEB CROSS. 
March 4, 1 841 . 
I .  A bill in equity which alleges that the plaintiff assigned a 
land contract to one of the defendants to secure him and 
another defendant against liability as indorsers on certain 
notes is not demurrable on the ground that it appears the 
assignment was made in fraud of creditors, although the 
bill also speaks of securing a retreat for the plaintiff and his 
family, refers to a nominal consideration, and alleges that 
the assignee was to hold the contract subject to the plain­
tiff's directions. 
2. A bill in equity which directly charges that a person to 
whom a land contract was assigned for a particular purpose 
'Violated his trust by disposing of the contract in a manner 
not warranted by the terms of the assignment alleges 
enough to show an equity between the plaintiff and the 
assignee. 
3·  A bill in equity which alleges that the maker of a land 
contract procured from a trustee, to whom the contract had 
been assigned for particular purpose, a wrongful assign­
ment so as to destroy the plaintiff's interest in the land, 
and then con'Veyed the land to a third person, alleges 
enough to show an equity between the plaintiff and the 
maker of the contract. 
4· A bill in equity which alleges that the purchaser of certain 
land knew that it had been sold to the plaintiff under a 
land contract states an equitable claim against said pur­
chaser. 
S· A ,bill in equity which claims a general right in which all 
the defendants are interested is not multifarious although 
each defendant has a separate and distinct interest. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. In chancery. Demurrer to 




Chipman, for the demurrer. 
H. N. Walker, contra. 
CALHOUN v. CABLE 
(INDORSEMENT] 
Sup. Court I Circuit. 
Calhoun � 
vs. 







Sup. Court I Circuit. 
A. B. Calhoun � 
vs. 
David Cable et al 
-
In Chancery. 
The Bill sets forth 
I .  That on the 26 March '33 Cable sold to PHI a certain lot 
of Land of 40 acres, and gave him an agrt in writing­
. The consideration $250., $ 100 to be paid down, and the 
hal" in 90 days-Cable to give a deed when the whole 
am t was paid, or as soon thereafter as PHI should direct-
2. That PHI paid the whole amount of the purchase money 
according to the agrt-but did not take a deed, as he had 
full confidence in Cable being his brother in law-
3·  That PHI took poss. of the land, and with the knowledge 
and consent of Cable, and expended 7 or $8oo thereon 
in building, and improving the land-
4· That PHI and Peter N. Girardin in the Spring of '34 be­
ing in partnership-procured Cable and A. H. Stowell 
to indorse for them in their Co business 2 notes for 
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$309.49 each pay• at the Bank of Michigan, dated the 1 6  
Ap. '34, one pay" in 6 and the other in 8 months-
5· That in the fall of '34 some of the Creditors of Plff and · 
Gir�rdin becoming alarmed, they made an assign t of of 
their joint debts, effects and stock, to the Stowell and 
Garry Spencer, in trust to secure the said Stowell and 
Spencer in the first instance, and also the said Cable and 
others for their liabilities as indorsers-, and others to 
whom they were indebted-dated 3 Nov '34 
6. That to secure a retreat for himself and family, and to 
prevent a sacrifice of his individual property, for the 
payt of the Copartnership debts, in case of attempts by 
said indorsers and creditors to enforce payt• at an earlier 
period than would have been practicable to raise funds 
out of the joint effects assigned-The Plff upon the 
suggestion of Stowell, was induced, for a mere nominal 
consideration, to assign all his right and interest in the 
said written agrt of Cable to convey the said land to said 
Stowell-That Stowell took the said assign t in strict 
trust and confidence for the sole benefit of Plff.-and 
solemnly promised that he would use the instrument 
assigned in such manner as Plff should direct, and parti­
cularly that it should be so used that in case the debts and 
effects of Plff and Girardin should be insuffi�ient to pay 
the said notes indorsed by Cable and Stowell, the said 
Cable and Stowell should be fully indemnified out of the 
private property of Plff-That it was agreed between 
Plff and Stowell, and it was the only object Plff had in 
view in making the assign t of the instrument to Stowell, 
to get an extension of time for the payt of said Cable and 
Stowell, for any advances they might be under the neces­
sity of making upon ' their liabilities as such indorsers­
and the said Stowell agreed to act as trustee that object in 
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virtue of the said assign t of said agrt to him-All of 
which matters the Plff informed the said Cable-and put 
him upon his guard, previous to the assign t of the said 
contract by s<�;id Stowell to said Cable as hereinafter 
mentioned-
7· That the said note indorsed by .Cable and Stowell, paye 
in 6 months was taken up after it became ·due, and by 
some arrangement between them, one half of the note 
was understood to have been paid in some way by Cable, 
and the other half by Stowell, as assignee of Plff and 
Girardin-And that Plff has reason to believe, altho he 
has not reed a strict a/ c of the same, that the funds be­
longing to said trust in the hands of Stowell, are amply 
sufficient for the pai of the said note, and said Cable 
will be fully indemnified and paid for his advances on 
a/c of said note out of said funds. 
-That Stowell has actually credited himself and 
said Spencer with the payt of said note, as Trustees of Plff 
and Girardin. 
8 .  That in Feby '35 Plff had a conversation with Cable in 
which C. intimated to Plff that Stowell was about to 
apply the interest in the contract assigned to him by Plff, 
to his own private use, and that he intended to get the 
land for nothing-And the said Cable told Plff, that as 
his contract for the sale of the land was made with Plff­
he was not bound to make a deed to Stowell, and ex­
pressly agreed to make a deed to Plff and take back a 
mortgage to secure him for payt• on said notes as indorser 
-and agreed to give Plff one year in which to pay the 
mortgage-That in pursuance of this agrt Cable and Plff 
went to a Lawyer, to whom C. gave directions to pre­
pare the deed and mortgage, which deed and mortgage 
were duly prepared and dated in the 23 Febry '35· That 
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the mortgage was for $4 70, which was to indemnify the 
said Cable as well for the full am t paid by him on the 
first note, as for the whole am t of the liability of the said 
Cable & Stowell on the Second note, then outstanding, 
and which Cable agreed to take up in consideration of the 
said mortgage-
9· That PHI executed said mortgage and delivered the 
same together with the deed so prepared to Caleb F. 
Davis, to be taken to Cable-
That Davis delivered the same to Cable, who with 
his wife executed the said deed and delivered it to said 
Davis 
IO. That PHI has always been, and still is ready under the di­
rection of this Court, to pay and satisfy the sum so 
secured by the said mortgage to Cable-
! I .  That soon after Cable executed the said deed and while 
it was in the poss. of Davis, the said Cable, without the 
knowledge or assent, of PHI, entered into negotiation 
with one Caleb Cross for the sale of said Land to Cross 
-That Cross being well informed of the PHis rights to 
the land, and that he was in poss. of the same, refused to 
purchase, unless Cable would take up the agrt of Cable 
to PHI 
1 2. That thereupon Cable applied to Stowell to give up to 
him said agrt-and that Stowell did deliver up the agrt 
to Stowell [Cable] ,  and that in consideration thereof, it 
was agreed between them, that Cable would assume the 
payt of one or both of said notes, that Cable should take 
up one or both of said notes, and deliver the same to 
Stowell after Cable's name should be erased therefrom 
-(Setting forth written agrt of Stowell to this effect, 
-That Stowell assigned the said agrt to Cable without 
the knowledge or assent of PHI-) 
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13 .  That the notes have not been given up to Plff, or can­
celled, but are still outstanding against him. 
r 4· That Stowell has treated the said notes as his private 
property-And has turned out, and actually passed away, 
one or both of said notes in payt of his private debts­
and that PHI is still liable on said notes-
I5. That Cable clandestinely obtained from Davis, and with­
out his knowledge or assent, the said deed given by 
Cable to PHI, and exhibited the same to said Cross who 
had a full knowledge of all the circumstances,-That 
Cross purchased the said land of Cable who executed to 
him a deed therefor dated the r 2  June '35-but which 
was not delivered until Sept. '35-
That the consideration paid by Cross to Cable on 
such purchase was $6oo--That that sum was greatly be­
low the value of said land. 
-That Cross took poss. of the said land and still re­
tains the same-
r 6. The Bill concludes with prayer for relief-
-r .  That the deed from Cable to Cross be cancelled 
and given up to Pl:fi.-
2. That Cable be compelled to perform his agrt with 
Plff upon such conditions as the Court shall deem 
proper &c. 
3d That the Defts be decreed severally to make and 
to execute all necessary receipts and releases and assur­
ances-and 4th to account to PHI and pay & satisfy him 
for any monies which shall be found due PHI from the 
Defts or either of them-
And for such other & further relief &c &c. 
To this bill all the Defts have demurred generally­
! .  To the equity of the Bill, & 
2. Multifariousness-
76 MICHIGAN UNREPORTED OPINIONS 
I. As to the Equity 
-The Defts in support of their demurrer contend. 
I .  That the assign 1 of the contract for the land, to 
Stowell-was made to secure the property from the 
reach of PHis Creditors-
( a )-Bill says to secure a retreat [for] from 
himself and family-
(b) A mere nominal consideration-
I Story, Eq. 364 
7 Johns. R. I 63. 
I 6  id. 
I 2  Ves. I03 .  
4 Mass. 354 
Roberts fraud. Con. 593, 4· 
Yelverton I97 
4 Cow. 207. 2 I6. 
8 id. 406. 
I I Wheat. 2 1 3  
I Cowan. I 7I .  
That being a voluntary con­
veyance, it is good between the 
parties-Altho void as to 
creditors-
All showing that whether 
voluntary or fraudulent as 
against Creditors, it is none­
theless good as between the 
parties 
-PHI should have set out the consideration, that the Court 
might see what it was &c.-not having done so the Court will 
presume that the consideration was sufficient-
2 Kents Com. 3 65. Valuable consideration-what­
-Benefit to the promissor, or trouble or prejudice to 
the promissee-
-The consideration as stated in Bill is vague & un­
certain. 
(c)-But the Bill states that the contract was as­
signed to Stowell as collatteral security to 
pay certain notes indorsed by Cable & Stowell 
in the event that the funds arising from the 
stock and effects assigned for that purpose 
by Plff and Girardin, should not be sufficient 
-This was to protect the indorsers-
4 Kents Com. 
302 
I Equity 
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Why does he then complain. 
-If the assign t of the contract was made to 
Stowell in trust for this purpose-Stowell 
had a right to convey, whenever the con­
tingency required it-It was optional with 
him to wait or not-
-Plff cannot take it away, or ask to have it 
taken away-and the only supervision which 
a Court of Equity would take of the 
matter, would be to see that the trust 
was carried into effect-That the col-
Cases Abridg. 93 
I I  Ves. I 2. 22 
lattery security was applied according 
to the agrt of the parties-
-The Bill does not ask to have the property 
applied to the purpose for which it was as­
signed-but, on the contrary, without ten­
dering the am t of the notes paid by Cable, 
seeks to compel Cable to convey the land to 
Plff. 
(d. ) In addition to all this, the Bill sets out, That the Lead­
ing and ONLY object of the assignment of the contract to 
Stowell, was to get an extension of the time for the Plff 
to repay Cable and Stowell what they should pay on the two 
notes-
-And Bill states that Plff informed Cable of the assign t 
to Stowell and "put him on his guard." against bargaining 
with him &c 
-Clearly intending to prevent Stowell deriving any advan­
tage from the assignt to him-as the assignt only could be 
available to Stowell by obtaining from Cable a deed of the 
land under the contract-
Bill States 
I .  That a mere nominal consideration was given by Stowell 
78  MICHIGAN UNREPORTED OPINIONS 
on the asst and that S. reed the assignt for the benefit of 
Plff-and that S. was to hold the contract, subject to Plffs 
direction-
2. That the object of the assignt was to secure Cable and 
Stowell for payt• made and to be made by them on the 2 
notes in case certain funds should not be sufficient for the 
purpose-
and 
3 ·  That the leading and only object of the assignt was to 
get further time for Plff to repay C. & S. for the amt 
paid by them on the notes-
Which of these 3 considerations here mentioned is the 
true one?-2 out of the 3 must be false. 
-Pl:ff not only intended to cheat his creditors, but also his 
confidential friend-
-The Bill next sets forth an agrt made by Cable with Plff. 
in Feby '35, several months after the assignt to Stowell, by 
which Cable agreed to make a deed to Plff--and states that 
the deed was accordingly made and put into the Hands of 
Davis, together with a mortgage back by Plff to secure Cable 
for payment of the notes-
-Now by Plffs showing what equitable interest 
in the land had Cable? 
By the Bill itself this was clearly an attempt to 
defraud Stowell of the benefit of the assignt as 
a collatteral security &c-
Stat. '33 -But the deed was never delivered to Plff­
P. 342- and as there was no memo in writing it is within 
the Stat. of frauds-
-The Relief prayed is that the deed from Cable 
to Cross may be cancelled-
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That Cable be compelled to perform his agrt 
with PHI, upon such conditions &c In other 
words his assign t to Stowell be Cancelled, and 
that the property be conveyed to PHI-
But if the Bill shows any equity to entitle PHI to Relief 
2. It is bad for multifariousness 
Storys Com. on Eq. Pleading. p. 224 §27I-definition­
id. p. 226. 
Cooper Pl. I 82 
Mitf. Pl. I 8 I 
I 8  Ves. 8o 
2 Masons R. I 8 I .-
2 Sch. & Lefr. 37 1 .  
"The improperly j oining in 
one bill distinct matters, and 
thereby confounding them, as 
for example, the uniting in 
one bill perfectly distinct mat­
ters against several clefts in 
the same bill" &c 
"So if a Bill be bought for Story Com. Eq. Pl. p. 226-
(id. 23 I )  a specific performance upon 
a sale of an estate, it would be multifariousness to include 
in such a bill a prayer for relief against third persons who 
should claim an interest in it, and who are unconnected 
with the sale which is sought to be inforced"-
-If the PHI seeks to recover upon his contract made 
with Cable in Feby '35-then the bill is bad, because 
Stowell & Cross who had nothing to do with the sale, are 
made parties-
-If he seeks to recover on the ground that Stowell 
is a trustee, and ought to account for his doings as such, 
then it is bad as Cross never had any thing to do with him 
in any manner-neither paid him money or received any 
title from him,-neither had Cable any connection with 
Stowell that would make him liable.-
-The same result would flow if Stowell violated his 
trusts, as Cable and Cross could not be made to account.-
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If he seeks to recover the land upon the first agrt by 
Cable, then it is bad for multifariousness, as Cross, who 
had nothing to do with that contr;tct, is made a party-
In support of the Bill the Counsel for the PHI. contends­
That the objections of Defts to the equity of the Bill are 
not warranted by the case made by the Bill-
-PHI does not seek to have the assign t to Stowell rescinded 
-He seeks to enforce it, according to the agrt of the parties-
He charges Stowell with a breach of trust in disposing of 
the contract assigned, before the happening of the contingency, 
upon which alone he had any right to dispose of, by the 
express terms of the assign t-alleging that the proceeds of the 
copartnership effects were amply sufficient to pay the notes 
indorsed by Cable and Stowell,-And therefore instead of 
seeking to avoid the assign t-He asks this Court to supervise 
the doings of the trustee, and that he may be compelled to 
execute the trust-
This is certainly apparent upon the whole face of the bill-
2. It is also objected by the Defts, that Plff intended by the 
assign t to Stowell to defraud, or delay his creditors, and that 
this design is expressed in the bill-
-But this objection has been already answered, on the 
ground that Plff does not seek to rescind the assign t-but 
to enforce its terms and the trust connected with it-and 
therefore it does not lie with Stowell to urge this objection, 
when he is ask[ ed] to execute the trust-
-Besides the interest assigned, is not . such to subject the 
PHI to such a charge-
! Story, Eq Com. 36r .-"To make a voluntary conveyance 
property which would be liable to be taken in Execution for 
void as to Creditors, it is indispensable that it should transfer 
the payt of debts" 
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The assign t was not absolute, but conditional coupled with 
a trust-
In making the assign t to Stowell as a collatteral indemnity, 
Plff merely preferred two creditors to others, if indeed he 
had any others-
I Story, Eq. Corn 370. 
Id. 3 64. 
1 1 Wheat. 48 or 78. 
5 Term R. 424-Lord Kenyon-
And a debtor may do 
this without fr3;ud-
1 John Ch. R. 1 19.-"Collatteral securities to creditors are 
considered as trusts, for the better protection of their debts, 
and equity will see that their intention is fulfilled." 
2 John Ch. R. 283 
I 5 John Ch. R. 57 1-Assign ts in trust with a power of 
revocation is considered fraudulent only as regards judgt 
creditors, or such as are taking measures to obtain payt of 
their debts. 
-So far therefore, is [as ]  the charge of fraud is concerned, 
it is directly against the facts stated in the bill.- The assignt 
was meritorious on the part of Plff-to secure his indorsers, 
in the event the co-partnership fund should prove insufficient 
to pay and indemnify them &c. 
-As to multifariousness-
-The Deft are properly made parties to the Bill, 
and it would have been demurrable if either had been 
omitted-
They have each participated-
! .  Stowell in disposing [of] the contract assigned 
in breach of his trust, 
2. Cable, with a full knowledge of the object of 
the assign\ in obtaining the contract assigned, 
and in executing a deed to Cross of the premises 
-also in violation of Plff rights-
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3 ·  Cross in taking the deed, having a full knowl-
edge of all the equities of the PHI-
, 
-As to the Relief prayed for-
-PHI not limited to the special relief prayed but under 
the general prayer for relief, may have such specific relief as 
his case calls for-
2 Madd. Ch. IJ8-"the practice now is to pray particular 
relief, though if the particular relief prayed by the bill cannot 
be given exactly as prayed, the Court will assist the particular 
prayer under the general prayer ; but relief inconsistent with 
the specific relief prayed, cannot be given under the general 
prayer."-
-Memo of Opinion-
! .  Ground of Demr Want of Equity in the Bill. 
1 .  That the assign t of Contract for Deed, by PHI to 
Stowell, was fraudulent, intended to delay or hinder 
creditors of Pl:ff 
-I think the allegations in the Bill do not show a case 
which will sustain this objection-
-There is a vagueness and looseness in that part of the 
bill setting for [ th] the assignment and the reasons and 
inducement prompting the Pl:ff to make the assignment-It 
speaks of securing a retreat for Pl:ff and his family-about a 
mere nominal consideration-
That Stowell was to hold it subject to Pl:ffs directions­
all which upon the first perusal seems to look as though the 
PHI was putting his property beyond the reach of creditors­
But it expressly states that it was assigned for the purpose 
of indemnifying Stowell and Cable for their liabilities as 
his indorsers on the notes, in the event that the j oint effects 
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of PHI and Girardin should not be sufficient for that pur­
pose-
-And besides the PHI does not seek to set aside the assign t-
He charges that the contract was assigned in trust to 
Stowell for a particular purpose-and that S. has violated 
that trust, by disposing of the contract in a manner and under 
circumstances not warranted by the terms of the assign t_ 
That the contingency had not happened upon which S. might 
have disposed of the contract, to wit, the insufficiency of the 
funds arising from the joint property and effects of Plff & 
Girardin to meet the liabilities of Cable & Stowell as such 
indorsers-And he avers that those funds were sufficient for 
that purpose-
Here then is a direct charge of misapplication of the 
equitable interest assigned. 
-And the Plff seeks the aid of the supervisory power of this 
court, to compel the execution of the agrt between the parties 
-and to correct a violation of the trust by Stowell-
-And that such a power is among the ordinary powers of a 
court of Equity will not be doubted-
Upon this part of the bill I think there is enough alleged 
to show an Equity between the Plff and Stowell. 
The Bill then alleges that Cable having a full knowledge 
of the object of the assign t and of the understanding and 
agrt between Plff and Stowell respecting the use and applica­
tion of the equitable interest assigned, procured the contract, 
so assigned to Stowell, to be assigned to him, for the purpose 
of destroying all evidence as to the equitable interest of Plff, 
in the lands agreed to be conveyed by said contract to the 
Plff-
Cable had thus taken up his own obligation to convey-and 
then conveyed the land to Cross. 
-Upon this alleged participation with Stowell in the breach 
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of trust by Stowell, and the getting up his contract to convey 
the land to PHI-
-And then conveying the land to Cross-there is an equity 
between PHI and Cable-
The Bill further alleges that Cross, at the time he pur­
chased the land and reed the deed from Cable, had full 
knowledge of all the equitable interest of Plff in the prem­
Ises-
This allegation, upon its face, subjects Cross to the equit­
able claim of the Plff-
I think, therefore that the first ground of Demr that there 
is no equity in the Bill, is not sustained-
And as to the 2d ground, Multifariousness-! think, that, 
for reasons already given, the Defts are all properly made 
parties, to the suit-The Bill claims a general right, that the 
legal title to the premises be delivered up to be cancelled, 
and that the same be conveyed to the Plff upon terms-And 
although the clefts have each separate and distinct interests, 
each of them is interested in the general claim-And are 
therefore properly made parties-
Demr overruled-
EorroR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was .found in file No. I 49 I  (as renumbered for 
Transactions of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan, 
Blume ed.) .  Volume I of the Journal of the Supreme Court, First 
Circuit, contains the following entry : p. I 20 (March 4, I 84 I )  de­
murrer overruled. Entries showing later proceedings in this case will 
be found on pp. I 2 I ,  I 23, I 40, I49, I 5 7,  304. For earlier proceed­
ings, see p. 4, supra. Also see Chancery Calendar, Supreme Court, 
First Circuit, Case No. I 3, p. 25 .  
RAYMOND v. WALES ss 
STEPHEN RAYMOND versus GEORGE WALES, 
MATTHEW HOWARD WEBSTER, and 
EDWARD WARNER. 
March 4, I 84 I .  
I .  Prior to the adoption of the Revised Statutes of I838, a 
summary judgment by a justice of the peace against an 
officer for failure to return an execution could be reviewed 
by the supreme court on certiorari, even though the statute 
authorizing the summary judgment expressly prohibited 
an appeal. 
2. The section of the Revised Statutes which declares that no 
proceeding before a justice of the peace shall be remo'J)ed 
to the supreme court by certiorari or otherwise, but may be 
reviewed on appeal to the circuit court (R. S. Ir838, p. 
399), is in conflict with the above express prohibition (R. 
S. I8J8, p. 397 ) . 
3 ·  As  it can hardly be supposed that the legislature intended 
to take away all modes of reviewing such a judgment, the 
circuit court may review such a judgment on an appeal in 
the nature of certiorari. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Motion for mandamus to 
Circuit Court, Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. 
J. Dissenting opinion by Whipple, J. Motion overruled. 
J. A. Van Dyke, attorney for petitioner. 
G. Bates, H. N. Walker, and Douglass, attorneys for 
respondants. 
[Paper I ]  
[ INDORSEMENT] 
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Sup. Court I"t Circuit. 
Stephen Raymond 
vs. 
Edward Warner Junr 
George Wales & 
Matthew H. Webster 
( OPINION] 
I 
In this case a motion is made by the Counsel for the PHI 
for a mandamus to be directed to the Judges of the Circuit 
Court for the County of Wayne commanding them to dismiss 
a suit entered in that court by the above named Defts. on 
appeal from the Judgt of a justice of the peace. 
The affidavit of the PHI upon which the motion is made, 
sets forth that the PHI sued Warner, as constable, and the 
other two Defts his sureties in an action of debt, and declared 
against them, & alleged that the PHI had delivered to the 
said Warner, as such constable, a certain execution issued on 
a judgt rendered by J. W. Strong Esq. a Justice, in favor 
of the PHI and against Abraham Starks-And that the 
said constable had failed to return the execution within the 
life of the same.-
That on the trial of that suit judgt was rendered in favor 
of the PHI and against the Defts for $97.50. That the Defts 
appealed from said judgt to the said Circuit Court, and caused 
the appeal to be entered in the Circuit Court at the last May 
term-That his attorney at the same term moved the Circuit 
[Court] to dismiss the appeal, and that his motion was 
denied, and that the appeal in is now pending in that Court. 
That a supersedeas to the EJf on the judgt rendered by the 
Justice, has been issued by the Presiding Judge at the 
Circuit Court. 
In support of the Mo. it is contended that the Circuit 
Court has no jurisdiction of the cause, on the ground that, 
RAYMOND v. WALES 
in such a case the Rev. Stat. expressly prohibit an appeal by 
the constable and his sureties in actions against them for such 
default of the constable-
The 25 Section of the Stat. relating to Justice's Courts, 
gives an action of debt against a constable and his sureties for 
the neglect of the constable in serving an execution, and 
authorizes the justice who shall try the case to give judgt 
for the amount of the ex" and 2 5 per cent damages thereon, 
with interest and costs ; and expressly declares that, in such 
case, "neither the constable not his sureties shall be entitled 
to any stay of ex" or an appeal, but ex" shall issue forth­
with."-
In opposition to the Motion it is urged, that by the 33d 
Sect. it is expressly declared that no order, or proceedings 
whatsoever had or made by any justice of the peace, under 
the authority of any law of this State shall be removed to the 
Supreme Court by certiorari or otherwise-, but may be 
reviewed and corrected only by appeal to th� Circuit Court 
according to the provisions of that Chapter-And that by 
the 34th Section, being a part of that Chapter it is provided 
that either may have an appeal to the Circuit Court, in all 
matters and proceedings before a Justice, upon which here­
tofore, according to the laws and usages of this State, a writ 
of certiorari might have been allowed and taken, to remove 
the same to the Supreme Court, and that upon inspection 
and ex" of such proceedings the Circuit Court shall give such 
judgt or make such order, as law and justice, and the rights 
of the parties shall require.-
There is certainly a mainfest inconsistency in these pro­
visions-one prohibiting an appeal in a given case from the 
judgt of a justice-and the other giving a party in all cases 
a right to appeal when by the laws and usages of this State, 
prior to adoption of the Revised Stat. the case might have 
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been removed by certiorari to the Sup. Court. and when 
in the given cases, where by the 25 Sect. the appeal is pro­
hibited, a certiorari to the Sup. Court did lay under those 
prior laws and usages. 
Up to the time of the taking effect of the Rev. Stat. a 
Judgt against a constable and his sureties for the neglect 
mentioned, could be removed to the Sup. Court by certiorari 
only-the appeal to the Circuit [Court] was then also ex­
pressly forbidden. And by the laws in force at the time of the 
adoption of the Rev. Stat. either party to a J udgt rendered by 
a Justice in all cases make [might] take his certiorari to the 
Sup. Court. 
By the Rev. Stat. the right to remove to the Sup. Court 
was entirely abolished in the most general terms-not confin­
ing it to judgt• rendered in the ordinary jurisdiction in civil 
cases at law, but including all orders or proceedings of a Jus­
tice whatever under the authority of the laws of the State-
And in the same Chapter it is also explicitly declared that 
in all cases when by the former laws and usages, a certiorari 
might have b�en taken to the Sup. Court, either party may 
appeal to the Circuit Court, and have the record inspected 
and decide by that Court, as upon certiorari-
The manifest intent of the legislature in this provision was 
to substitute an appeal to the Circuit Court in all cases where 
by the former laws a certiorari might be taken to the Sup. 
Court. 
It was evidently an oversight, after making this general 
provision, that the prohibition of an appeal in the 25 Sect. 
was stricken not out. 
This prohibition was in all the former Stat., but then the 
Defts could review the proceedings on certiorari-
It can hardly be supposed that the legislature intended 
to take away every mode of review or redress in cases of such 
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summary proceedings before a Justice of the peace, and 
where too he was authorized to inflict a heavy penalty upon 
the officer and his sureties-2 5 per cent & interest upon the 
am t of the ex" 
With these views of the subject, the provisions of the 
.Stat. conflicting in terms directly, I think the Defts are 
entitled to the same remedy, to which they would have been 
entitled to in the Sup. Court on certiorari previous to the 
adoption of the Rev. Stat. only modifying it however, as to 
the form, by taking this special appeal in the nature of a 
certiorari to the Circuit Court, according to the provisions 
of the Rev. Stat. 
Mo. denied-
[Paper 2 ]  
[ INDORSEMENT] 
Sup Court : r •t Cirt 
Stephen Raymond 
vs 
Edwd Warner Et al 
Opinion of C. W. W. 
Van Dyke for pff. 
Bates, Walker & Douglass 
for defendant. 
[DISSENTING OPINION] 
Ex parte Stephen Raymond &:  
This i s  a motion made by Stephen Raymond, for a 
mandamus to the Circuit Court of Wayne County, directing 
that Court to vacate and order, & dismiss an appeal : 
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The application is grounded on the following statement 
of facts, which are admitted by Counsel on both sides to be 
true. 
It appears that Raymond instituted an action of Debt 
before a Justice of the Peace against one Edward Warner & 
his sureties, under the provisions of the 2 5 Section of Chapter 
5 title 2 part 3 of the Revised [Statutes] :  Warner was a 
Constable to whom, it would seem, an execution in favor of 
Raymond was confided for the purpose of being collected : 
failing in the performance of his duty in this respect the 
action of Debt, provided for in the section above cited was 
commenced, as well against the Constable as his sureties 
George Wales & Matthew H. Webster : The Justice rendered 
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, & from that judgment 
the parties defendants took an appeal to the Circuit Court : 
upon entering the appeal, the plaintiff appellee moved 
the Circuit Court to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdic­
tion : this motion was denied, & the plaintiff now applies to this 
Court for a mandamus to the Circuit Court, directing that 
tribunal to vacate the order overruling the motion to dismiss 
the appeal, and further directing the Court to dismiss the 
cause: 
The decision of this Court upon the application, must 
depend upon the construction of the 25, 29, & 33 Sections of 
the Justice's Act : The 25  Section provides that "in case any 
sheriff or constable, to whom an execution shall be delivered, 
shall not levy the same on the goods & chattels of the person 
against whom such execution shali be granted, and on the 
return day thereof pay the debt or damages, with interest 
& costs &c levied, in the hands of the Justice who issued the 
same; the said Sheriff or Constable, and their sureties, shall 
be holden to pay the amount of such judgment, with interest 
& costs, to the person in whose favor such execution was 
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granted, to be recovered by action of debt : in which case, & in 
cases where judgment is entered on motion against him, 
neither the sheriff or constable, nor their sureties, shall be 
entitled to any stay of execution, or an appeal, but execution 
shall issue forthwith" : Section 29 provides, that "if any per­
son shall conceive himself injured by any judgment of a 
Justice of the Peace, except in cases where judgment is ren­
dered on the report of referees or arbitrators, such party, his 
agent or attorney, may appeal to the Circuit Court of the 
County" &c : Sec 33 provides that "no judgment or or proceed­
ing whatever, to be had or made by any Justice of the Peace, 
under the authority of any law of this State, shall be removed 
to the Supreme Court by any writ of Error, false judgment, 
habeas Corpus Cum Causa, certiorari or by appeal ; but 
may be reviewed only by appeal to the Circuit Court of the 
proper County, according to the provisions of this Chapter." 
Sec 34 provides� that "in all cases where either party shall 
appeal from the judgment of a Justice of the Peace pursuant 
to the provisions of this Chapter, the Circuit Court to which 
the appeal is taken, shall have authority to inspect & examine 
into the proceedings of the Justice" &c with respect to all 
matters which heretofore, according to the laws of the State, 
a writ of Certiorari might have been allowed & taken to re­
move a cause to the Supreme Court : and upon such inspec­
tion & examination the Circuit are authorized to make such 
order as law & justice & the right of the parties shall require. 
The 25th Section is clear & explicit : it expressly denies 
the right of appeal to a sheriff or constable and their sureties 
in cases where judgment is rendered against them for a failure 
on the part of the Sheriff or Constable to perform the duties 
enjoined upon them by that Section: 
The 29 Section is equally clear, & grants to any party 
who may consider himself injured by the judgment of a 
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Justice of the Peace, the right of appeal, except in certain 
cases: 
The 33rd & 34th Sections prohibit the removal of judg­
ments &c rendered by Justices of the peace to the Supreme 
Court, but provides a remedy by appeal to the Circuit Court, 
which is authorized to inspect the proceedings of the Court 
below, and generally, to exercise, both in reviewing the case 
& in giving judgment all the powers which the Supreme 
Court formerly exercised, when writs of certiorari were sued 
out for the removal of causes originating before Justices of 
the Peace : 
The 2 5  & 2 9  Sections apparently conflict the one with 
the other, and we are called upon to give such a construction 
to these Sections, as will conform to the intentions of the 
Legislature, & if possible, to give such effect to each provision, 
as that the whole may stand well together : 
The obvious intent of the Legislature - in denying the 
right of appeal to ministerial officers who should fail in the 
performance of their duty, was to ensure faithfulness & 
fidelity on their part, & to provide a summary remedy for 
those who might be injured by reason of their unfaithfulness 
or infidelity The provision of law which denies the right 
of appeal, is well calculated to achieve the object the Legis­
lature had in view: The proceding is in its nature summary, 
and the remedy somewhat stern, but not too summary or 
stern for a breach of trust & a violation of duty by a public 
officer, who should, in all cases, be held to a strict account. 
How then can we reconcile the provisions of Sec 2 5 & 29. 
Simply by supposing that the legislature never intended in 
one breath and in direct & intelligable language to deny a 
right of appeal, & at the same time by a general provision, 
emb�acing all but one excepted case, affirm that right : The 
reasonable & only rational construction, evidently is, that the 
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general right of appeal was intended to be given in all cases 
by the 29 Sec, except such as are either expressly excepted 
in that Section, or in any other Section of the same Chapter. 
By this construction, each provision is made to harmonize 
with the other, & no violence is done to any rule of construc­
tion with which I am familiar. 
But it is contended that the Legislature never intended 
to deprive a party against whom a judgment may be rendered 
by a Justice of the peace, of the right of having that judgment 
reviewed either by appeal or Certiorari. As a general proposi­
tion it is true that a party ought not to be bound, conclusively, 
by the judgment of a Justice; hence the Legislature has 
provided an appropriate remedy by which such judgment 
may be reviewed: Public policy, however, as in this case, may 
suggest the propriety of denying to a public officer, a remedy, 
which in his individual capacity he might be entitled to ; ·  and 
such if [as] I am disposed to think was the motive in the 
cases like that under consideration.-
But it is by no means certain that such a judgment may 
not be removed to this Court by a writ of certiorari : the 33 
Sec directs that no order or proceeding of a justice of the 
Peace shall be removed to the Supreme Court by a writ 
of certiorari, but that the remedy �hall be by appeal to the 
Circuit Court : The J'd Sec of Chap I title I part 3 of the Re­
vised Statutes, gives to this Court a general superintendence 
over all inferior jurisdictions, to prevent & correct abuses 
therein, where no other remedy is provided by law: The 
remedy by appeal in a case like the present being expressly 
denied, it may be a question whether this Court may not, by 
a writ of certiorari, correct any "Error or abuse," that may 
occur even in proceedings against sheriffs or constables who 
may be charged with a dereliction of duty: The remedy by 
appeal, however, is clearly prohibited by law, & it is not 
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necessary to the decision of the present question, whether any 
other remedy, than that by appeal has been provided. 
I am, therefore, of opinion that the mandamus should 
issue as prayed for: 
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinions, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher and Justice Whipple, respectively, were found in file 
No. I 89, First Circuit-Law. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, 
contains the following entries : p. I07 (Jan. 8, I 84 I )  motion for 
mandamus; p. I I  6 (Jan. I 4, I 84 I )  argued and submitted : p. I I 9 
(March 4, I 84 I )  motion overruled. Also see Calendar, First Cir­
cuit-Law, Vol. I, case I 89. 
JOHN BT. BOMIER versus THOMAS CALDWELL 
March 6, 1 841 .  
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Appeal from Court of 
Chancery. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Decree modified and 
affirmed. 
J. A. Van Dyke, attorney for plaintiff. 
F. Johnson, attorney for defendant. 
EDITOR's NoTE : The opinion in this case appears in 8 Mich., 463 
( I  86o) . It deals with specific performance, variance in pleading, 
statute of frauds, past performance, etc. The original MS. is not in 
the files. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the follow­
ing entries: p. I07  (Jan. 8, I 84 I )  argued ; p. 108  (Jan. 9, I 84 I )  
argued and submitted, Whipple not sitting ; p. I 2 I  (March 6, I 84 I )  
decree modified and affirmed. Also see Chancery Calendar, First 
Circuit, Case No. I 9, p. 3 7 .  For opinion of chancellor, see Harring­
ton, Chancery Reports p. 67. 
Ex PARTE IRISH 
EX PARTE BENJAMIN IRISH 
July 1 2, r 841 .  
95 
1 .  A sheriff, being a ministerial officer, must obey the com­
mand of a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum with respect to 
the county in which the prisoner shall be confined. 
2. A writ of capias ad satisfaciendum issued from the circuit 
court of Genesee county directing the sheriff of Oakland 
county to imprison a judgment debtor in Genesee county 
is void insofar as it fixes the place of imprisonment. 
Before Whipple, one of the justices of the Supreme 
Court, Fourth Circuit. Habeas corpus to Sheriff, Oakland 
County. Opinion by Whipple, speaking for himself as justice, 
not for Court. Prisoner released. 
G. W. Wisner, attorney in person. 
[INDORSEMENT] 
Ex parte 
Benj . Irish : 
Filed July 1 2th r 84r 
A. Treadway Clerk 
Sup Court 4th Circuit 
[oPINION] 
Ex parte Habeas Corpus ad Sub[mJ 
Benjamin Irish 
The party (Irish) was brought before me by virtue of a 
writ of Habeas Corpus : The writ was directed to the Sheriff 
of Oakland Courtty, who returned, in obedience to the writ 
that he held Irish in custody by virtue of a capias ad Satis­
faciendum issued out of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Genesee. 
It appears that judgment was rendered in Genesee 
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County, in favor of Geo W Wisner & against Irish for $50 
& costs : that the action brought by Wisner was for a libel, 
which I take it for granted authorized the suing out of a ca sa, 
on the judgment : 
The only objection to the writ is, that it directs the 
Sheriff of Oakland County to commit Irish to the jail in 
Genesee, in the event that no goods & chattels &c can be 
found to satisfy the execution : it is contended that if im­
prisoned at all, he must be imprisoned in the County in 
which he resides, & that, therefore, the writ should have di­
rected the Sheriff accordingly. 
Upon a review of the Statutory provisions on the subject, 
I am clearly of opinion that the objection to that part of the 
writ, which commands the Sheriff to commit the defendant 
to the Keeper of the jail in Genesee is well taken : It is a 
well established principle that the Sheriff must obey the 
command in the writ: by it he must be guided : If that officer, 
contrary to the command in the writ, should undertake to in­
carcerate Irish in this County, he would, I think, be liable 
in action for false imprisonment : this would result from the 
disobedience of the command in the writ, not withstanding 
the place of confinement is the one designated by law; for 
the Sheriff is a mere ministerial officer, & cannot of conse­
quence exercise a discretion which is strictly judicial: So much, 
then, of the ca sa as directs the Sheriff to deliver Irish to the 
Keeper of the jail in Genesee, is irregular, & therefore void : 
It is, therefore, ordered & adjudged, & I do accordingly 
order & adjudge that the Sheriff of Oakland County do re­
lease & discharge from his custody the said Benjamin Irish, 
provided he be held by none other than the writ of capias ad 
satisfaciendum aforesaid:  
Chas W Whipple 
Pontiac 1 2  July 1 841 .  Asso Jus Sup Court. 
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EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Jusice 
Whipple, was found in an unnumbered file of the Supreme Court, 
Fourth Circuit. Newspaper accounts of the case out of which the 
present proceedings arose will be found in Detroit Daily Free Press, 
Oct. 7 ,  1 837, and Pontiac Courier, May 1 8, 1 838. 
PEOPLE versus PETER D. LABADIE, JR. 
January 1 7, 1 842. 
1 .  Although, in an indictment for perjury, it is not necessary 
to allege that issue was joined in the action in which the 
perjury is alleged to have been committed, such an allega­
tion is descriptive and must be proved strictly. 
2 .  Proof (a) that a plaintiff, in an action on a jail-limits bond 
before a justice of the peace, filed the bond as his declara­
tion; (b) that the defend ants filed no plea; (c) that, on 
appeal to the circuit court, the transcript of the justice 
stated "The plaintiff declares on a limit bond on file'' which 
bond was attached to the transcript; (d) that defendants in 
the circuit court filed a plea of nil debit; and (e) that no 
similiter was added or other pleadings filed--is not proof 
that issue was joined in the circuit court. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Questions reserved by Cir­
cuit Court, Monroe County; certified to Supreme Court. 
Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Verdict set aside ; nolle prosequi 
entered. 
Christiancy, prosecuting attorney. 
H. T. Backus, attorney f<?r defendant. 
[Paper 1 ]  
[ INDORSEMENT] 
The People &c 
vs. 
Peter D. Labadie Junr 
On Questions Certified to Sup. Court-from 
Monroe Circuit. 
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(QUESTIONS RESERVED] 
To the Hon" the Judges of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Michigan. 
· The undersigned respectfully certifies and submits for 
the determination of the Supreme Court, certain questions of 
law which were reserved by him on the trial of Peter D. 
Labadie Jun• on an Indictment charging the said Labadie 
with Perjury in the Circuit Court for the County of Monroe 
at the last December Term thereof-, a copy of which In­
dictment is hereto annexed. 
On that trial two questions were raised and reserved by 
the undersigned. 
First Whether the averment in the Indictment, that a 
certain issue was joined in a plea of debt, between James 
Ellison Plaintiff and John D. Labadie Medard Labadie and 
Anthony B. Beaubien, as set forth in the Indictment, was 
duly proved on the trial of said Peter D. Labadie Jun•? 
and 
Second-Whether the matter testified to by the said 
Peter D. Labadie Jun• on the trial of such issue, upon which 
the Perjury was assigned as set forth in said Indictment, 
was duly proved to have been material on the trial of said 
issue? 
The Evidence on the trial of said Labadie Jun• on said 
Indictment which tended to prove the averment in the In­
dictment that an issue was joined between the parties as set 
forth in the Indictment ; was as follows, that is to say : that 
an action of debt was originally commenced before a Justice 
of the Peace in favor of James Ellison Plaintiff, and against 
John D. Labadie, Medard Labadie and Anthony B. Beau­
bien Defendants-that the Plaintiff filed with the Justice 
of the peace as his declaration in the cause, a bond for the 
Prison limits executed by the Defendants to the Plaintiff · 
PEOPLE v. LABADIE 99 
conditioned that one of the Defendants John L. Labadie 
should remain within the prison limits in the usual form­
that the Defendants did not file any plea before the Justice­
that the cause was tried before the Justice and that all the 
Defendants were present at the trial, together with Peter D. 
Labadie Junr as their attorney & Counsel-that the Justice 
gave judgment for the Plaintiffs, and thereupon the De­
fendants appealed to the Circuit Court aforesaid-and that 
such appeal was duly entered-that while the appeal was 
pending in the Circuit Court and before trial, the Defendants 
Attorney applied to the Court and obtained leave to plead 
in the cause and thereupon filed a plea of Nil debit-that 
there was no other declaration filed in the cause by the Plain­
tiff but the said bond which was sent up on the appeal by 
the Justice and examined in the Circuit Court, except the 
transcript of the Justice, which contained these words-"The 
Plaintiff declares on a limit bond on file-["] 
Upon this State of the pleadings the parties went to 
trial in the Circuit Court before a Jury and the cause was 
tried in the same manner as though a regular and formal 
declaration upon the bond had been filed setting forth a 
breach of the condition by the Departure of the said John D. 
Labadie from the prison limits, and as though the Defendants 
plea of Nil debit had been filed to such formal declaration­
and an issue had in due form been joined in the cause. 
This was all the Evidence to show that an issue had been 
joined in the cause as alleged in the Indictment. 
The second question is whether there was proper and 
sufficient evidence given on the trial of Labadie Junr on the 
Indictment, that the matters testified to by him on the trial 
of said cause on appeal in the Circuit Court, upon which the 
Perjury was assigned, were material to the issue joined in 
the cause? 
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And upon this point there was no other evidence except­
ing that above stated, and that hereinafter stated-
The matters testified to by Labadie Junr and upon 
which the Perjury was assigned related to the admissions of 
John D. Labadie on the trial of the origination [original] 
action before the Justice of the Peace as stated in the Indict­
ment and the Evidence corresponded with the Statement. 
Upon the trial of the said Peter D. Labadie Junr--on the 
said Indictment, the above mentioned questions were raised 
by his Counsel and by the counsel of the said Labadie Junr 
the undersigned reserved the same for the decission of the 
Supreme Court ; and thereafter left the cause to the Jury 
as if the Evidence in both respects was sufficient in the law,­
and the Jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
All which is respectfully submitted. 
Ann Arbor JanY r ,  1 842 : 
wm A. Fletcher. 
[Paper 2 ]  
[ INDORSEMENT) 





The People � 
vs. 
Peter D. Labadie Junr 
-
This case comes before this Court on certain questions 
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reserved and certified by the Presiding Judge of the Circuit 
Court for the County of Monroe. 
The Deft was indicted for Perjury-
The Indictment alleged that the Deft was sworn and 
testified as witness on the trial of a certain issue joined in 
a plea of debt in a certain action wherein James Allison was 
Pl:ff and John D. Labadie, Medard Labadie and Anthony 
Beaubien were Defts-and assigned the perjury upon that 
Testimony. 
On the trial of the Deft. upon this Indictment, the prose­
cutor proved that the cause between the above named parties, 
was originally commenced before a justice of the peace, in 
debt, and that the Plff in that cause filed, as his declaration 
before the Justice, a bond for the prison limits executed by 
the· Defts to the Plff, conditioned that John D. Labadie 
should remain a prisoner within the limits of the County, in 
the usual form-And the Justice made upon his docket the 
following entry-"The Plff declares on a limit bond on 
file"-I t was further proved that the Defts did not file any 
plea. That all the Defts were present before the Justice, and 
that a trial was had, and a J udgt rendered against the Defts­
And that the Defts thereupon appealed to the Circuit Court 
for the County of Monroe-It was further proved that the 
appeal was duly entered in the Circuit Court, and that no 
other declaration was filed in the cause, except that the tran­
script of the justice was filed on entering the appeal, in which 
it was stated that the Plff declared on a limit bond on file ;­
and the return and filing of the said bond-That after the 
appeal was entered and before trial, the attorney for the 
Defts moved for and obtained leave from the Circuit Court 
to file a plea-and thereupon filed for all of the Defts a plea 
of Nil debit--concluding to the country-No Similiter was 
added-and there was no other or further pleadings in the 
cause. 
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Upon this state of the pleadings the parties went to trial 
before a jury, and the cause was in fact tried in the same 
manner as if a formal declaration alleging a breach of the 
condition of such bond, by the departure of the said John D. 
Labadie from the prison limits-had been filed, and a Simil­
iter had been added to the plea nil debit This was all the 
evidence given on the trial upon the Indictment, tending to 
prove the averment in the indictment that a certain issue was 
joined in a plea of debt. And the question is whether the 
evidence supports this averment? 
In support of the prosecution, it has here been urged 
that the evid. substantially supports the allegation-on the 
ground that formal pleadings and a formal issue are not re­
quired in a suit before a Justice's Court, nor on the trial of 
such a suit on appeal to the Circuit Court. That the Stat. -has 
declared that appealed causes shall be tried on the pleadings 
below, unless the Circuit Court shall otherwise direct, and 
that it was therefore competent and proper for the Circuit 
Court to try the cause in question, upon the state of the plead­
ings above set forth-in the same manner as if there had 
been regular pleadings and a formal issue j oined to the 
country- -On the part of the Deft. it is contended, that 
whether it was or was not competent and regular for the 
Circuit Court to try the cause on appeal upon the State of 
the pleadings set forth, yet the evid. does not support the 
averment that an issue had been joined in the cause-That 
having made this averment the prosecutor is bound to prove 
it strictly-
There is a well settled dis [tine J tion between descriptive 
allegations, which must be strictly proved, and other aver­
ments which must be substantially proved-Averments de­
scriptive of records, writings, and property, must be supported 
by proof of every fact and circumstance which is necessary 
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to establish· the identity of the matters averred-In each of 
these descriptive allegations, the question, as to the sufficiency 
of the proof to support the allegation, is one of identity, and 
any substantial variance is fatal. The same rule upon this 
subject applies both in civil and criminal cases. 
2 East P. C. 3 Stark. Ev. 2 Russ on Cr. Arch. cr. Pl. &c. 
That the averment in question is descriptive can hardly 
be questioned-The subject matter of the allegation is the 
State of the pleadings, and when the Indictment alleges that 
an issue was j oined in a plea of debt in a certain specified 
cause depending in a Court of Record of common law juris­
diction, and proceeding according to the course of the com­
mon law, we must intend, that there are sufficient pleadings 
and an issue joined in due form of law. 
The pleadings are a part of the record, and when it is 
averred that an issue has been joined in a plea [of] debt, in 
a suit upon a bond for the prison limits, we must legally 
intend, that a declaration has been filed assigning a breach 
of the condition of the bond, and that such further pleadings 
have been filed as have resulted in the joining of an issue 
to the country in due form-of law. 
Nor is it any answer to say that the Circuit Court, on 
such a State of pleadings, in an appealed case had a right 
to proceed in the trial of the cause in the same manner as if 
there had been formal pleadings and a formal issue. There 
was no necessity to aver in the indictment that an issue had 
been joined in the cause-
But although not necessary to have been averred, yet, 
as it is averred, the proper and strict proof must be made and 
can in no case of descriptive averments be dispensed with­
Verdict set aside-And a nolle pros. entered--and that Deft 
be discharged from custody, unless detained on some other 
cause-
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EDITOR's NoTE : The above questions and opinion, in the hand­
writing of Chief Justice Fletcher, were found in file No. 2 I 2, First 
Circuit-Law. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the 
following entries : p. 1 28 (Jan. 5 ,  I 84 2 )  case received and filed ; 
p. I 33 (Jan. 8� I 842) Labadie brought from jail in Monroe County 
by habeas corpus; ordered committed to jail in Wayne County ; 
p. 1 34 (Jan. I O, I 842) argued;  p. I 35 (Jan. I I , I 842) argued 
and submitted ; p. 139 (Jan. 1 7, 1 842 ) verdict set aside ; nolle 
prosequi entered. Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case 
No. 2 1 2. 
PEOPLE versus LURETT C. HARGER ET AL 
January [ ? ]  1 842. 
An indictment which charges that defendants killed certain 
hogs of one Davis and did ((thereby" destroy the personal 
property of said Davis does not embrace two distinct offenses 
under Revised Statutes of r838, p. 6 3 2 viz., (I) the killing of 
another's livestock, and ( 2) the destruction of another's per­
sonal property. 
Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit. Question reserved by 
Circuit Court, Oakland County ; certified to Supreme Court. 
Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Certified by Supreme Court that 
motion in arrest of judgment should be overruled . 
• . • . • . . . . , prosecuting attorney . 
. . . Hanscomb, attorney for defendant. 
(INDORSEMENT) 
Sup. Court 4th Cir. Jan7 '42 
People l 
vs. Indict-
Harger et al 
Mo. in arrest 
of Judgt 
Memo of opinion--
PEOPLE v. HARGER IOS 
[OPINION] 
The People � 
vs. 
Harger et al 
-
This case was tried at the last term of the Circuit Court 
of Oakland Co., a verdict of guilty was found against the 
Defts-and a motion was made in arrest of judg\ and the 
questions arising on that motion were reserved and certified 
to this Court by the Presiding Judge of that Circuit. 
The Defts were indicted for wilfully and maliciously 
killing certain hogs-and on the trial were found guilty­
A motion in arrest of judgt was made, on the ground 
that each of the 2 Counts in the Indictt embraces two distinct 
o:ffences-
T he first Count of the Indict alleges that the Defts "did 
wilfully and maliciously kill 25 barrow hogs of the value 
of $I!o each, three sows of the value of $2o each, the Beasts 
of one Phineas Davis, and did thereby then and there wilfully 
and maliciously destroy the personal property of him the 
said Phineas Davis, against the Peace," &c 
The 2d Count is precisely like the first except that it 
alleges the property to be the property of N. T. Ludden and 
Alanson Shuley.-
The counsel for the Defts contend that two distinct 
offences are charged in each count-the charge of killing 
the hogs, as one1 and the charge of destroying personal prop­
erty as the other-
The statute under which this Indictt was found is in 
these words. 
Rev. Stat, 632 §3 8-"Every person who shall wilfully and 
maliciously kill, maim or disfigure any horses, cattle, or 
other beasts of another person-or shall wilfully and mali-
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ciously administer poison to such beasts, or expose any poison­
ous substance, with intent that the same should be taken or 
swallowed by them,-or shall wilfully and maliciously de­
stroy or injure the personal property of another person, in 
any manner, or by any means, not particularly described or 
mentioned in this chapter, shall be punished by imprison­
ment". &c &c 
Several qistinct offences are here created and enumer­
ated-and if any two of them are embraced in the same 
Count it would be a valid objection to the Indice-
If after alleging that Defts. killed the hogs of Davis, 
there was a distinct and independent allegation that the 
Defts. destroyed the personal property of Davis, then the 
objection is well taken-
But I think that the averment that the Defts. thereby 
then and there destroyed the personal property cannot be 
considered independent of the previous allegation that the 
Defts. killed the hogs-
The charge altogether is that the Defts. killed 25 hogs, 
the beasts of P. Davis, and did thereby destroy the personal 
property of said Davis-
The language here used necessarily precludes any sup­
position that other personal property, than the hogs, were 
intended-It is a mere conclusion of law that by killing the 
hogs, they had thereby destroyed the personal property of 
Davis-
This concluding averment that the Defts. thereby de­
stroyed the personal property, is a mere inference or con­
clusion of the prosecutor, and can in no sense affect or qualify 
the charge of killing, especially as the conclusion of law is 
strictly true-
Mo. in arrest overruled­
To be certified-
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EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher was found in file No. I 90 ,  Fourth Circuit. The 
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries: p. I 3  (Jan. 
I 9, I 842) question reserved filed ; p. I S  (Jan. 20, I 842)  argued and 
submitted. Also see Calendar, Fourth Circuit, case No. I 9 0 ·  The 
question reserved will be found in file I I 8 2  (as renumbered in I 902) .  
HENRY A. CASWELL versus SAMUEL WARD 
February r 8, 1 842. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to. two justices 
of the peace, St. Clair County. Opinion by Whipple, J. Judg­
ment reversed. 
A. & H. H. Emmons, attorneys for plaintiff. 
J. F. Joy & G. E. Porter, attorneys for defendant. 
EDITOR's NoTE : The opinion in this case appears in a footnote in 
2 Douglass (Mich.) 374 ( I 849).  It deals with procedure before 
justices of the peace in forcible entry and detainer. Volume I of the 
Journal of the Supreme Court, First Circuit, contains the following 
entries : p. I 2 7  (Jan. 5 ,  I 842) motion to quash certiorari and super­
sedeas ; p. I46 (Feb. 4, I 842)  argued ; p. I47  (Feb. 5, I 842) 
argued ; p.  I50 (Feb. 9,  I 842) argued ;  p.  I 5 I  (Feb. 1 0, 1 842) 
argued and submitted ; p.  I55 (Feb. I 8, I 842) judgment reversed. 
Also see Calendar, First Circuit, Vol. I, case No. 209. The original 
MS. opinion is not in the file. 
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WILLIAM BREWSTER versus JOHN DREW 
March 29, I 842. 
I . The fact that tm indorser of a promissory note received 
security from the maker to indemnify him against liability 
as an indorser does not make him absolutely liable without 
demand on the maker and notice to the indorser of non­
payment. 
2. In an action by an indorsee against the indorser of a 
promissory note, a declaration which alleges that the de­
fendant received from the maker certain property to in­
demnify him as indorser and that the defendant has not 
<'sustained any damage by reason of his not having re­
ceived notice of the nonpayment of said note'' is demurr­
able. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Question reserved by Cir­
cuit Court, Wayne County; certified to Supreme Court. 
Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Certified by Supreme Court that 
demurrer to counts 3 and 4 of declaration should be sus­
tained. 
G. C. Bates, attorney for' plainti:ff. 
A. D. Fraser, attorney for defendant. 
( INDORSEMENT] 
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This case was certified to this Court by the Presiding 
[Judge] of the 2d Circuit, from Wayne Cir. Court, and 
presents a question raised upon Dem• to the 3d & 4th Count [s]  
of Pl:ffs declaration-These two Counts are the same, only 
varied as to the description of two different notes-
Pl:ff as the Indorsee sued the Deft as indorser of two 
notes made by E. Morse & Co, and pay" to the order of, and 
indorsed by the Deft-
In the 3d & 4 Counts, there are no averments of demand 
of payment of the maker, or notice of non payment to the 
indorser, but it is averred that the Deft, at the time of the 
indorsement reed indemnity from the maker, and that Deft 
has not sustained any damage-
. 
That part of the Count which avers these facts, is in 
these words 
"And the said Pl:ff avers that at the time of the making of 
said note as aforesaid, towit: on the IOth day of March 1 83 8, 
at Detroit aforesaid, the said E. Morse & Co. assigned, trans­
ferred and delivered to the said John Drew a large amount 
of property to secure and indemnify him the said John Drew 
as indorser aforesaid, of great value, towit: of the value of 
$ ro,ooo, which said security, property, and indemnity, the 
said John Drew held and retained in his pos�ession as security 
aforesaid at and from the time of the making of the said 
note until the time the said note became due, towit, on the 
1 I th June 1 83 8, at Detroit aforesaid, and the said Pl:ff 
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avers that the said Deft hath not sustained any damage by 
reason of his not having reed notice of the non payment of 
said note, all of which said several premises the said Deft 
had notice."-
T o this Count the Deft demurs alleging for cause that 
these allegations do not dispense with the necessity of pre­
sentment and notice to the indorser 
The only question, therefore, which is presented by the 
pleadings in this case is whether an indorser of a promissory 
note taking an assignment of property from the maker at the 
time of indorsing as collateral security to indemnify him 
against his liability as indorser, is entitled to the usual notice 
of non payment? 
The liability of an indorser, being conditional, and not 
absolute in the first instance, the general rule is that, in 
order to charge him, there must be a demand upon the maker, 
and notice to the indorser of non payment. 
But, on the part of the Pl:ff, it is insisted that the facts 
averred in the Count in question, bring this case within a 
recognized and well established exception to the general 
rule. And to maintain this proposition, several authorities 
have been cited-
Those principally relied [upon] ,  however, are Corney 
vs. Da Costa I Esp. R. 302. 3 Kents Com. 79· Bond et 
al vs. Farnham, 5 Mass. R. I70. Mead vs. Small, 2 Green­
leaf, R. 207. Barton vs. Baker, I Serg. & R. R. 334· 
Prentiss vs. Danielson, 5 Conn. R. I 7 5. & The Merchants 
Bank of N. Y. vs. Griswold, 7 Wend. R. I 6 5. 
It will be necessary, therefore to examine these authori­
ties, with such others as relate to the question-In the case 
of Corney vs. Da Costa, the Deft was not held liable, on the 
ground of his liability as an indorser merely. Da Costa & Co. 
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compounded with their creditors, and drew notes payable to 
the Deft, and at the same time put property to the am t of 
the composition into the hands of the Deft. And it was held 
that Deft was not entitled to notice-he having no remedy 
over; and having in his hands the fund with which to pay 
the notes. 
-The Court held there that the Deft was liable at all events, 
not upon any condition-And it would be a fraud for the 
Deft to call upon the maker, who had provided and left in his 
hand property to meet the note-
In the 3 Kents Com. 79, it is laid down that "if the in­
dorser has protected himself from loss by taking collateral 
security of the maker of the note, or an assignment of his 
property, it is a waiver of his legal right to require proof 
of demand & notice." 
-And in support of this proposition, the learned commen­
tator cites Bond vs. Farnham-5 Mass R. Mead vs. 
Small 2 Greenleaf R. & Prentiss vs. Danielson 5 Conn. R. I 7 5. 
In the case of Bond et al vs. Farnham-Deft was sued as 
indorser of a note made by Barker-Before the note became 
due, Barker became insolvent, and the Deft having indorsed 
other notes for him, he obtained from Barker an assignt of 
all his property as security which was insufficient to meet the 
Defts liabilities-and it further appeared that the Deft had 
offered to pay the note to the Plffs if they would take foreign 
bank notes. 
Parsons Ch. J. in giving the opinion of the note [court] 
says that "under the circumstances of this case the Deft had 
no right to insist upon a demand upon the maker. It appears 
that he knew such a demand would be fruitless, as he had 
secured all the property the maker had. And as he secured 
it for the express purpose of meeting this and his other in-
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dorsements, he must be considered as having waived the 
condition of his liability, and as having engaged with the 
maker, on receiving all his property, to take up his notes. 
And the nature or terms of the engagement cannot be varied 
by an eventual deficiency in the property, because he received 
all that there was. This intent of the parties is further 
supported by the offer of the Deft to the Plffs to take up 
this note if they would receive foreign bank notes in payment 
-We do not mean to be understood that when an indorser 
receives security to meet particular indorsements, it is to be 
concluded that he waives a demand or notice as to any other 
indorsements." "But we are of opinion that if he will apply 
to the maker, and representing himself liable for the payt 
of any particular indorsements, receives a security to meet · 
them, he shall not afterwards insist on a fruitless demand on 
the maker, or on a useless notice to himself, to avoid payt of 
demands, which, on receiving security, he has undertaken to 
pay." 
The Ch. Jus. further adds "The case most analogous to 
this is, where the drawer of a bill had no effects in the 
drawee's hands. He cannot insist on a demand upon the 
drawee, for he could not expect an acceptance, and he suffers 
no injury for the want of it. The indorser of a note resembles 
the drawer of a bill-Although once having effects, as he 
had a demand on the maker, yet he has afterwards withdrawn 
from the maker all his property, to enable himself to meet 
his own indorsements, and had not, when the bill was payable, 
any remedy, unless perhaps the miserable one of seizing the 
body of a man worth nothing: and that remedy he has never 
lost." 
· 
It will be seen that the decision in this case, does not 
support the rule laid down in 3 Kents-The ground of this 
decision was not that the indorser had merely taken security, 
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or an assignment by way of indemnity against his conditional 
liability as indorser-But that the indorser had taken all the 
means of the maker, to enable the indorser to meet the 
liability-
The Court say the nature of the transaction is such, that 
the indorser must be considered as having engaged with 
the maker to take up the note- -That having taken all the 
means which the maker had to meet the note, the Indorser 
is to be regarded as having the fund to provide for the pay­
ment, and is therefore, himself the principal debtor-[The case of Prentiss vs. Danielson 5 Conn. R. I 7 5. is next] 
refered to. This case I have not been able to find-
Mead vs. Small, 2 Greenleaf R. 207. is also cited to support 
the doctrine in 3 Kent Com. 
That is the only case which, in terms, goes to support 
the doctrine. In that case the indorser held a mortgage from 
the maker as collateral and sufficient security for the am t 
of the note. The case was decided upon the authority of Bond 
vs. Farnham. 5 Mass. R. 
Mel,len Ch. J. in delivering the opinion of the Court 
says-
"These facts present a stronger case in favor of the Plff, than 
those in the case of Bond vs. Farnham. There the property 
pledged was not a sufficient indemnity, to the indorser, but 
it was all the maker had. Here it is proved to be sufficient. 
If the indorser has protected himself from eventual loss by 
his own act in taking security from the maker, such conduct 
must be considered as a waiver of the legal right to require 
proof of demand and notice."-
Now with all deference for this very respectable au­
thority, I must say that, the true ground upon which the 
case of Bond vs. Farnham was decided, was entirely misap-
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prehended or overlooked-Ch. J. Mellen says the case of 
Bond vs. Farnham was not so strong a case as the one before 
the Court, because the security in that case was insufficient to 
meet the Defts liability, When Ch. J. Parsons expressly says 
the nature & terms of the engagement cannot be varied by a 
deficiency in the property.-The true ground in 5 Mass. was 
that the indorser had got all the makers property, and like 
a drawer of a bill who had no funds in the hands of the 
drawee, and had no reasonable expectations that the bill 
would be excepted-was himself the proper party to provide 
for payt.� 
So that so far from the case in 2 Greenleaf being a 
stronger case for the Pl:ff than the 5 Mass. R., they have 
nothing in common and cannot be compared together. 
The amt of the security was considered the strong ground 
in favor of the Plff, in the one case-but in the other the 
nature of the transaction between the maker and the indorser 
was the ground upon which the Plff recovered-
The case of Barton vs. Baker, I Serg. & R. 334, was also 
cited by the Counsel for the Pl:ff-In that case, as in the 
case of Bond vs. Farnham, the maker had assigned all his 
property to the indorser to indemnify him for his advances 
and indorsements, it was held that the holder of the note was 
excused from proving a regular demand & notice in order 
to charge the indorser. 
In that case, and in the case of Bond vs. Farnham, the 
decisions seem to have been made upon the supposition that 
the indorser of a promissory note, and the drawer of a bill 
of exchange, are placed in the same situation as to their lia­
bilities, and their right to insist upon notice-So far as this 
right may be affected by the want of funds in the hands of 
the drawee of the bill, and a want of reasonable expectation 
of acceptance by the drawee, and a reasonable expectation 
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by the indorser that the note would be or has been paid by 
the maker. 
And this supposed analogy has occasioned some incon­
venience in several of the English cases, respecting the rights 
of indorsers of promissory notes-
-A distinction seems first to have been taken in the 
argument of Counsel in the case of Nicholson vs. Gouthit, 
2 H. Bl. 609, where it was contended, that altho notice of 
the dishonor of a bill drawn without funds in the hands of 
drawee, need not be given, yet that the rule in the case of 
promissory notes is totally different, and notice must in all 
cases be given to the indorser-
And in delivering the opinion of the Court Lord Ch. J. 
Eyre assented to this distinction, and admitted the rule with 
respect to notice to the indorser, to be as stated. He therefore 
reversed his own decision at Nisi Prius, and granted a new 
trial upon the strict law, contrary to his ideas of the Justice 
of the case. 
That was a very strong case, because the indorsement 
was made in consequence of a previous engagement on the 
part of the indorser to guaranty the payment of a debt due 
from the maker of the note, who appears from the transac­
tion to have been in bad circumstances at the time, and who 
became insolvent before the note was payable. 
From his connection with the maker, and from other cir­
cumstances, the indorser must have known that the maker 
would not pay the note, and it was the understanding of all 
parties that it should be paid by the indorser. 
The justice of the case was said to be clearly with the 
Pl:ff., and under the impression that the want of notice could 
not injure the Deft, the Lord Ch. J. had at the trial instructed 
the jury that it was unnecessary, and indeed that it might 
be considered as received by anticipation-
I I 6  MICHIGAN UNREPORTED OPINIONS 
In the case of French vs. The Bank of Georgetown 4 
Cranch R. 141-where the decisions of the subject were re­
viewed, Marshall Ch. J. in delivering the opinion of the 
Court, says "However, then, the law may be with regard 
to the drawer of a bill of exchange, who from other circum­
stances may fairly draw, but who has no funds in the hands 
of the drawer; it seems settled in England, by the case of 
Nicholson vs. Gouthit, that the law with regard to a promis­
sory note is different, and that if, in any case, where the note 
is made for the benefit of the maker, notice to the indorser 
can be dispensed with, it is only in the case of an insolvency 
known at the time of indorsement." And he adds-
"In point of reason, justice and the nature of the under­
taking, there is no case in which the indorser is better entitled 
to demand strict notice than in .the case of indorsement for 
accommodation, the maker having received the value."-
Several other cases are found where the same doctrine 
has been laid down in respect to the indorser of a note, which 
go further to establish the distinction between the right of 
a drawer of bill to demand notice, when he had no funds 
in the hands of the drawee, and no reasonable expec [ ta] tion 
that the bill would be accepted, and the right of an indorser 
of a note to require notice, notwith [stand] ing there was the 
strongest evidence to show that the indorser must have known 
that the maker would not, or had not paid the note-
In Dwight vs. Scovill, 2 Conn. R. 654 it was held that 
notice to the indorser was necessary under the following 
circumstances-
A person was a member in each of two copartnerships­
one of which made the note and the other indorsed it-Swift 
Ch. J. in delivering the opinion of the Court, says, "It is 
true one of the Defts must, in legal consideration, have known 
that the note was not paid ; but he equally well knew that 
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the note when it became due had not been presented to the 
makers, and payt demanded. He knew the fact that exon­
erated the Defts from all liability on their indorsement ; 
and it would be strange logic to say that this knowledge 
rendered the Defts liable." 
In the case of Ireland et al. vs. Kip, I I  Johns 231 ,  the 
PHI offered to prove on the trial, for the purpose [of] hold­
ing the Deft liable as indorser of a note, that the maker of 
the note had failed before it became due, and that he had 
conveyed his property in trust, to secure and indemnify the 
Deft against his indorsement, and that the trust fund was 
amply sufficient to indemnify him. This evid. was a rejected 
and a non-suit entered-and on motion to set aside the non­
suit, the motion was denied. 
But the strongest case upon this point is that of Ma­
gruder vs. The Union Bank of Georgetown, 3 Peters R. 
87. 
There the maker of the note died before it became due, 
and the indorser was appointed administrator to this estate. 
On the part of the Defts in Error, the Plffs below, it 
was contended in argument-that the indorser having taken 
adminis [ tra] tion of the estate of the maker, was to be con­
sidered as the payer of the note-and as such was bound 
to pay without demand-& no demand on him being required, 
it was useless to give him notice that he had not done what 
he well knew he had omitted. That the purpose of the rule 
as to notice did not exist in that case, if notice was required 
to enable the indorser to secure himself by calling on the 
drawer, this could not be done; and that as he had the estate 
of the maker of the note in his hands for his indemnity, no 
demand or notice was necessary. That the law never requires 
that to done which is useless: and therefore the Deft in Error, 
who could not by the notice or by its omission have affected 
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the rights of the indorser, or his means of protecting himself 
from loss, was not required to give it. 
In giving the opinion of the Court Marshall Ch. J. says 
"The general rule that payt must be demanded from the 
maker of a note, and notice of non pai to the indorser, in 
order to render him liable, is so firmly settled that no author­
ity need be cited in support of it. The Deft in Error does 
not controvert it, but insists that this case does not come within 
it ; because demand of pay\ and notice of non payt are totally 
useless, since the indorser has become the personal representa­
tive of the maker. He has not, however cited any case in sup­
port of this opinion, nor has he shown that the principle has 
ever been laid down in any treatise on promissory notes or 
bills. 
The Court ought to be well satisfied of the correctness of 
the principle, before it sanctions so essential a departure from 
established usage." "The fact that the indorser is the repre­
sentative of the maker does not oppose any obstacle to pro­
ceeding in the regular course"-"If this unusual mode of 
proceeding can be sustained, it must be on the principle that, 
as the indorser must have known that he had not paid the 
note, as the representative of the maker, notice to him was 
useless. Could this be admitted, does it dispense with the 
necessity of demanding payt? It is possible that assets which 
might have been applied in satisfaction of this debt, had payt 
been demanded, may have received a different direction. It 
is possible that the note may have been paid before it fell due. 
Be this as it may, no principle is better settled in com­
mercial transactions, than that the undertaking of the indorser 
is conditional. If due diligence be used to obtain payt from 
the maker, without success, and notice of non payt be given 
to him in time, his undertaking becomes absolute ; not other­
Wtse. 
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Due diligence to obtain payt from the maker, is a condition 
precedent, on which the liability of the indorser depends. As 
no attempt to obtain payt from the maker, was made in this 
case, and no notice of non payt given to the indorser, we 
think the Circuit Court should have given the instructions 
prayed for by the Deft in that Court"-
This appears to me a very strong case. The indorser must 
have known that the maker had not paid the note-It was 
his duty to provide for and make the pay t-He had the whole 
of the makers estate in his hands in trust to pay all his debts­
Neither of these facts, nor all combined were considered suf­
ficient to warrant the Court in departing from the general 
rule. 
Not on the ground that the Indorser would suffer any in­
jury-Ch. Jus. Marshall says it is possible that the maker had 
paid the note before it fell due-or that it was possible the 
assets which might have been applied in payt of the note in 
question, had notice been given, may have been otherwise 
applied-
After supposing these possible, but improbable results­
He goes on to say "be this as it may."-as much as if he had 
said supposing even that there could be no possible loss or 
inconvenience to the indorser from want of notice, yet "no 
principle is better settled in commercial transactions, than 
that the undertaking of the indorser is conditional-And that 
due diligence to obtain payt &c is a condition precedent, on ·. 
which the liability of the indorser depends"-
Had such just views been taken by the Courts in some of 
the earlier cases, where exceptions [could] have been easily 
made to the general rule ; and the Courts had looked at the 
nature of the engagement entered into by the indorser, and 
had endeavored to carry his undertaking into effect, instead 
of speculating upon the possible injury to the indorser in cer-
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tain cases, where a departure from the general rule has beeh 
urged, much litigation would have been saved, and great in­
convenience avoided-
Even if it were conceded that, as between the parties, in 
all those cases where notice has been dispensed with, justice 
had been done, yet a wide door has been opened for litigation, 
and the uncertainty of the rules by which commercial engage­
ments are to be governed, has occasioned much greater mis­
chief, than would have arisen from a failure of equitable 
justice in a few cases, by the uniform observance of a general 
rule of law, equally known to all. 
That there are exceptions to the general rule is not in­
tended to be questioned; but as observed by Marshall Ch. J., 
in the case of French vs. Bank of Georgetown, "The Court 
ought to be well satisfied with the correctness of the principle, 
before it sanctions so essential a departure from established 
usage." 
In the case of Corney vs. Da Costa, the very nature of 
the undertaking on the part of the indorser, was not condition­
al, but absolute, and on that ground the case was decided­
This was not strictly an exception to the general rule, that 
an indorser is entitled to notice-
In the case of the Merchants Bank of N. Y. vs. Griswold, 
7 Wend R. I 6 5. the indorser after the making of the note, . 
received in trust, an assign t of property and outstanding debts 
from the maker, with a power to sell the property and collect 
the debts for the express purpose of meeting the note. 
In other words he had consented to take funds to meet the 
payment of the note, and to act as the agent of the maker in 
making such payment. And it was as good ground upon which 
to dispense with notice to him, as if the maker had left the 
money with the Deft the day before the note became due, 
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with instructions to take up his note the next day-
There is an averment in the Counts demurred to that the 
Deft has not sustained any damage by reason of his not having 
received notice of non pai of said note-
But this can avail nothing-no evidence could be received 
in support of this averment. 
In the case of Dennis vs. Morrice, 3 Esp. R. 158, where 
to excuse the holder of a bill for not having given notice to 
the drawer of non payt by the.acceptor, an offer was made to 
prove, in fact, that the Deft had not been prejudiced by the 
want of notice, Lord Kenyon said, "This would be extending 
the case [rule] still further than ever has been done, and 
opening new sources of litigation in investigating whether in 
fact the drawer did receive a prejudice from this want of 
notice or not"-and the evidence was rejected-
In the case now before the Court the property is alleged 
to have been assigned by the maker to the Deft to secure and 
indemnify him against his liability as indorser-There is no 
allegation that there was any authority on the part of the 
Deft to dispose of the property for the purpose of paying the 
holder-nothing showing that the Deft had undertaken to 
provide the means for the payment of the notes. 
It was a transaction between the maker & the indorser, 
by which the indorser provided for security in case his condi­
tional engagement should become absolute, and he be obliged 
to pay the money. 
That the prudence of an indorser, in taking security from 
the maker, as indemnity against eventual and contingent 
liability on his conditional undertaking as indorser, should 
be construed as changing the nature of such an undertaking 
into an absolute undertaking, by which he would be liable in 
the first instance and at all events, without the holder's mak-
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ing any attempt to get payt of the maker, cannot, certainly, 
be sustained either upon principle or authority. 
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the facts alleged in 
the 3d & 4th Counts of Pl:ffs declaration, do not present such 
a case as dispenses with a demand of payt upon the maker­
and notice to the indorser-and that the Dem• be sustained-
EDIToR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 232,  First Circuit-Law. 
Volume I of the Journal, First Cin;uit, contains .the following entries:  
p.  1 4 1  (Feb. 2, 1 842) argued and submitted ; p.  1 60 (March 29, 
I 842) demurrer to counts 3 and 4 of declaration sustained. Also see 
Calendar, First Circuit, Vol. I. case 232. 
WILLIAM E. DUNN versus JAMES MURRAY and 
J. CLEMENS 
March 29, I 842 . 
1 .  Where in an action for trespass there is any legal testi­
mony, however slight, against one of the defendants, the 
court may not direct a verdict for that defendant in order 
that he may testify in behalf of a codefendant. 
2.  The fact that a witness called by the plaintiff on rebuttal 
testified that one of the defendants had declared during 
the trial "that he had no hand in taking the property" did 
not justify a conclusion by the court that the plaintiff had 
abandoned his action against that defendant. 
3·  Whether the declaration of a defendant sued for trespass 
can be used against a codefendant sued as a joint tortfeasor, 
quaere. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Questions reserved by 
Circuit Court, Washtenaw County; certified to Supreme 
Court. Opinion by Whipple, J. ;  Fletcher, Ch. J. dissenting. 
Certified by Supreme Court that court below erred in direct­
ing a verdict for Clemens. 
E. Mundy, attorney for plaintiff. 
0. Hawkins, attorney for defendants. 
DuNN v. MuRRAY 
( INDORSEMENT] 




Murray & Clemens 
-
Opinion of the Court 
by Whipple, Justice. 
Morell, Ransom 
& Whipple 
Chf Justice Dissenting . 
• 
2d Circuit Jan7 
term 1 842. 
Hawkins for defts. 
Mundy for plff. 
William E. Dunn � 
vs. 
James H. Murray 
and Clemens 
(OPINION] 
Sup. Court : 2nd Circuit 
Jany term 1 842. 
Questions reserved : 
1 23 
This is an action of Trespass brought by the plaintiff 
against the defendants for taking and carrying away a pair 
of horses and a wagon : The declaration was in the common 
form and the pleas were ; I81 the general issue ; 217, a special 
plea of justification setting forth that the property was in 
Clemens &c & that Murray acted by the request & under 
his direction : The cause was tried at the term of the 
Circuit Court Court for the County of Livingston ; From the 
case as reported to this Court, it would seem that evidence 
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was introduced a [ t J the trial tending to prove that Clemens 
was present & assisted Murray in taking the property : It 
also appears that after the defendants had concluded the 
testimony for their part, the plaintiff introduced rebutting 
evidence, & at this stage of the proceeding a witness was 
introduced, who stated, in answer to a question propounded 
to him by the attorney of the plaintiff, that he had heard 
Clemens declare during the trial, "that he had no hand in 
taking the property &c," this answer it is further stated 
occassioned no surprise on the part of the Counsel of the 
plff: aft. this declaration was elicited from Clemens the 
Counsel for the clefts' moved the Court to instruct the jury to 
give a verdict of acquittal, forthwith, in favor of Clemens : 
which motion was granted on the ground that the plaintiff's 
Counsel had abandoned his action against him : the jury under 
the instruction of the Court rendered a verdict of not guilty 
in favor of Clemens, who was then called as a witness & 
testifi.ed in behalf of his co-defendant Murray : The cause 
was then submitted to the Jury, who were unable to agree 
upon a verdict. 
In the abstract of the cause with which I have been 
furnished, it further appears that the Circuit Court decided, 
during the trial that the declarations of one of the de­
fendants could ,not be given in evidence against the other: 
The questions which arise in this case, & which were 
reserved for the consideration of this Court, by the Chief 
Justice who presided at the Trial, are, 1"\ whether the in­
struction asked by the Counsel of the Defts', should have been 
· granted; & 2 1Y, whether the declarations of one of the de­
fendants should have been received as competent evidence 
against the other : 
Upon the argument of this cause, the Counsel for the 
plaintiff insisted that the Circuit Court erred upon the first 
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point, for the reasons ; That in an action of Trespass against 
several, the Court cannot discharge any one of the Defend­
ants, when there is the slightest evidence against him: The 
proposition is undeniable that one of several persons charged 
with the commission of a trespass cannot be discharged by 
the Court, nor can the Court direct a nolle prosequi to be 
entered, or the jury to render a verdict of acquittal, where 
there is any legal testimony, however slight, against him: 
The rule is of universal application, as is founded upon a 
principle too firmly established by reason & authority to be 
shaken at this day: that principle is, that, in civil causes, it 
is the province of the Court to decide upon the questions of 
law that govern the case, & of the jury to decide upon the 
facts : the wisdom of the rule will not be questioned, & any 
invasion of it would overthrow the constitutional & legal 
rights of parties : Let us apply, then, this rule to the case 
at bar, and ascertain whether under the circumstances the 
instruction asked by the Counsel for the Defts should have 
been given : It is admitted that there was some evidence 
tending to shew that Clemens participated in the alledged 
trespass : the degree of evidence introduced by the plfi to 
prove his guilt does not appear, nor is necessary that it 
should under the strict rule I have laid down: But it was 
contended upon the argument of the cause by the Counsel for 
the defendants, that, the plaintiff having elicited from a 
witness the declaration of Clemens that he was in no wise 
concerned in the trespass, and especially as it was well known 
to the plaintiff's Counsel whe [ n] the question was put to the 
witness, what the answer would be, that its effect was an 
abandonment of the cause as to Clemens. It does not affirma­
tively appear in the case reported, whether the plaintiff's 
Counsel was apprised what the answer of the witness would 
be,-but it is suggested that when the answer was elicited 
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it occasioned no surprise: according to the view I take of 
the question, however, it  is of no consequence whether the 
plfi had a full knowledge of what the answer would be, or 
whether he manifested surprise when the answer was given. 
What then was the condition of the cause with respect to 
Clemens, after his declarations were given in evidence ; It 
was as follows : the plaintiff had before the defendants en­
tered upon their defence introduced evidence tending to prove 
that he participated in the alledged trespass, & after the 
defence had closed, he propounded a question to a witness 
which elicited a declaration made by ·Clemens that he had 
no hand in the matter: here, then, was conflicting evidence ; 
a portion of that evidence tending to the proof of guilt, a 
portion tending to the proof of his innocence : which was, 
then, the tribunal to weigh this conflicting evidence & decide 
upon its effect: to my understanding the jury & not the Court 
was the appropriate tribunal to refer the question: unless 
there was an "abandonment'' of the cause against Clemens : 
But in what consisted this "abandonment" of the cause ? Why 
the Counsel would reply the "declaration of Clemens" vol­
untarily drawn by the plaintiff's Counsel, from a witness, that 
he was not guilty of the Trespass : this view qf the case would 
be correct, if the declarations then elicited is to be regarded, 
as CONCLUSIVE evidence of the innocence of Clemens: whether 
it be conclusive, must depend upon the law of evidence, and 
my apprehension of the law upon this point, is, that, such 
declarations are not conclusive, however strongly they make 
against the party who thus voluntarily draws from a witness 
declarations, like that made by Clemens : To test the question : 
suppose that three or any other no. of witnesses of undoubted 
veracity had sworn that Clemens had confessed to them that 
he committed the trespass alledged against him ; would it 
be contended that the declarations of Clemens given in evi-
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dence as stated in the report, that he had nothing to do With 
the matter, would be conclusive as to the fact of guilt or inno­
cence, or that the legal effect would be an "abandonment" of 
the cause by the plffs as regards him: the mere statement of 
the question, exhibits the falacy of such a conclusion : The 
whole testimony in the case, would necessarily be referred 
to the jury, as the appropriate & constitutional body for 
determining questions of fact : 
Allusion was made by the Counsel for the clefts upon 
the argument of the case upon the extraordinary course 
adopted by the Counsel of the plaintiffs in the trial, in intro­
ducing evidence of declarations, when he was well advised, 
that those declarations would conduce to the proof of the 
innocence of one of the clefts : Such a course . ought not, & 
cannot vary or influence the legal rights of the plaintiff: he 
had a right to elicit the declarations, and it was for him to 
bear the consequences which might result from its exercise, 
the defendants ought not to complain that the plaintiff elicited 
facts which would go far towards establishing their claim to 
a verdict of acquittal : If I have taken, a correct view of the 
question under consideration, the Circuit Court erred in di­
recting the jury to acquit Clemens: 
I ought here to state, that reliance was had by the Coun­
sel for the plff, in argument, upon the pleadings in the cause, 
to establish error in the direction given by the Court to the 
jury: Beside the plea of the general issue, it is said that there 
was a joint plea of justification, & it was argued that if the 
plea is not supported as to all, neither of the defendants can 
be protected under it. The books recognize a distinction, in 
this respect, between a case where several defendants, in 
trespass, plead the gen1 issue, and where a joint plea of justi­
fication is pleaded, but as it is not clear from an inspection of 
the pleadings, whether in point of law the second plea 
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amounts to a joint plea of justification, and especially as this 
point was not urged upon the Circuit Court, an expression of 
opinion upon the question will not be given-
II : In the abstract of the case as reported it is alledged that 
the Circuit Court decided that the declarations of one of 
the clefts was not competent evidence against the other : This 
opinion of the Circuit Court may have been right or wrong 
according to circumstances: and as the facts necessary to form 
an opinion have not been spread out in the case, any expres­
sion of opinion by this Court would be hypothetical: the gen­
eral rule upon the subject I apprehend is this : that if there 
was any evidence connecting the defendants as joint trespass­
ers, the declarations of one rna y be given [ in] evidence against 
the others, in the same manner as the acts of one may be 
given in evidence, against all concerned:  the foundation laid 
by connecting the defendants as being jointly concerned in a 
trespass, the declarations & acts of each become that of all : 
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice 
Whipple, was found in file No. 235, First Circuit-Law. Volume I 
of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entry : p. 1 6 2  
( March 29, 1 842)  court below erred in directing jury to render a 
verdict in favor of Clemens ; with respect to other questions raised in 
the. case the Court declined to express an opinion. Also see Calendar, 
First Circuit, Vol. I, case 235 · 
LARGY v. HoLLAND 
JOHN LARGY versus PATRICK HOLLAND 
March 29, I 842. 
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I .  Delivery of an award of arbitrators (addressed to the 
court) to the clerk of the court in vacation is a delivery to 
the court within the meaning of the statute (Revised 
Statutes of r'838, p. 532.) 
2.  Although, ordinarily, an award made without notice of 
hearing is void, in this case the parties appeared before 
the arbitrators and agreed that they might, after viewing 
the land involved, make an award without notice and with­
out hearing evidence. 
3 ·  Where an award is silent with respect to notice of hearing, 
it is fair and reasonable to intend that notice was given. 
4· By making the agreement set forth in ( 2), supra, the 
parties did not annul the original agreement for arbitra­
tion. They merely agreed upon the means of giving effect 
to that agreement. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to Circuit Court, 
Wayne County. Opinion by Whipple, J. Judgment affirmed. 
D. Goodwin & Collins, attorney for plaintiff in certiorari. 
J. A. Van Dyke � E. B. Harrington, attorneys for de­





Sup Court : Ist Circuit 
Jany term 1 842. 
Opinion of Court 
by Whipple Justice. 
Goodwin for Plff in Error 
Van Dyke & Harrington for 
Deft.-
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[OPINION] 
John Largy, plff in Er- upon Certiorari to Wayne Cir-
ror, cuit. 
VS 
Patrick Holland, deft in 
Error. --------------------
Sup Court I "t Circuit 
Jany term I 842. 
From the return made to the Certi�rari in this cause, it 
appears that the parties on the I 5 day of Sept I 840, "agreed 
to submit, the demand, a Statement whereof was annexed 
to the agreement, to the determination of David Thompson, 
Edwin Jerome, & Joseph H. Steele, the award of whom, or 
the greater part of whom, being made & reported within one 
year from this day to the Court Court of the County of 
Wayne, the judgm. thereon should be final &•" : this agree­
ment was acknow !edged pursuant to the statute, before a 
competent officer : the statement of the demand of Holland 
against Largy, is in the following words "On or about the 
I 7th day of June I 8 3 9, John Largy purchased of Patrick 
Holland certain land in Livingston County described as the 
S E ;4. & S W frac1 ;4. of the 2 8 town 2 N R 4 E' being 
2 5 I  8 I/Ioo acres ; which land the said Holland has conveyed 
to Largy: The said Largy has paid Holland $ IOO on the 
purchase: the matter now in dispute is how much, if any­
thing more, the said Largy ought to pay said Holland as a 
just & full consideration for said land." An award was made 
by the arbitrators in favor of Holland for the sum of $604: 
upon which judgment was rendered in the Circuit Court: To 
reverse this judgment a certiorari was sued out of this court 
by Largy. 
Various grounds have been urged by the plff in Error 
why the judgm. below should be reversed: I shall consider 
them in the order in which they are set forth in the Plff's 
brief: 
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1 : The award was not returned to the Court either by 
the arbitrators or under seal : Endorsed upon the award is 
the following memorandum made by the Clerk of the Circuit 
Court : "I do hereby certify that the within award was trans­
mitted to the Court & remained sealed until opened by. me 
in open Court on the 1 2  November 1 840." The 7 Sec. of 
chapter 7 part 3 title IV of R. S provides that "the award 
shall be delivered by one of the arbitrators to the Court 
designated in the agreement, or shall be enclosed and sealed 
by them, & transmitted to the Court & shall remain sealed 
until opened by the Clerk" It is contended by the pHI that 
in as much as the award was returned to the OFFICE OF THE 
CLERK & FILED UPON A DAY OUT OF TERM, and not TO THE 
couRT by whom the same should be opened, that the return 
was void, as being against the provisions of the 7th & roth 
of the chapter refd to : It will be perceived that the 7th 
Section contemplates two modes by which an award may be 
returned; and if the return made by the arbitrators in this 
case is to be sustained it must be under the 2d clause of the 
7th Sec : was then 1 Ir the award enclosed & sealed by the 
arbitrators ; 2, was it transmitted to the Court ; & 3 17 did it 
remain sealed until opened by the Clerk: The certificate of 
the Clerk endorsed on the award appears to me to be con­
clusive with respect to the 1st & 3rd requisitions of the 
statute : that the 2d requirement was complied with is equally 
conclusive from a further endorsement on the award, which 
is in the following words : "To the Circuit Court for the 
County of Wayne" "Detroit" "award of arbitration." But it 
is insisted that the statute evidently contemplates that the 
return should be made to the Court in term, & by the Court 
opened: it would certainly be competent under the provisions 
of the roth Sec. of the same chapter for arbitrators thus to 
return & for the Court thus to open the award, but it does 
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not necessarily follow, that a return made in the manner 
pointed out by the 7 Sec. is nugatory: The language of the 
7th Sec. is imperative, that of the roth permissive, "The 
award may be returned at any term or session of the Court, 
that shall be held within the time limited in the submis­
sion" &0• 
With respect to the objection that even under the 7 Sec. 
the award should be transmitted to the Court in term, I have 
only to r·emark, that in my opinion the language of that Sec 
does not justify such a construction: I regard a transmission 
of the award, enclosed & sealed, to the Clerk of the Court, 
as a transmission to the Court, and the fact that the award is 
to remain sealed until that seal is broken by the CLERK, indi­
cates with sufficient certainty that the return may be made as 
well in vacation as during the term of the Court, for if the 
return was required to be made in term, it is probable that 
the language of the 7th Section would have been different, 
by containing an express provision to that effect, or directing 
that the CouRT should break the seal : I might have stated 
that this construction was adopted by this Court at the last 
term in the case of the Black River Steam Mill Co vs Chad­
wick when the question was fully considered & decided. 
2 1r another objection to the award is that Largy had no 
notice of the proceedings of the arbitrators; & that if notice 
was given it should appear, affirmatively, on the face of the 
award. The 5th Section of the Chapter already adverted to, 
contemplates notice to the parties to appear before the arbi­
trators : and altho' the language of the Section is does not 
contain an express direction to that effect, yet, a reasonable 
construction justifies the conclusion that notice in all cases 
is required to be given : indeed this would be the dictate of 
common justice, which will not justify a proceeding of this 
character, in which important interests are at .stake, without 
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notice to the parties immediately concerned: was there notice 
given to Largy? to ascertaine this fact we must resort to the 
affidavits which were filed in the Circuit Court, copies of 
which have been returned to this Court as part of the pro­
ceedings in the cause : The affidavit of Largy sets forth "that 
he had no notice of the time & place appointed for the meet­
ing of the arbitrators, & that he had no opportunity of being 
heard by them nor of producing his witnesses on the investi­
gation, &c. If this was the only testimony upon this point, 
the award could not be sustained; but the affidavits of Daniel 
Thompson, one of the arbitrators, & of one Thomas Galla­
gher, while they do not deny the facts stated by Largy, give 
such a version to this part of this . cause, as are sufficient, in 
my view, to render notice unnecessary: They both state, "that 
both parties appeared before the arbitrators, & agreed they 
might, instead of giving notice, and hearing evidence respect­
ing the matter submitted, go upon the lands & premises men­
tioned in the demand annexed to the agreement of submis­
sion, & from a personal view & examination make the award., 
But it is urged by the Counsel for the plff in Error, that the 
award is void, upon its face, for the reason rst that it does 
not there appear that notice &" was given : & 2 Jy admitting 
the facts to be as is stated in the affidavits of Thompson & 
Gallagher they cannot avail, inasmuch as if true, they shew 
a new agreement between the parties, taking it out of the 
statute, & in that case the award could only be enforced by 
an action at law. It has been the policy of the law to sustain 
the adjudications of tribunals erected & chosen by the parties 
themselves. The award of arbitrators are always liberally & 
favorably construed, & every reasonable intendment will be 
made to support them : And there is reason in the rule : The 
submission to arbitrators is the voluntary Act of the parties-, 
the arbitrators are agreed upon by them-They are the 
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judges of their own choice, which implies great confidence 
not only as respects their judgment but fairness & disinter­
estedness : It is a mode of adjusting differences which has 
always been encouraged, as it prevents protracted litigation, 
& the great expense which necessarily follows : with these 
general rules in view, I think it a fair & reasonable to intend 
that notice was given to the parties : & in this opinion I am 
sustained by the whole current of American Authorities : The 
reasoning of the Court in the case of Lutz vs Linthicum in 
the 8th Peters 16 5, and in case of Ackley vs Finch, 7 Cowen 
290 is strongly in point ; in the latter case the Supreme Court 
of N. Y. assert, (with respect to an objection to an award 
that it did not appear whether all the arbitrators heard the 
cause, or only two, a fact necessary to be determined) "that 
no case could be adduced shewing the necessity of this fact 
appearing on the face of the award itself." And in the case 
first cited the Supreme Court of the United States, say: 
"Without question due notice should be given to the parties 
of the time & place, for hearing the cause, & if the award 
was made without such notice, it ought, on the plainest prin­
ciples of justice to be set aside : But it is by no means necessary 
that it should appear on the face of the award that such notice 
was given." 
I am next to consider whether the first agreement to refer 
was annulled by the subsequent assent of both parties, that 
instead of receiving evidence touching the matters in con­
troversy, the arbitrators should by a personal view of the 
premises determine its value, and make their award without 
any further hearing: without an assent, expressed, or implied 
it is certain that the arbitrators were confined in the examina­
tion of the case to legal evidence, but it was certainly com­
petent for the parties to prescribe another rule for attaining 
the same end: they did not make a new agreement, but 
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· simply agreed upon the means of  giving effect to the existing 
one : It was simply saying to the arbitrators, that they repose 
more or at least as much confidence in their judgment touch­
ing the value of the premises, after they should have viewed 
it, as they would in the testimony of witnesses who could 
have no better means of forming an opinion : This objection, 
then, to the award cannot be sustained: 
With regard to the other objections, of a more formal & 
technical character, it is only necessary to say, that this Court 
cannot, for the alledged irregularity in receiving the affi­
davits as stated in the Exceptions, reverse the judgment be­
low: whether they should have been received or not was a 
matter which rested in the discretion of the Circuit Court: 
The other objections, if of any force, can be remedied, 
by the necessary amendments : they are of too technical a 
nature to authorize this Court to interfere with the judg­
ment-
J udgm-affirmed 
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice 
Whipple, was found in file No. '2oo, First Circuit-Law. Volume I 
of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 145 
(Feb. 4, 1 842)  motion to set aside rule for return to certiorari; p. 
149 (Feb. 8, 1 842)  rule for return ; p. 1 54 (Feb. 14, 1 842)  argued 
and submitted ; p. 1 6 1  (March 29, 1 842)  judgment affirmed. Also 
see Calendar, First Circuit, Vol. I, case 200. 
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DUNCAN McCALL et ux. versus SIMEON M. 
HOUGH and PETER McPHERSON, Executors, 
etc. of ROBERT FINDLEY, Deceased. 
March 29, 1 842. 
Although it appeared from testimony that a paper offered 
for probate as a will had been signed by a person now deceased 
and by three persons who signed as witnesses at his request, 
in his presence, and in the presence of each other, one of whom 
thought he had seen the decedent sign, HELD the supposed 
will was not executed pursuant to statute (Laws of r 82 o, 
p. 20) because "All must see the act of signing, or the 
testator must acknowledge that he had signed it, or declare 
that it is his will." 
Supreme Court, First Circuit, on transfer from Fourth 
Circuit. Appeal from Probate Court, Oakland County. 
Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Decree reversed. 
J. Goodrich & W. Draper, attorneys for appellants. 
0. D. Richardson, attorne� for respondents. 
( INDORSEMENT] 
Sup. Court 4th Cir. 1 842 
app. rom McCall et ux. � f 
Hou;�· et al Judge Probate 
Memo of Opinion-
29 March '42-
McCALL v. HouGH 
Duncan McCall and 
Janette McCall, his wife 
Appellants 
(OPINION] 
Simeon M. Hough & Peter 
McPherson, Ex•• of the last 




This i s  an appeal by Duncan McCall & wife heirs at 
law of Robt Findley, deceased, from the decree of the Judge 
of Probate for the County of Oakland, allowing probate, and 
establishing the last will and testament of the deceased, Robt 
Findley. 
The cause, by the stipulation of the parties, was heard 
and argued at bar, at the last term of this Court in the 4th 
Circuit-
Several reasons were assigned for the appeal, but only 
one has been insisted upon before this Court, which is that 
the execution of the said will was not duly proved-· 
The will appears to have been executed on the I 2  July 
I 8 3 8-and devised Real estate-
. It was objected that there was no evidence that the Wit. 
saw the Testator sign his name to the will -- or that he de­
clared in their prescence that it was his last will and testament 
-or in the last place that the Signature was his-
On the hearing before this Court, the three subscribing 
witnesses were produced & sworn on the part of the Re­
pondants-
Theron T. Armstrong-one of these wit.-testified that on 
or about the date of the will-( I 2 Aug. '3 8 }  the testator 
came to the field where he, Le Roy Armstrong and Sam1 
Clark, the other subscribing wit., were at work and requested 
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them to go to Mr McPherson's house-said he would not 
detain them long-He did not say what he wanted of them­
They went with him to McPherson-After they went into 
the house they were requested to witness a paper laying on 
the table-
Mr Hough, one of the Executors, and the person who 
drew the will, was there, and directed wit. and the others 
where to write their names-The paper was so folded up 
that wit. only saw the name of deceased to the paper--Wit. 
signed the paper & saw the other two wit.-Le Roy Arm­
strong and Sam1 Clark sign it-The will produced and 
shown to wit. is the same paper signed by him and the other 
witnesses-The deceased was present in the same room near 
by when they all signed the will as witnesses-No one spoke 
of it as the will of deceased at that time-Wit. supposed he 
knew what it was, as the deceased had before spoken to him 
about making his will-The wit :  states that he did not see 
the deceased sign the paper, nor him [hear] him say that 
it was signed by him-or that it was his last will & testi­
mony-The paper had the signature of deceased to it, when 
wit. subscribed his name as a witness-
· 
Le Roy Armstrong-testified nearly to the same facts-and 
says further, that when the three wit. went into McPhersons 
house with the deceased, Hough asked the deceased if those 
were his witnesses-Deceased nodded assent, and said they 
were-that he signed as a wit. with T. T. Armstrong and 
Sam 1 Clark-That the deceased was present, and looking on 
when the witnesses subscribed the paper-That after all the 
witnesses had signed Hough took up the paper and gave it to 
the deceased, who delivered it back to Hough at the same 
time saying something which witness did not notice or under­
stand-Wit. does not recollect whether he saw deceased name 
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written on the paper at the time witness signed it--did not 
hear him say that he had signed it-
Sam1 Clark-was present and subscribed his name as a wit­
ness to the paper-same paper now shown him- - Before 
the witnesses signed, thinks deceased went to the table and 
sign something-Is not positive, but thinks such was the 
fact-Thinks that after Hough had done writing, the de­
ceased went to the table took up the pen and signed the 
paper-After the witnesses had all signed Hough took the 
paper and handed it to deceased who immediately delivered 
it back to him, saying something which witness did not under­
stand-
Hiram A. Hills-was called to prove that the signature to 
the will to be the hand writing of the deceased--and testified 
he had seen him write two or three times, and thinks the 
signature to the will is the hand writing of deceased-
Simeon Hough, one of the Ex•s and one of the Respondants, 
was then offered as a wit. by the Respondants in support of 
the will-to show the due Execution &c-
Objection to the competency of this wit. was made by 
the appellants, on the ground of interest, being a party to 
the proceeding &, and liable under our Stat. for costs in case 
the decree of this Court should disaffirm the will-
The testimony was heard by the Court, subject however, 
to be rejected if on examination the Court should be of the 
opinion that the Ex• was an incompetent wit.-
The view I have taken ?f this case, however, renders it 
unnecessary to decide this point, or to consider the testimony 
of the witness-
The Respondants also called Dan1 Rowe as a witness to 
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prove the declarations of the- deceased made after the date 
of the will, that he had made a will and left it in the hands 
of- Mr Hough-Appellants objected to this evid. as inad­
missable-but the Court received it subject to be rejected 
and disregarded, in case they should be of opinion on ex" that 
it was not admissable 
-But for the reason before given it is not necessary to decide 
the question, or to take the testimony into consideration­
-Taking therefore only the testimony of the three subscrib­
ing witness [ es] and the testimony of Mr Hills who [ testi­
fied] to the signature of the Deceased to the will-Is the 
Evidence sufficient to establish the due execution of the will 
under the Statute? 
On the part of the appellants it is contended that the 
testator must sign the will in the presence of the subscribing 
witnesses, or must declare in their presence and hearing that 
he signed the same, or that it was his last will a�d testament-
The act of the 27 July r 8 I 8, entitled "An Act pre­
scribing the manner of devising Land, Tenements and Here­
ditaments"-Which was in force at the time this will appears 
to have been executed, enacts 
"That all devises and bequests of any lands or tene­
ments, shall be in writing and signed by the party so devising 
the same, or by some person in his presence and by his 
express direction, and shall be attested and subscribed in the 
presence of the said De'Uisor, by three or more credible wit­
nesses, or else shall be utterly void, and of no effect."-
This is a transcript of the 5 Sect of the Stat of 29 ch. II-, 
and in relation to that Stat. the principles by which it is to 
be construed, have long been settled in England, and also 
in this country, where the same phraseology has been adopted 
by the Legislature-
In England it was never questioned but that the attesta-
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tion of the witnesses must be in the presence of the Devisor, 
or that the witnesses must either see him actually sign the 
Devise or that the Devisor must declare to them that it is 
his last will, or must acknowledge that he had signed the 
same-
6 Cr. Dig. It was indeed for some time questioned 
p. 6o. whether such acknowledgement by the Devisor 
in the presence of wit. that he had signed the instrument, 
was a sufficient compliance with the Stat., or whether the wit­
nesses ought not to attest to the very: act of signing by the 
Devisor-
Stonehouse vs. Evelyn. 2 P. wm• 264-[3 P. wm• 252] 
Grayson vs. Atkinson. 3 Ves. 454-[2 Yes. s· 454] 
But it was finally settled r Ves. Ju• ro [ u ]  Ellis vs. 
Smith, when Ld Hardwicke, assisted by Sir John Strange, 
Ld. Ch. ]. Willes and Ld Ch. B. Parker, in which it unani­
mously resolved that the declaration of a testator before 3 
wit. that a paper was his will was equivalent to signing it 
before them, and constituted a good will within the 5th Sec­
tion of the Stat. frauds-And there has never been any re­
laxation of this rule in England-
-Indeed how can any meaning be given to the act requiring 
that the 3 persons shall attest and subscribe as witnesses­
unless this construction be adopted? what do they attest, or 
witness but the execution of the will by the testator?-If 
this act of the testator is not attested and witnessed by the 
three witnesses, to what do they attest, or witness?-
In this case one of the wit. was under the impression that 
he saw the testator sign a paper-but the other two think 
that the name was to the paper when they first saw it, and 
when they subscribed as witnesses- -All must see the act 
of signing, or the testator must acknowledge that he had 
signed it, or declare that it is his will &c-
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The testimony therefore of the Executor Mr Hough, 
even if admissable, could not avail anything-nor does the 
testimony of Mr Hills who testified to the hand writing of 
the testator-
The three credible witness [ es] are placed around the 
testator by the Legislature for the express purpose of prov­
ing the due execution of the will, and their testimony alone 
can support it-
This court therefore doth order adjudge and decree that 
the decree of the Judge of Probate be reversed, and that the 
said will and testament-be altogether held for nought­
and void-
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 234, First Circuit-Law. 
Other papers will be found in file No. I 2, Fourth Circuit. The 
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 2 {June 25 ,  
I 839)  rule for issues to try sanity and fraud ; p .  5 (Jan. 20,  I 84 I )  
continued ; p. 5 (Jan. 20, I 84 I )  motion for security for costs ; p. 
6 (Jan. 2 I ,  I 84 I )  motion overruled ;  p. I 4 (Jan. I 9, I 842) argued 
and submitted. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the 
following entry : p. I 6 I  (March 29, I 842)  judgment reversed. Also 
see Calendar, Fourth Circuit, case No. I 2 ;  Calendar, First Circuit, 
Vol. I, case No. 234· 
PEOPLE versus VIRGIL M. ROSE 
March 29, I 8.42; 
I .  Repeal by the Revised Statutes of r(8.J8 ( p. 690} of the 
act for the punishment of crimes which was in force when 
the offence charged in the indictment in this case was com­
mitted did not exempt the defendant from the punishment 
previously prescribed for his alleged crime, the Revised 
Statutes having expressly provided against such exemption 
except to the extent that any punishment was mitigated by 
the Revised Statutes ( p. 6r6) .  
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z; Repeal of the punishment for larceny prescribed by the 
Revised Statutes of I8ij8 ( p. 628) and provision that lar­
ceny of property worth less than $I oo may be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison (Pub. Acts, I 84o, p. 42) 
"does not affect any criminal act committed under the act 
in force for the punishment of crimes previous to the tak­
ing effect of the Rev. Stat." 
3· Repeal of the mitigating provisions of the Revised Statutes 
of I 8g8 (p. 62'8) leaves the defendant under the provi­
sions of the act in force when the crime was committed. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit, on transfer from Fourth 
Circuit. Question reserved by Circuit Court, Oakland County; 
certified to Supreme Court. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. 
Certified by Supreme Court that demurrer to indictment 
should be overruled . 
. . . · . . . . . . , prosecuting attorney. 
M. L. Drake, attorney for defendant. 
[ INDORSEMENT] 
[Sup. ] Court 4th Cir. 
Jan" 1 842. 
The People � 
vs. 
Rose 
Memo of Opinion 
2.9 March '42 
Dem r overruled, 
order that Deft 
plead over-
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The People � 
vs. 
Virgil M. Rose 
-
[OPINION] 
On questions reserved and certified from Oakland Cir­
cuit, by the Presiding Judge of that Circuit-· 
The Deft was indicted in the Court below for Larceny­
Indice exhibited and filed I S  Oct. '39-Charging the offense 
to have been committed on the 6th March 1 8 3 8-and alleging 
the property stolen to be of the value of $82.  
-To this Indictt the Deft demurred generally. 
The grounds urged in support of the Demr are 
I .  The the act for the punishment of crimes, which was in 
force on the 6th of March 1 8  3 8, the time when this offense 
was alleged to have been committed, was repealed when 
the Rev. Stat. went into operation on the 1 Sept 1 8 3 8-
2.  That if by the saving clause in the Rev. Stat. repealing 
the former act for the punishment of crimes the Deft 
might have been Indicted, notwithstanding such repeal, 
yet that by the act of the of I 840, so 
much of the Rev. Stat. as prescribed the punishment in 
case of Larceny, was repealed, and therefore the Deft 
cannot be punished for the offense-
! .  As to the repeal of the act for the punishment of crimes 
by the Rev. Stat.-
In the Repealing part of the Rev. Stat. there is an ex­
ception in the 6th Section respecting criminal offenses-· 
It is in these words-"No offense committed, or penalty, 
or forfeiture incurred, under any of the acts hereby re­
pealed, and before the time when such repeal shall take 
effect, shall be affected by such repeal, except that when 
any punishment, penalty or forfeiture shall have been 
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mitigated by the provisions of this act, such provisions 
may be extended and applied to any judgment to be pro­
nounced after the said repeal"-
Here then is an express provision that offenses committed 
under the former act which was repealed by the Rev. 
Stat. may be punished in the same manner, a.S if the 
former act had not been repealed, with this exception only, 
that in case the penalty under the formerly law were 
mitigated by the Rev. Stat. that such mitigated punish­
ment should be applied-
-The repeal of the former act, by the Rev. Stat. does 
not therefore exempt the Deft from indictment, convic­
tion and punishment for an offense committed before 
the Rev. Stat. took effect. 
2. As to the effect of the. act of the 14  of March 1 840. upon 
this prosecution-
That part of the Rev. Stat. which prescribed the punish­
ment for Larceny, was repealed by the act of March 14. 
1 84o-And a new provision was made by that act for 
the punishment of Larceny-being the same as that in 
the Rev. Stat. except that it abolished the distinction made 
in the Rev. Stat. between Grand and Petit Larceny, and 
authorised the Court to sentence the offenderto imprison­
ment in the State prison when the property stolen should 
be of less value than $ 100 But this does not affect any 
criminal act committed under the act in force for the 
punishment of crimes previous to the taking effect of the 
Rev, Stat.-
Because all that a party convicted could claim under the 
Rev. Stat. was that, if by the Rev. Stat. the punishment 
was mitigated, he should have the benefit of that 
mitigation-And if the mitigated provisions of the Rev. 
Stat. were subsequently repealed, he was left then under 
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the provisions of the act, in force at the time the offense 
was committed-
For it will be observed, that the saving exception in the 
Rev. Stat. is, that-"No offense committed before the 
taking effect of the Rev. Stat. shall be affected by such re­
peal, except that the accused shall have the benefit of any 
mitigated punishment provided by the Rev. Stat. 
The repeal of such mitigating provisions of the Rev. 
Stat. left the offender under the provisions of the act in 
force when the offense was committed-and wholly un­
affected by the Repeal part of the Rev. Stat.-
The Dem• therefore is overruled-
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 239, First Circuit-Law. The 
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries: p. 13 (Jan. 
1 9, 1 842) question filed; p. 1 8  (Jan. 2 1 ,  1 842)  submitted without 
argument. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the follow­
ing entry: p. 1 63 (March 29 ,  1 842) Demurrer of defendant over­
ruled ; leave to plead anew. Also see Calendar, Fourth Circuit, case 
No. 200 ; Calendar, First Circuit, case No. 239· 
JUSTUS SIMONS versus ENOS PECK 
March 29, r 842. 
r .  Property was taken from B's possession on a writ of execu­
tion and sold to S on said writ while being held for P un­
der a writ of replevin issued in an action by P against a 
receiptor who held under a prior writ of execution against 
B, which action of replevin was pending when the present 
action of replevin was commenced by S against P. HELD, 
such property was not in the custody of the law at the time 
the present action of replevin was commenced; hence it 
was error to instruct the jury that the property could not 
be replevied in the present action. 
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2. In an action of replevin brought under the circumstances 
set forth in ( r), supra, the plaintiff should be permitted to 
prove that a prior sale, under which the defendant claims, 
was made in fraud of the seller's creditors. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit, on transfer from Fourth 
Circuit. Error to Circuit Court, Oakland County. Opinion 
by Fletcher, Ch. J. Judgment reversed. 
M. L. Drake, attorney for plaintiff in error. 
G. W. Wisner, attorney for defendant in error. 
[ INDORSEMENT] 




Justus Simons l 
vs. 
Enos Peck 




This is a writ of Error directed to the Circuit Court of 
the County of Oakland, brought to reverse a Judgment ren­
dered in the Court against the Plff below, who is also the 
Plff in error-
Simons sued Peck in the Court below in an action of 
Replevin for a yoke of oxen-
The Deft pleaded that he did not detain the property, 
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and gave notice that he would prove on the trial that the 
property, in question, was the Defts-
A bill of exceptions was allowed, and sets forth the mat­
ters upon the errors [which] have been assigned-
From the bill of exceptions it appears, that on the trial 
the PHI proved that he purchased the oxen at a public sale 
the 1 Feby '39, made by a constable in virtue of an execution 
in favor of Le Roy & Munson and against one wm C. Bower­
ing, and that the oxen, by some means unknown to the PHI 
got into the possession of the Deft. 
And the Pl:fi brought this action-The Pl:fi then rested­
The Deft proved that he bought the oxen of Bowering in 
Dec• 1 838,  or about the I Jan7 '39-That afterwards they 
were levied upon by a constable on an Exn against Bowering, 
and that the officer delivered them to a Receiptor-and that 
the Deft. Peck replevied them from the Receiptor, and gave 
bond in the usual manner-That after Peck had commenced 
his replevin against the Receiptor, the cattle were again taken 
by a constable on Exn vs. Bowering, that the officer sold the 
cattle upon that EX" to the PHI. 
It was further proved the Repl,evin suit of Peck against 
the Receiptor had been tried in the same Term at which this 
suit was tried, and that Peck had recovered the property­
It was also in evidence that when the Ex" under which 
the PHI in this suit purchased the oxen was levied, the oxen 
were in the poss. of Bowering. 
-And the Pl:ff introduced testimony to show that the sale 
from Bowering to the Deft. was fraudulent, made with intent 
to keep the property from the creditors of Bowering-
Upon this evidence, the Court charged the Jury, that the 
oxen having been replevied by Peck in his suit against the 
Receiptor, and that suit then pending when they were levied 
upon and sold to the PHI in virtue of an Exn, and the Re-
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plevin suit of Peck against the Receiptor being pending when 
this suit was commenced, that the property was in the custody 
of the law could not be sold to the Plif on the Exn or re­
covered by him in this action. The Court further instructed 
the Jury that .they need not inquire whether the sale from 
Bowering to Peck was fraudulent, or n�t, and that the Deft. 
was intitled to a verdict. 
-To this charge the PHI excepted-
On the part of the Plff in error it is insisted that the 
Court erred in giving the above instructions to the Jury. 
r .  In charging the Jury that inasmuch as the property 
in question had been replevied by Peck against the Receiptor, 
and that suit pending when this was commenced, that the 
property was in the custody of the law, and could not be 
replevied in this action-
2. That the Court also erred in charging the jury to dis­
regard the evid. given by the PHI tending to prove that the 
original sale from Bowering to Deft. was fradulent and in­
tended to defraud creditors-
! think both these objections are well taken-
In the case of_ Clark vs. Skinner 20 John. R. 467, there is a 
very full review of the cases showing under what circum­
stances property taken on Exn &c is in the custody of the law-
Platt says the Deft in Ex" whose goods have been taken 
on a fi. fa, cannot bring trespass or Replevin against the 
officer-as to him the property is in the custody of the law­
But this rule has no application to the rights of a Stranger 
whose property has been wrongfully taken on Ex" against 
another person-
Nor can a Deft in Replevin, replevy the property from the 
Plff-
But a third person may-
The first point being sustained, the 2 d is of course, because 
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if the Plff could maintain the action, he had a right to show 
that Deft claimed the property under a fraudulent sale-
Judgt reversed--case remand with directions that a vemre 
de novo be awarded-
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 23 I ,  First Circuit-Law. 
Other papers will be found in file No. J4., Fourth Circuit, and in file 
No. 20I ,  First Circuit-Law. The Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains 
the following entry : p. I 2 (Jan. I 8, I 842) argued and submitted. 
Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entry : 
p . .  I 6o (March 29, I 842) judgment reversed ;  venire de novo. 
Also see Calendar, Fourth Circuit, case No. I 4 ;  Calendar, First 
Circuit, Vol. I, case 2 3 1 .  
JAMES SLAUGHTER versus PEOPLE 
March 29, I 842. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to Mayor's 
Court, Detroit. Opinion by Whipple, J. Judgment reversed. 
G. A. O'Keeffe & G. C. Bates, attorneys for plaintiff. 
J. A. Van Dyke, attorney for defendants. 
EDITOR's NoTE : The original MS. opinion in the above case is in 
file No. 20I ,  First Circuit-Law. In printed form, it appears in a 
footnote in 2 Douglass (Mich.)  334 ( I  849) ; also, in By-Ltn��s tmd 
Ordintmces of the City of Detroit, 1842 (Burton Historical Collec­
tion, Public Library, Detroit) .  It deals with the constitutionality of 
prosecutions by complaint instead of by indictment. Volume I of the 
Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 7 5 (Aug. 7, 
I 8 39) motion to change name of defendant from City of Detroit 
to People of the State of Michigan; p. 76 (Aug. 8, I 839) motion 
granted ; p. I 38 (Jan. I4, I 842) motion to quash writ of certiorari ; 
p. I40 (Feb. 2, I 842)  argued and submitted ; p. I 5 8  (March 29, 
I 842) judgment reversed. Also, see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, 
Vol. I, case No. 201 .  
TAYLOR v. BEACH 
ELISHA TAYLOR versus ELISHA BEACH 
and HARVEY PARKE 
March 29, 1 842. 
I 51  
Testimony by an employee of a bank that it was his uniform 
practice to demand payment of promissory notes held b'y the 
bank on their due dates, and, on the same dates, to give notice 
of nonpayment to each indorser either in person or by leaving 
notice at his place of business or dwelling house if residing 
in the village, or by mail if residing outside the village, plus 
testimony that the witness knew from a memorandum at­
tached to the note sued on in this case that it was protested on 
the day it became due, is "no evidence at all" that notice of 
nonpayment was given to the defendants who are sued as 
indorsers of said note. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit, on transfer from Fourth 
Circuit. Question reserved by Circuit Court, Oakland County; 
certified to Supreme Court. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. 
Certified by Supreme Court that a new trial should be 
granted. 
Hunt & Watson, attorneys for plaintiff. 
M. L. Drake, attorney for defendants. 
[ INDORSEMENT] 




Beach et al 
Mem0 of opinion 
29 March '42 
Verdict set aside & 
venire de novo 
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Elisha Taylor l 
vs. 
Elisha Beach & 
Harvey Parke 
[OPINION] 
This case was reserved and certified to this Court from 
the Oakland Circuit by the Presiding Judge of that Court., 
and presents a single question whether the evidence given on 
the trial to prove notice to the Defts who were sued as 
Indorsers of a promissory note, of the non payment of the 
note by the maker. 
A verdict was taken for the Plff, subject to the opinion of 
this Court on this question-
The note was discounted at the Bank of Pontiac, and was 
there at maturity-
The evidence to prove the notice, was the Deposition of 
Mr. Vandevanter, and is as follows.-"! cannot recollect 
particularly whether I did, or did not, give notice of the 
nonpayment of the note to the said Defendants-["] 
[" ] There is  no memorandum on said note by which I can 
tell positively whether I did, or did not give said notice to said 
indorsers-[ "] 
-["]It was at the time the said note matured, the prac­
tices in said Bank of Pontiac, for me to demand payment, and 
give notice of the non payment to endorsers, on all notes 
which fell due at the said Bank-Sherman Stevens was at 
that time, an officer of the said Bank, and a Notary Public, and 
it was the common practice for said Stevens to leave with me 
certifi.cates of protest, signed by him, to be annexed to notes 
which should fall due at said Bank in his absence from the 
Bank-And when notes so fell due in his absence, and not 
paid, it was the uniform practice for me to demand payment 
of said notes, and give notice of nonpayment to the indorsers 
TAYLOR 'V. BEACH 1 53 
on the day the note or notes matured-And whenever notice 
of nonpayment was served by me, it was done by delivering 
the same to the indorser personally, or by leaving the same 
at his place of business or dwelling house, if he resided in the 
village of Pontiac-and if he did not reside in said village, 
to deposite the said notice in the Post office, directed to the 
Post office nearest the residence of such indorser-From a 
memorandum on the back of the certificate of Protest, in my 
handwriting, it appears that the said note hereto annexed, 
was protested at said Bank; and from the practice prevailing 
in said Bank, at the time said note matured, my best impres­
sion is that the said note was protested by me, and that I 
gave notice of the non payment thereof to the Deft-E. 
Beach by delivering the same in writing to him personally, 
or at his dwelling house in Pontiac, on the day the said note 
mature ; and to the Deft. H. Parke by leaving the said notice 
at the Post office at Pontiac, directed to said H. Parke at his 
place of residence"-
This is all the evidence of notice to the Defts-
For the Plff it is contended that this evidence was compe­
tent for the jury to pass upon, and they having found that 
notice was given, it is conclusive-
But whether the evidence was sufficient is not exclusively 
for the jury to determine-and as the question was reserved 
by the Judge on the trial, the question now is what direction 
this Court would give to the Jury if the case were now here 
on trial-
The witness�s swearing to his belief, which belief is 
founded upon the practice in the Bank or the general course of 
business has never been held sufficient-Some act done is re­
quired to be shown before such general practice can be per­
mitted to be allowed as a ground of belief-
Smedes vs. Utica Bank-20 John. 372. 
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Halliday vs. Martinet 20 John. r68-
Where the evid. of notice was quite similar to the evid. 
in this case-In that case a memo of notice made by a person 
in the office of a Notary Public of notice left at post office­
But the persons who made the memo being called as a wit. 
could not recollect any thing upon the subject-Who put the 
letter in the post office, or how it was directed,-
. 
-He further said that it was the custom of the office to leave 
notice at the residence of the indorser, if they could learn 
where it was, and if they could not discover it, to put a 
notice for him in the post office ; and that he had no doubt 
that inquiry was made for the residence of the indorser, and 
that it could not be ascertained; but he could not say that such 
inquiry was made by him, or any other person. 
The Judge who delivered the opinion of the Court says­
"If the Notary has stated, that the indorser could not be 
found, he would have would have made out sufficient to 
entitle the Plff to recover; but to charge a party on a contract 
which is conditional in its nature, and creates no liability until 
certain precedent acts are performed, by merely proving the 
general practice of the office in other cases, accompanied by 
the opinion of a witness, not resting on any recollection or 
knowledge, but manifestly derived from such usual practice 
only, would, in my opinion, be dangerous and unjust. There 
could be no security in the administration or Justice, if such 
an innovation on the rules of evidence should receive the 
sanction of our Courts." 
In the present case the evid. is even less than it was in the 
case of Halliday vs. Martinet, last cited-
The witness does not refer to a fact or circumstance with­
in his knowledge or recollection respecting the notice to the 
Defts-He says that from a memo which he found on the 
back of the certificate of Protest, in his own handwriting, it 
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appears that the · note was protested at the Bank, the day it 
became due-Even this does not relate to the notice to the 
indorsers-And the whole of his testimony in relation to the 
notice is his belief founded, and so stated by him to be, solely 
on the general practice prevailing in the Bank at the time-
There was no evidence at all upon the subject, and the 
jury could make no inference or presumption in the case­
-Verdict set aside-VENIRE DE NOVO 
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher was found in file No. 229; First Circuit-Law. The 
certificate of question reserved is in file No. 260, Fourth Circuit. The 
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 14· (Jan. 
I 9, I 842) reserved question filed;  p. I 8  (Jan. 2 I ,  I 842) argued and 
submitted. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the 
following entry : p. I 59 (March 29, I 842) certified that the evidence 
was insufficient to support proof of notice and that a new trial should 
be awarded. Also, see Calendar, Fourth Circuit, case 260 ; Calendar, 
First Circuit, Vol. I, case 229. 
JOHN CHAMBERLIN versus CULLEN BROWN 
March 3 I, I 842. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to two justices 
of the peace, Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. 
Judgment affirmed. 
A. & H. H. Emmons, attorneys for plaintiff. 
D. Stuart, attorney for defendant. 
EDITOR's NoTE : A copy of the opinion in this case, in Harring­
ton's handwriting, will be found in file No. I 95, First Circuit-Law. 
In printed form, it appears in a footnote in 2 Douglass (Mich.) I 20 
(I 849) .  It deals with notices to quit, forcible entry and detainer, 
function of juries in justices' courts, etc. Journal I, First Circuit, 
contains the following entries : p. I 46 (Feb. 4, I 842) rule for further 
return ; p. I 5 2  (Feb. 1 1 ,  I 842)  motion to expunge part of return ; 
p. I 53 (Feb. I 2, 1842) ; part of return ordered expunged ;  case 
argued and submitted ; p. I67 (March 3 I ,  I 842) judgment affirmed, 
Also, see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case 195 .  
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JAMES L. LOCKWOOD and HIRAM BARRETT 
versus JOHN SCUDDER and EDWIN WILCOX 
March 3 1 , 1 842. 
Although it appears that a writ of attachment directed to 
the sheriff of another county was levied by summoning a per­
son of that country who appeared and admitted that he had 
money and effects belonging to the defendants, the court is 
without jurisdiction to render judgment unless it appears that 
a writ of attachment "!las first directed to the sheriff of the 
county in which . the attachment suit was commenced and 
levied on property in that county. A suii in attachment must 
be "pending" before a writ may be issued to another county. 
(Revised Statutes of I838, p. sri.) 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Question reserved by Cir­
cuit Court, Wayne County; certified to Supreme Court. 
Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Certified by Supreme Court that 
motion to quash attachment and subsequent proceedings 
should be granted. 
J. G. Atterbury, attorney for plaintiff. 
A. D. Fraser, attorney for defendant. 
[INDORSEMENT) 
Sup. Court I st Cir. Jan" , 42 
Lockwood et al � 
vs. 
Scudder et al 
-
Mo. to quash 
Attachment-
Memo of opinion 
29 March '42 
LocKwooD v. ScuDDER 
James L. Lockwood & 
Hiram Barrett 
vs. 




Motion to quash and set aside proceedings on a writ of 
Attachment. Certified from Wayne Circuit, Court, on a 
statement of Facts agreed upon by the Attys of the parties. · 
From the facts agreed on it appears that the Plffs on the 
2 Feby '41 ,  obtained from the Clerk of the Cir. Court of 
Wayne Co. on the usual affidt--of indebtness and that Defts 
were non residents a writ of Attach. against the Deft, re­
turnable the next May term-And afterwards on the same 
day, filed an affidt that Defts had property in the County 
of Hillsdale, and another affidt that Henry A. Delavan of the 
Co. of Hillsdale, had monies & effects in his hands belonging 
to the Defts-And upon these affidt"--obtained another writ 
of Attach t directed to the Shff of Hillsdale County and re­
turnable at the said May term. To the the first writ, directed 
to the Shff of Wayne County, the Shff returned that he could 
find no goods, &"&" in the County where onto levy the At­
tacht-
U nder the 2 d writ of Attach t directed to the Shff of Hills­
dale, H. A. Delavan was summoned as Garnishee, and on the 
return of the writ appeared and admitted that he had moneys 
and effects of Defts in his hands-
At the May Term '41 the Defts Atty moved the Court 
below to quash & set aside all the proceedings. 
The grounds relied upon in support of this mo. are 
I .  That as the writ directed to the Shff of Wayne Co. was 
not levied on any property, the second writ directed to the 
Shff of Hillsdale Co. was issued without any authority of 
law-
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2. That the Cir. Court for the County of Wayne could only 
acquire jurisdiction of the cause by return of the writ of 
Attach t upon property within that County, and as no property 
was attached on that writ, or any other proceedings had upon 
it, by which the Cir. Court could acquire jurisdiction, that 
Court cannot take jurisdiction of the cause in virtue of the 
issuing and service of the writ directed to Hillsdale Co. 
3· That if the writ of Attacht issued to the County of Hills­
dale was regularly issued, yet the Plffs could not on such 
writ, proceed against the rights, credits &" in the hands of the 
Garnishee, but could only proceed to attach the lands, tene­
ments, goods or chattels of the Defts situate in that County-
In opposition to the motion, and in support of the pro­
ceedings it is contended 
That the Stat. authorised the issuing of the second writ of 
Attach\ on the taking of the writ of Attach t in the proper 
County; and that the jurisdiction of the Court over the cause 
on the service of the 2d writ, was not dependent upon the tak­
ing of property on the original writ-And that inasmuch as 
the Statutes directs that the same proceeding shall be had 
upon the 2d writ as upon the original writ-The Plffs had a 
right to Garnishee any one having moneys, credits or effects 
in his hands belonging to the Defts-& that chases in action, 
are properly included under terms "goods & chattels" men­
tioned in the Stat.-
The determination of the questions raised in this case will 
depend upon the construction of the Stat. for-
It is not, and cannot be questioned, that the Legislature 
may, if it deems proper, give jurisdiction to the Circuit Court 
of any County in cases of Attach t by the service of a writ of 
Attachment in any other County in the State-
The first seventeen Sections of Chap. r ,  Title 4, Part 3d 
of the Rev. Stat. provide for the issuing, and serving writs of 
Attachts and the manner of proceeding to judgt-
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The r 8th Sect., under which the 2d writ of Attach\ was 
issued in this case, provides, that "In all cases of Attach­
ments in virtue of the provisions of this Chapter, if the Pl:ff, 
or some other person in his behalf, shall make and file with 
the Clerk an affid\ stating therein that he believes that the 
Deft in Attach t, has lands, tenements, goods or chattels, 
situate in any other county in this state, naming therein the 
county, the clerk shall, on application in behalf of the Plff, 
make out and seal another writ of attach t, directed to the 
Sh:ff, or other proper officer of the County in which such prop­
erty shall be, who shall serve and return . the same in the 
same manner, and under the same liabilities and penalties, as 
if such writ had issued, a�d been made returnable in his own 
County: and on such writ being executed, the saine proceed­
ings shall be had, as hereinbefore prescribed-" 
The contingency, declared by the Stat., upon which a 
second writ may be taken into another county, is the pendency 
of an attach t in virtue of the previous provisions of that 
Chapter. 
The words of the Statute are " in all cases of Attach t, &c. 
seem to me to require that a suit in Attach t be pending-that 
property has been attached on the original writ, or a Garnishee 
summoned, so as to give the Court jurisdiction, on the origi­
nal writ, before another writ may be issued into another 
County-
It does not appear to have been the intention of the Legis­
lature to give jurisdiction by the · issuing of the second writ, 
but when jurisdiction has been acquired by an attach t of prop­
erty, or by summoning the Garnishee under the original 
writ, to give additional and further process, to perfect the 
remedy, and reach other property of the Defts. 
Such, we should naturally suppose was the intention of 
the Legislature, and there is nothing in the Stat. which re­
quires a different construction-On the contrary, the very 
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language of the Stat. seems to require such a construction­
The very language employed seems to require, that, be­
fore the second writ shall isssue, an attachment shall be pend­
ing over which the Court has jurisdiction-
The language is "In all cases of Attachment in virtue of 
the provisions of this chapter" - -
This does not mean, merely the issuing of the writ-It 
includes also such proceedings on the writ, as to give the 
Court jurisdiction, and when that jurisdiction has attached, 
then the PHis may proceed, under the I gth Section, to bring 
within the jurisdiction of the Court any property which may 
be found in another County-
-And besides, if jurisdiction may be acquired in virtue 
only of the service of the collatteral writ, a suit may be com­
menced in a Cir. Court in any County, when there is no prop­
erty, and for the very purpose of attaching property in another 
County-For in order to obtain a writ of Attacht it is not 
necessary that an affidt should be made stating that the Deft 
has property in the County.-
Statutes of this description, giving a special remedy in 
derogation of Common law rights, are to be strictly con­
strued 
Mo. granted-&c 
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was found in .file No. 247, First Circuit-Law. 
Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entry: 
P· I 68  (March 3 I I 842) writs of attachment issued in the courts 
below and all subsequent proceedings thereon, quashed. Also see 
Calendar, First Circuit, I, case No. 247· 
PAULDING v. wILKINS r 6 r  
LUTHER MOSES versus STEAM BOAT MISSOURI 
March 3 1 , 1 8 42. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Questions -reserved by Cir­
cuit Court, Wayne County; certified to Supreme Court. 
Opinion per curiam. Certified _ by Supreme Court that 
demurrer to plea should be sustained . 
. . . . . . . . . . , attorney for plaintiff. 
. . . . . . . . . .  , attorney for defendant. 
EDITOR's NoTE : The original MS. opinion in this case has not 
been found. In printed form, it appears in I Mich. 507 {Appendix) 
( I  8 52 ) .  It deals with application of stat11:te giving liens on boats, 
causes of action arising outside of state, etc. Volume I of the Journal, 
First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 147 (Feb. 5, I 842) 
argued and submitted ; p.  I 69 (March 3I,  I 842) demurrer of 
plaintiff to defendant's plea sustained. Also see Calendar, First 
Circuit-Law, case No. 248. 
MORRISON PAULDING versus ROSS WILKINS and 
JOHN S. BAGG impleaded with ELIJAH J. ROBERTS 
March 3 1, 1 842. 
I .  A writ of error sued out in the names of two of three per­
sons against whom a joint judgment was rendered should 
be quashed unless an amendment is allowed. 
2. A t  common law a writ of error may not be amended by 
adding a party. 
3 ·  In Michigan the statute authorizing amendments in sub­
stance (Revised Statutes of r'i838, p. 46r) does not apply 
to proceedings in error. Such proceedings, in the absence 
of usage or court rules changing the common law (id., p. 
522), may be amended only in form (id., p. 46r :) .  
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Error to Circuit Court, 
Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Writ of error 
quashed. 
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D. E. Harbaugh & Rowland, attorneys for plaintiff in 
error. 
D. Goodwin, attorney for defendant in error. 
[INDORSEMENT] 
Sup. Court 1•t Cir. 
JanY 1 842 
Paulding � , 
vs. 
Bagg et al Writ of Error 
Mo. to quash & 
Mo. to amend. 
29 March '42 
Memo of Opinion. 
[ OPINION] 
Morrison Paulding 
I Ross Willi�s & John s. Writ of Error to Wayne Circuit Bagg, Y impleaded with Court E. J. Roberts 
A motion is made by the Defts. in Error that the Writ be 
set aside and quashed, on the ground that judgt in the Court 
below was rendered against three Defts, to wit the present 
Defts in Error-Wilkins and Bagg, and also against Elijah J. 
Roberts. 
From the return of the record to the writ of Error it 
appears that Judgt was rendered against all the three Defts 
below. 
The· motion must be granted unless, the Court shall grant 
leave to amend the writ of Error, on the motion made by 
Plffs in Error. 
The only question therefore is whether the amendment 
shall be allowed. 
PAUI.:DING v. WILKINS 
In support of the mo. to amend the counsel for the Pl:ff re­
lies upon the Sect. 20 & 2 1 , Chap. 8, Title 2 part 3d of the 
Rev. Stat. Sect. 20 declares that "The Court in which any civil 
action is pending, may at any time before judgt rendered 
therein, allow amendments, either in form or substance, of any 
process, pleading or proceedings in such action, on such terms 
as shall be just and reasonable"-
The counsel for the Defts contend that this provision does 
not include Writs of Error, but only original suits pending 
in Court and before final judgt therein-in as much as there is 
also in the Rev. Stat. express provision made for amendments 
in causes pending on Writ of Error. The Sect. 2 1  of the Chap. 
above cited, providing that defects or imperfections in matter 
of form found in the record, or proceedings, may be amended 
by the Court into which the record shall be removed by Writ 
of error. 
And that by Chap. 4. Title 4· pt 3 of the Rev. Stat. regu­
lates the proceedings on writ of error. 
Sect. 6 is in these words "The proceedings upon writs of 
error as to the assignment of error, and as to the appearance 
of the Deft in error, and the pleadings, judgt and all other 
matters not herein provided for, shall be according to the 
Course of the Common law, as modified by the practice and 
usage in this State, and such general rules as shall be made by 
the Supreme Court." 
We think the 20 Sect. does not relate to amendments on 
Writ of Error-The amendments there allowed are ex­
pressly limited to amendments before final judgt and the 
Judgt in the Circuit Court was a final judgt-The judgt 
denominated final, does not mean a judgt on a writ of error 
in the appellate Court. · 
-And the statute having provided expressly for amend­
ments in causes pending on Writs of Error, this court must be 
governed, in deciding this motion, by the course of the Com. 
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Law, and the practice and usage in this State-Because this 
court has not by any general rules provided for amend­
ments-
Nor has any usage or practice obtained in this State except 
the course of the Coin. law practice in this respect. 
By the practice of the Com. law a writ of error cannot be 
amended by adding another party. 
Nor is [it] allowed in England since the 5 G. I Ch. 1 3  
which authorizes amendment in all writs of Error wherein 
there shall be any variance from the original record, or other 
defect. 
One case is found (2 St. 682) where an amendment was 
allowed by adding other parties ; but this has been over­
ruled-2 Str. I I r o--r Lord Raym 7 1  2 Lord Ra� 1403. & 
8 T. R. 302. 
In the case of Andrews & another, vs. Bostwich, 3 Mass 
R. where 2 only of those Defts against whom judgt was 
rendered, brought error, the writ was quashd. 
The case of Clapp vs. Bromagham et al, 8 Cowan & 9 
Cowan, in the Court of Errors, cited in support of the mo. to 
amend, does not apply to this question-That was a Writ of 
Error on a Judgt of Partition of real estate-
The Petition was filed against Clapp, and others un­
. known, which was in conformity with the requirements of the 
Stat. respecting partition-
Clapp, the only one of the respondents named, or known, 
brought writ of error in his own name, omitting the words, 
"and others unknown ["]-
-Deft in  Error moved to quash on the ground that all the 
Respondants had not joined in bringing error-PHI in Error 
moved to amend by adding, and others unknown-The 
amendment was allowed, on the ground that it was a matter of 
form-merely descriptive of the proceedings-
And Spencer, Senator, in giving the opinion of the Court, 
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said the proceedings below were not according to the course of 
the Com. law, but peculiar, and given by the Stat, which de­
clares that "any of the parties to such judgt may bring writ 
of Error.-The judgt determines nothing, nor can this court 
determine any thing respecting the persons "unknown." ["]  
The only question which can be agitated in this court re­
lates to the rights of Clapp, the PHI in Error. 
The practice of summons & severance does not apply. The 
reason given why all the Defts should join in a Writ of 
Error, is to prevent multiplicity of suits-that is, different 
suits presenting the same question, but if the judgt in partition 
be final, the same question will not be presented on different 
writs of error-But in this case the record is not correctly 
described-and the amendment was allowed.-
It will be seen therefore that in the case of Clapp vs. 
Bromagham, the amendment was allowed not for the purpose 
of adding substantially other parties, but merely that the 
writ might correspond with the description of the cause in the 
record-and on the ground that the proceedings were not ac­
cording to the course of the Com. law. 
This same question was decided in this Court on the 5 
March '41 in the case of I ves vs. Chaffee-that was originally 
a Suit appealed from a justice of the peace into the Cir. 
Court of Wayne Co.-
Judgt was rendered in the Cir. Court against Ives the 
appellant, and Dubois his surety-! ves only sued out a Writ 
of Error-A mo. was made to quash on the ground that 
Dubois ought to have joined-and a Mo. by Plff to amend­
The Mo. to amend was denied, on the authorities above cited 
-and the writ was quashed-Mo. to amend denied & the 
mo. to quash is granted-
EDIToR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 1 68, First Circuit-Law. 
Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following 
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entries : p. I 04 (Jan. 6 I 84 I )  defendant in error ordered to file 
joinder; p. 1 08 (Jan. 9, I 84 I )  motion to set aside above order ; p. 
I 09 (Jan. I I , I 84 1 )  order set aside ; p. 1 27 (Jan. 5, 1 842) motion 
to quash writ of error ; p. 1 29 (Jan. 6, I 842)  motion argued and 
submitted ; p. 1 3 1  (Jan; 7, 1 842) motion to amend writ of error; p. 
1 35 (Jan. I I , I 842)  motion argued; p. I67  (March 3 1 , 1 842) writ 
of error quashed. Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. 
I, case No. I 68. 
ALBERT H. PORTER and CHARLES PARSONS versus 
ARTHUR G. SPARHAWK and SAMUEL 
SHERWOOD 
March 3 1 ,  1 842 . 
A person sued as principal, who has defaulted and consents 
to testify, is a competent witness for the plaintiff against a 
codefendant sued as secondarily liable on the same contract. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit, on transfer from Fourth 
Circuit. Question reserved by Circuit Court, Oakland County ; 
certified to Supreme Court. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. 
Certified by Supreme Court that Sparhawk is a competent 
witness for the plaintiffs . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . , attorney for plaintiffs . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . , attorney for defendants. 
[INDORSEMENT] 
Sup. Court 4 Cir. J an7 I 842 
Porter et al l 
VS 
Sparhawk et al 
. vs. 
Knowlton et al l 
Aynur 
Mem0 of Opinion 
March 3 1-decided-
PoRTER v. SPARHAWK 
Porter & Parsons l 
vs. 
Sparhawk & Sherwood 
[OPINION] 
This is a case certified to this court from the Oakland 
Circuit by the Presiding [Judge] of that Court, and presents 
only this question, Whether in assumpsit against two clefts, 
and one of them, the principal in the Contract having suffered 
judgment against him by default, is a competent wit. for the 
Plff to support the action against the other deft, he the princi­
pal, consenting to testify? 
The decisions upon this question have been somewhat 
con [ tra] dictory both in England, and in the United States. 
In the case of Chapman vs Graves 2 Campb. R.  333 Le 
Blanc J. said "The general rule is that a party to the record 
is not admissible as a Witness"-and the evidence was re­
jected. 
In Emmet vs. Bradley, 7 Taunton R. 599, 3 of 5 Defts 
pleaded Bankruptcy, and the evidence having established 
their plea, it was proposed to enter a verdict for them forth­
with, and to call them as witnesses, to show that the other two 
were not j oint contractors, but the evidence was rejected. 
And in Mant vs. Mainwaring, 8 Taunt. 1 39, a co de­
fendant who had suffered judgt by default, was not allowed 
when called as a witness for the Plff to show that the other 
clefts were his partners. 
Dallas and Park Justices, on the ground that he was 
interested-But Burrough Justice, said "The general rule is, 
that no party to an action can be examined but by consent ; 
and all the parties to the record must consent ; and without 
such consent none can be called. In this case, he continues, 
the codefendants objected, and therefore the witness was 
properly rejected"-
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In the case of Brown vs. Brown, 4 
Taunt. 7 52 it was decided that a witness 
who had suffered judgt by default, could 
not be called for the plff to prove the partnership between 
himself and the other Deft., because he had an interest 
in fixing the other Deft. with a proportion of the debt ; inas­
much as, having suffered judgt by default, if the Plff failed 
in the joint action, he the Witness would be liable for the 
whole in a separate action. 
Cited 8 Taunt. 
I39  
But in several other cases it has been held that when a 
party to the suit had suffered judgt by Deft. and had no inter­
est in favor of the party calling him, that he was a competent 
witness. 
Ward vs. Haydon and another, 2 Esp. N. P. C. 553 
Raven vs. Dunning 3 Esp. N. P. C. 25. Buller N. P. 98 .  
But the latest case I have seen, decided in the Com. Pleas 
in England in I 8 3 I ,  appears to me to lay down the correct 
rule. 
This was the case of Worrall vs. J a" Jones, wm Baker & 
Ed. Jones, 7 Bingh. 395-Debt on Bond, conditioned for 
the pai of rent by Edward Jones, as te�ant to the Plff, 
pursuant to an agrt made in Jan7 I 8o6. 
The two Jones's suffered Judgt by default, and Baker 
pleaded that the tenancy under the agrt ceased on March 
I 8 I 6, up to which time all rent had been paid. And the issue 
to be tried was, whether the tenancy under the agrt had 
ceased-
At the trial before Bosanquet, Justice, the Plff called Ed. 
Jones, one of the Defts as a Witness to prove that his tenancy 
under the agrt continued to I 829. 
His testimony was objected to, on the ground, that he was 
a party to the record, but the testimony was reed, subject to a 
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motion to the Court as to its admissibility, and the PHI re­
covered a verdict. 
A rule nisi for a new trial was obtained on the _ground 
that the Witness had been improperly reed. 
On the argument the cases were fully cited. 
Tindal, Ch. Jus. delivered the opinion of the Court in 
which he says-"No case has been cited, nor can any be 
found, in which a Witness has been refused upon the objection 
in the abstract, that he was a party to the suit ; on the contrary, 
many have been brought forward, in which parties to the suit, 
who have suffered judg1 by default, have been admitted as 
Wit. against their own interest : and the only inquiry seems to 
have been, in a majority of the cases, whether the party called . 
was interested in the event of the suit or not ; and the admis­
sion or rejection of the Witness has depended on the result 
of this inquiry. , 
The exclusion on the ground of interest is a known princi­
ple of the law of Evidence ; and so much did Lord Chief 
Baron Gilbert consider this as the only solid objection against 
the evidence of a party to the suit, that after laying it down 
as a general rule, that no man interested in the matter in 
question can be a Witness for himself, he states, that several 
corollaries may be deduced from this rule ; of which he gives, 
as the first "That the Plff or Deft cannot be a Witness in his 
own cause ; for these are the persons who have a most immedi­
ate interest, and it is not to be presumed that a man who com­
plains without cause, or defends without Justice, should have 
honesty enough to confess it." "That a party to the record ["]  
continues Ch. J .  Tindall ["] should not be compelled against 
his consent to become a Witness in a court of law, is [ a  rule] 
founded in good sense and sound policy ; it forms the point 
of the decision in the case [of] the King vs. Woodburn IO 
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East 3 9 5, and the decision of that case leads to the necessary 
inference, that if the party consents to be examined, he is then 
an adm!ssible Witness. [ " ]  
H e  adds "We think, therefore, when the party to the 
Suit, who has suffered judgt by default, waives the objection 
and consents to be examined, and is called against his own 
interest, there is no ground, either on principle or authority, 
for rejecting him." 
The case at bar is precisely like the case in 7 Bingh. Here 
the principal in the contract was called, and consented to be 
examined as a Witness. Ifjudgt should be rendered against 
all the Defts he could not compel a contribution, as it was his 
own proper debt. And the only interest he could have would 
be in the failure of Plff to establish the point contract, and 
against that interest he was called to testify-and waiving his 
strict legal objection, and consenting to testify, I may say 
with the Court in the Case of Worrall vs. Jones and others, 
"there is no ground, either on principle or authority for re­
jecting him"-
( Qn? J udm't set aside? )  
James M .  Aynur 
I 
vs. The Same question 
wm W. Knowlton, 
wm Phelps and Did the Wit. consent? 
Olmstead Chamberlain 
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief 
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 249, First Circuit-Law. The 
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entry: p. 1 9  (Jan. 
2 I ,  I 842) reserved question filed ; case submitted without argument. 
Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entry : 
p. 1 70 (March 3 I ,  I 842) answer certified to Supreme Court, Fourth 
Circuit that defendant Sparhawk is a competent witness on the part of 
the plaintiff. Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, case No. 249· 
RoYCE v. BRADBURN 
JAMES F. ROYCE versus THOMAS BRADBURN 
March 3 r, r 842. 
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to two justices of 
the peace, Washtenaw County. Opinion by Whipple, J. 
Judgment reversed. 
E. Mundy, attorney for plaintiff. 
E. Lawrence & 0. Hawkins, attorney for defendant. 
EDITOR's NoTE : The original MS. opinion in the above case has 
not been found. In printed form it appears in a footnote in 2 Douglass 
(Mich. ) 377  ( 1 849) . It deals with forcible entry and detainer, 
privity of parties, etc. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains 
the following entry: p. 165 (March 3 1 ,  1 842) judgment reversed. 
Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case No. 242. File No. 
242, First Circuit-Law, contains copies of orders made in the case. 
Supreme Court Rules 
EDITOR's NoTE : The following rules have been copied from 
journals of the Supreme Court. It is possible that other rules were 
recorded in the missing journal for the Second Circuit. In 1 838 the 
Legislature directed the Supreme Court to formulate rules for prac­
tice in both the Supreme and Circuit Courts in all matters not ex­
pressly provided by law (Rev. St. 1 838, Part III, Title I, Ch. I, 
Sec. 5 ,  p. 358) ,  and that within two years and at least once in every 
seven years thereafter, the Court should revise the rules to simplify 
and shorten proceedings, etc. (ibid.) .  
January 3, 1837. 
ORDERED that the rules of practice of the Supreme Court 
of the late Territory of Michigan be adopted as the rules of 
practice of this Court until the further order of Court. 
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. I ]  
January 13, 1837. 
ORDERED that in all cases on writ of Error now pending 
in this Court for the first circuit where the pleadings are not 
completed, Errors shall be assigned in twenty days from the 
date of this order, and Joinder in Error shall be filed in 
twenty days after the time hereby limited for filing the as­
signment of Errors, where the Defendant in Error has ap­
peared-and where there has been no appearance, the De­
fendant in Error shall join in Error in twenty days after a 
notice served on him that Errors have been assigned-and 
when the plaintiff shall be in default under this rule, Judg­
ment of non pros may be entered against the plaintiff, or the 
Court may inspect the record and enter final Judgment at the 
option of the Defendant-and when the Defendant shall. be 
in default the plaintiff may proceed Ex parte. 
ORDERED that in all cases on writ of Error to be brought 
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into this Court sitting in the first Circuit where the writ shall 
be returnable on the first Tuesday of June next the plaintiff 
shall assign Errors on the day next succeeding the return day; 
and the Defendant shall j oin in Error in two days after serv­
ice of a notice that Errors have been assigned, where the De­
fendant shall reside within thirty miles of the place where the 
Court shall be held-and where the Defendant resides more 
than thirty miles from such place, joinder in Error shall be 
filed within such additional time after the service of such 
notice, as a computation of the distance of Defendants resi­
dence shall give, allowing one day for every twenty miles 
over and above the first thirty miles, Excluding Sunday; and 
in cases of default under this rule, the same proceeding, shall 
be had as provided in the rule relative to causes in Error now 
pending in this Court for the first Circuit. 
ORDERED that the first Tuesday of June next Ensuing be 
and said day is hereby fixed by this Court as a return day, to 
which all writs lawfully issuing out of this Court until that 
day may be made returnable. 
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 2 1 ]  
June 28, 1837 
I .  Ordered that in cases on certiorari to a justices court, it 
shall not be necessary to make a formal assignment of 
errors in law, but instead thereof a brief shall be made, in 
which shall be specified the points of error relied on to­
gether with the authorities to which reference shall be 
made. in argument : and- that it shall be the duty of consel 
for each party making a brief to furnish one copy to the 
opposite consel, and one for each member of the Court. 
2 .  Ordered that in cases on writ of error, assignment of 
errors shall be filed on or before the first day of the term, 
to which the Writ is made returnable, and joinder in error 
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shall be filed thereto, at or before the opening of the 
Court on the second day of the term : and that in cases of 
Certiorari to a justices court where errors in fact are 
intended to be relied on, the assignment of such facts & 
the j oinder in error shall be filed severally within the 
times respectively limited in this rule, for filing assignment 
of errors in joinder in cases on writ of error, unless the 
court in either of the above cases for special reasons shall 
allow or direct a longer or shorter time for filing such 
assignment or joinder. 
3·  Ordered that in cases of certiorari to a justices Court, the 
Plaintiff in error or his consel, at any time after service of 
the writ of certiorari, may serve a written notice, personally 
on the defendant in error, to appear on the first, or any 
other certain day of the term to which the writ shall be 
made returnable, and hear & answer the errors to be as­
signed in the cause which notice shall be served at least 
twelve days before the first day of the next term, and on 
proof of the service of such notice & no appearance being 
entered for the defendant, the Court will proceed to hear 
the cause ex parte. 
4· Ordered that in cases in writ of error, the Plaintiff at his 
option rriay coerce the appearance of the defendant in 
error, by a writ of Sceri facias audiendum errores, or by a 
personal service of a notice to appear and join in error on 
the first or other specified day of the term to which the 
writ shall be made returnable-notice to be served on the 
defendants at least twelve days before the first day of the 
term on which the defendant was notified to appear. 
5. Ordered that in cases, where by any rule of this Court, 
personal service of a notice or a copy of a rule is required 
to be made, a service thereof by copy left at the place of 
residence of the party, with some member of the family, in 
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which the party resides, of the age of fourteen years, or 
service upon the Attorney of the party shall be deemed 
as personal service. 
[Journal, Third Circuit, pp. 2-3 ] 
January IJ, i838. 
ORDERED 1 .  On the return of a writ of Error or Certiorari, 
if the defendant in Error shall fail or neglect to cause his 
appearance to be entered during the term to which the writ 
of Error or Certiorari shall be made returnable, the plaintiff 
in Error may Enter a rule at any time thereafter in the Com­
mon rule Book requiring the Defendant in Error to cause his 
appearance to be Entered within sixty days after the service 
of notice of said rule, or that his default be Entered. 
2. The service of such notice may be on the said Defend­
ant personally or by putting the same into the Post Office di­
rected to his residence, or by affixing the same in some con­
spicuous place in the-Clerks office, and upon filing an affidavit 
of such service the plaintiff in Error may cause the Defend­
ants default to be entered in the Book of Common rules. 
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I ,  p. 41-42 ] 
January I 2, I839· 
Ordered by the Court that in all cases pending in the 
Chancery side of this Court, in which Subpoena has been 
returned served, and in which no pleadings have been filed 
by the defendant, that the defendant file his plea answer or 
demurrer to the Complainanes bill of Complaint within sixty 
days from this day; and that the Complainant file his replica­
tion or Exceptions to such answer within thirty days there­
after. 
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 59] 
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February 27, 1839. 
Ordered that the rules adopted by this Court for the 
Government of the practice of the different Circuit Courts 
of this State, so far as the same relate to the obtaining of com­
missions to take the depositions of witnesses shall apply to, 
and be the order of, this Court until further order. 
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 72] 
January 21, 1841. 
It is ordered by the Court that in actions of Right made 
returnable to this Court at the present term. Declaration be 
filed in Sixty days from the first day of the term and Subse­
quent pleadings in twenty days thereafter Alternately. 
[Journal, Fourth Circuit, p. 6]  
January 4, 1842. 
Ordered that Saturday the eight day of January instant 
be a general return day for process issuing from this Court. 
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 126] 
January 7, 1842. 
Ordered that in Cases of Writs of Error issued out of 
& returnable to this Court. The Defendant in Error may take 
a rule upon the Plaintiff in Error to appear and bring in or 
file the Record in Two days from the return day of the Writ 
of Error-And after record is filed, the Defendant in Error 
may take a rule upon the Plaintiff in Error to assign Errors in 
two days and after Errors are assigned, the Plaintiff in Error 
may take a rule upon the Defendant in Error to plead or 
demur to such assignment or join therein in Two days. And 
in case of Default in either case under this rule on proof of 
a service of a copy of the rule upon the opposite party or his 
SuPREME CouRT RuLES 
attorney-& if the default be on the part of the Plaintiff he 
shall be non-prossed, and if the default be on the part of the 
Defendant, the judgment shall be reversed-Provided how­
ever that the Court may, in its discretion, on special cause 
shewn, extend the time for either of the said rules and may 
set aside any default under this rule. 
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 1 32 ]  
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Rule I 
Every attorney shall have an agent in each place 
where there is a circuit court held in this state, except in 
the city or town where such attorney keeps his office. No 
·person shall be an agent unless he be an attorney of the 
court, clerk of the court, or deputy clerk. The appoint­
ment of agents shall be made in writing, signed by the 
attorney, and filed in the clerk's office ; and the clerk 
shall keep a catalogue of the appointments filed in the 
office, with the attorneys' names alphabetically arranged. 
Rule z. 
Where the attorney for the adverse party resides 
more than two miles from the place of holding court, 
service of papers contemplated by these rules may be 
made on an agent ; but if he has no such agent, such 
service may be made by putting the notice or papers in 
the post office, directed to the attorney at his place of 
residence, to be ascertained according to the best infor­
mation and belief of the person making such service. 
Rule 3·  
All notices shall be in writing, and shall be served 
on the attorney in the cause, or his agent ; and where a 
party who is also an attorney of this court, shall prose­
cute in person, or, if a defendant, shall give notice that 
he is an attorney and will defend in person, all notices 
and other papers shall be served on him in like manner ; 
and where the object is to bring the party into contempt 
for disobeying any rule or order of the court, the service 
shall be on such party personally, unless otherwise spe­
cially ordered by the court. 
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Rule 4· 
Notices and papers may be served on an attorney or How to be served. 
his agent, by leaving the same with him or his agent, or. 
with his clerk in his office, or with a person having 
charge thereof ; or when no person is to be found in the 
office, by leaving the same, between the hours of six in 
the !*1morning and nine in the evening, in some [*p. 4] 
suitable and conspicuous place in such office; or if the 
office be not open so as to admit of service therein, then 
by leaving the same at the attorney's residence, with 
some person of suitable age and discretion. 
Rule 5· 
Where a party, other than an attorney of this court, 
prosecutes or defends in person, the service of papers 
may be on such party personally, or by putting the same 
into the post office, directed to him at his place of resi­
dence. And no service of notice or papers in the ordinary 
proceedings in a cause shall be necessary to be made 
on a defendant who has not appeared therein and given 
notice to the plaintiff's attorney of his intention to de­
fend the suit, except where the defendant is returned 
imprisoned for want of bail, in which case a copy of the 
declaration shall be delivered to him, or to the sheriff or 
jailer in whose custody he shall be; and when an excep­
tion is entered to bail, and no notice of retainer of an 
attorney to defend is given, notice of such exception 
shall be delivered to the sheriff or one of his deputies. 
Rule 6. 
No private-agreement or consent between the parties 
or their attorneys, in respect to the proceedings in a 
cause, shall be binding unless the same shall have been 
reduced to the form of a rule by consent, and entered 
When an attorney 
is a party. 
When service not 
necessary. 
All agreements to 
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accordingly in the book of common rules ; or unless 
evidence thereof shall be in writing, subscribed by the 
party, or his attorney, against whom the same shall be '
alleged. 
Rule 7· 
Original writs may be issued in vacation, or in term 
time, and made returnable in any day in term. 
Rule 8.  
Every rule to which a party would, according to 
the practice of the court, be entitled of course, without 
showing special cause, shall be denominated a common 
rule; and every other rule shall be denominated a spe­
cial rule. All common rules, and all rules by consent 
of parties, shall be entered with the clerk at his office, 
in a book to be provided by him for that purpose, to be 
called the "Common Rule Book," and may be entered 
at any time, as well in vacation as during term; and the 
day when the rule shall be entered shall be noted there­
in, and the party may enter such rule as he may con­
ceive himself entitled to, of course, but at his peril. 
l•1Rule 9. 
The day on which any rule shall be entered, or 
order, notice, pleading or paper served, shall be ex­
cluded in the computation of the time for complying 
with the exigency of such rule, order or notice, pleading 
or paper, and the day on which a compliance therewith is 
required, shall be included, except where it shall fall on 
a Sunday, in which case the party shall have the next 
day to comply therewith. When by the terms of any 
order an act is directed to be performed instanter, it 
shall be done in twenty-four hours. 
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Rule IO. 
In all suits originally commenced in the circuit court, 
declarations shall be filed with the clerk of the court 
within sixty days from the first day of the term to which 
the writ is made returnable, and the defendant shall 
plead thereto within thirty days from the expiration of 
the ' time to declare; and all subsequent pleadings shall 
respectively be filed within ten days each after the other, 
until issue of fact or law be joined. 
Rule I I . 
In suits commenced by the service of declaration, 
the defendant shall be entitled to the same time to plead 
subsequent to the next succeeding term after the service 
of declaration, as is provided by the preceding rule in 
cases commenced by original writs, and all subsequent 
pleadings shall be in accordance with said rule ; and in 
cases against a number of defendants, where process shall 
not have been served on all of them, declaration may be 
filed against all the defendants, and a copy thereof 
served on the defendant or defendants not served with 
process, and such defendant or defendants shall plead 
thereto in thirty days after notice of the filing thereof 
and service of such copy, and in case such defendant or 
defendants shall not plead thereto in such time, the 
plaintiff, on affidavit filed of such service, may enter 
the appearance and default of such defendant or de­
fendants ;  subsequent pleadings to be filed in ten days 
each consecutively, as under the preceding rules. 
Rule I 2. 
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torney within fifty days from the first day of the term 
to which the writ is made returnable ; and in cases com­
menced by declaration, within fifty days from the first 
day of the next succeeding after service thereof. 
Rule 13 .  
When the plaintiff's attorney receives notice of re­
tainer, as is provided in the preceding rule, he shall, at 
or before the time limited for filing £•1declaration, 
serve a copy thereof on the defendant's attorney; and if 
such notice of retainer be not received until after the 
time above stated, then a copy of such declaration shall 
be served within ten days after receiving such notice. 
Rule 14. 
After the service of a copy of such declaration, the 
party filing any pleading, whether plaintiff or defend­
ant, shall, on or before the day limited for filing any 
such, serve a copy of such pleading on the attorney of 
the opposite party. 
Rule r s. 
When a defendant has been taken upon a capias ad 
respondendum, and has given satisfactory appearance 
bail, the plaintiff may proceed to final judgment, which 
proceeding shall not release the appearance bail. Until 
the defendant has appeared and perfected special bail, 
he is not entitled to a copy of the declaration, nor can he 
plead thereto, nor take any default against the plaintiff ;  
and where the defendant in any original writ accepts 
service, his appearance may be entered and he will be 
considered in court. 
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Rule r 6. 
If the plaintiff shall make default in declaring, then 
the defendant, or if either party shall make default in 
answering, then the opposite party, may have the de­
fault entered in the common rule book; but it shall not 
be competent to enter such . default unless on receiving 
notice of retainer as aforesaid, copies of the pleadings in 
the cause have been served, as provided by these rules. 
Rule r 7. 
The defendant's default being duly entered, the 
plaintiff shall not be bound afterwards to accept a plea, 
unless the defendant, as soon as he shall know that the 
default has been entered, shall serve an affidavit of 
merits,-plead issuably and pay or tender the costs of the 
default. 
Rule r 8. 
The party in whose favor default shall have been 
entered, may at any time after four days in term shall 
have intervened, have a rule e!ltered in the common rule 
book to make such default absolute, and for such judg­
ment as the party is entitled to by reason of the default. 
If such default be taken by plaintiff for want of plea, 
he shall, by said rule, in cases where it is competent, 
make reference to the clerk to assess the damages ; and 
in cases where they must be assessed by a jury, said 
rule shall direct that such jury be called to make the 
assessment. 
f*1Rule I 9. 
The assessment being made as provided by the 
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Rule 20. 
Pleas in abatement, or to the jurisdiction, and all 
other dilatory pleas, may be filed without any rule for 
a special, or a general special, imparlance within the 
time limited by the tenth rule. 
Rule 2 1 . 
The court will not entertain a motion to set aside 
the proceedings in a cause, on the ground of misnomer 
of the party arrested, but will leave him to his remedy 
by a plea in abatement . 
• 
Rule 22. 
The plaintiff may at any time, upon notice to the 
defendant or his attorney, and on the payment of all the 
costs taxed in the cause, discontinue his suit in the com­
mon rule book. 
Rule 23. 
Every attorney filing any pleading in a cause, shall 
endorse thereon the costs allowed him by law therefor, 
and the number of folios in the draft and copies thereof. 
Rule 24. 
All motions to set aside a default shall be made and 
filed within the four first days of the term next after the 
default shall have been entered; and in all cases of spe­
cial motions (except a motion for a continuance) the 
affidavits and other papers on which the same may be 
founded, shall be filed at the time of making the mo­
tion, and copies thereof shall be served on the attorney 
of the opposite party on or before the day of making 
such motion. 
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Rule 25. 
All motions shall be in writing, shall have endorsed 
thereon the names of the parties and their respective 
attorneys ; and no motion which is resisted shall be 
argued on the day it is made, without the consent of 
parties, unless the court, on good cause being shown, 
otherwise direct. 
Rule 26. 
When either party shall demur to any pleading, he 
shall briefly but plainly specify the objections, in matters 
of substance, as well as those of form, upon which he 
intends to rely on the argument ; and if the l*1pleading 
shall be adjudged bad for any cause not so specified, 
the party pleading, when allowed to amend on terms, 
will be permitted to do so without costs. 
Rule 27. 
The plaintiff may at any time before the default for 
not replying shall be entered, if the plea shall be a spe­
cial plea, or a plea in abatement, or within ten days after 
service of a copy of the plea, if it shall be the general 
issue, amend his declaration. After plea, either party 
may, before default for not" answering shall be entered, 
amend the pleading to be answered; and where there 
shall be a demurrer to a declaration or other pleading, 
such pleading may be amended at any time before the 
default for not joining in demurrer shall be entered. 
The respective parties may amend under this rule, of 
course, and without costs, but �hall not be entitled so 
to amend more than once. Under this rule new counts 
or pleas may be added. 
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Rule 28 .  
No rule to  amend shall be required, but a copy of 
the amended pleading, endorsed "amended narr .," 
"plea," &c., (as the case may be) shall be filed and 
served, with a notice that the same is a copy of the 
pleading as amended. And the time to plead, or answer, 
if notice thereof has been given, shall be from the day 
of service of such copy of the amended pleading. 
Rule 29. 
In cases in which the defendant is entitled to demand 
a bill of particulars, the plaintiff shall furnish such on 
being served with a notice requiring the same by the 
defendant or his attorney, and if such bill be demanded 
before the expiration of the time for filing plea, the 
defendant shall have like time to plead after receiving 
the bill of particulars to which he was entitled at the 
time of serving such notice. 
Rule 30. 
If the plaintiff shall unreasonably neglect to furnish 
a bill of particulars, or if the bill of particulars delivered 
be insufficient, the court may in its discretion nonsuit 
the plaintiff, allow further time to furnish it, or require 
a more particular bill to be delivered. 
Rule 3 1 . 
In cases where it is competent for the plaintiff to 
call upon the defendant for a bill of the particulars of 
his setoff, the defendant shall furnish such on the 
written request of the plaintiff or his attorney ; and in 
case it be not furnished within thirty days after such 
request, the £•1plaintiff may, by rule entered in the 
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common rule book, order the plea under which a setoff 
is claimed, if it requires a replication, to be struck 
out ; and if it be the general issue, with a notice of setoff, 
the court may exclude all testimony touching it from 
going to the jury. Where the bill of particulars is de­
manded and furnished in cases where a replication is 
necessary, the plaintiff shall have the same time to reply 
that was unexpired of the rule at the time of demanding . 
such bill. 
Rule 32. 
Application may be made by petition to any circuit 
court, in term time, or to the presiding judge thereof, in 
vacation, to compel the production and discovery of 
books, papers, and documents relating to the merits of 
any suit pending in such court, or of any defence to such 
suit, in the following cases : 
First. By the plaintiff, to compel the discovery of 
papers or documents in the possession or under the con­
trol of the defendant, which may be necessary to enable 
the plaintiff to declare or to answer any pleading of 
the defendant. 
Second. The plaintiff may be compelled to make the 
discovery of papers or documents, where the same shall 
be necessary to enable the defendant to answer any 
pleading of the petitioner. 
Third. The plaintiff may be compelled, after de­
claring, and the defendant after pleading, to produce and 
discover all papers or documents on which the action, or 
defence, is founded. 
Fourth. After issue joined in any action, either party 
may be compelled to produce and discover all such books, 
papers, and documents as may be necessary to enable 
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the party applying for such discovery to prepare for the 
trial of the cause. 
Rule 33· 
The petition for such discovery shall state the facts 
and circumstances on which the same is claimed, and 
shall be verifi.ed by affidavit, stating that the books, pa­
pers, and documents whereof discovery is sought, are 
not in the possession nor under the control of the party 
applying therefor, and that the party making such 
affidavit is advised by his counsel, and verily believes, 
that the discovery of the books, papers, or documents 
mentioned in such petition is necessary to enable him to 
declare, or answer, or to prepare for trial, as the case 
may be. 
Rule 34. 
The rule granting the discovery shall specify the 
mode in which the same is to be made, which may be 
either by requiring the party to [*ldeliver sworn copies 
of matters to be discovered, or by requiring him to 
produce and deposite the same with the clerk of the 
court in which the trial is to be had. The order shall 
also specify the time within which the discovery is to 
be made; and when the papers are required to be de­
posited, the order shall specify the time for which the 
deposite shall continue. 
Rule 35· 
The court, or presiding judge thereof, in granting 
such order, shall be governed by the principles and 
practice of the court of chancery in compelling discov­
eries, except that the costs of such proceedings shall al­
ways be awarded in the discretion of the court. 
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Rule 36. 
Every such order may be vacated by the court, or 
the judge granting the same, 
First. Upon satisfactory evidence that it ought not 
to have been granted. 
Second. Upon the discovery sought being obtained. 
Third. Upon the party required to make the dis­
covery denying, on oath, the possession or control of the 
books, papers, or documents ordered so to be produced. 
Rule 3 7· 
The order directing the discovery of books, papers, 
or documents shall operate as a stay of all other pro­
ceedings in the cause, until such order shall have been 
complied with, or vacated ; and the party obtaining such 
order, after the same shall have been complied with, or 
vacated, shall have the like time to declare, plead, or 
answer, to which he was entitled at the time of the 
making the order. 
Rule 3 8. 
In case of the party refusing or neglecting to obey 
such order for a discovery within such time as the court 
shall deem reasonable, the court may nonsuit him, or 
may strike out any plea or notice he may have given, or 
may debar him from any particular defence in relation 
to which such discovery was sought ; and the power of 
the court to compel such discovery shall be confined to 
the remedies herein provided, and shall not extend to 
authorize any other proceedings against the person or 
property of the party so refusing or· neglecting. 
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Rule 39· 
The books, papers, and documents, or sworn copies 
thereof, produced under any order made in pursuance of 
the preceding rules, shall £*1have the same effect, 
when used by the party requiring them, as if produced 
upon notice, according to the practice of the court. 
Rule 40. 
In actions of debt, or covenant, on any sealed instru­
ment, a plea of non est factum shall be so far deemed a 
general issue as to entitle the defendant to accompany 
the same with a notice of special matter intended be 
given in evidence, as a defence to the action, provided 
if specially pleaded it would be a bar to such action. 
Rule 41 .  
The party filing a demurrer to a part of  any plead­
ing, shall, before proceeding to the argument, furnish 
the court with a copy of the part demurred to, and also 
of the special causes of demurrer, if any, filed; and if it 
be a general demurrer, a copy of the whole pleading 
demurred to shall be furnished, in default of which the 
demurrer shall be overruled. 
Rule 42. 
Application for a commission to take the deposition 
of any witness without this state, may be made to any 
circuit court, or to a judge thereof in vacation, in all 
cases provided for in the revised statutes. 
Rule 43· 
Such application must be founded on an affidavit, 
stating that the cause is at issue, the names of the wit-
CIRCUIT CouRT RuLES 
nesses and their residence, and that they are without this 
state ; and also that their testimony is material, without 
which the party cannot safely proceed to the trial of 
the cause, as he is advised by counsel and verily believes. 
Rule 44. 
1 93 
Notice of such application shall be served on the Notice of. 
adverse party, at least eight days before the time of 
making such application, if made to a judge in vacation. 
Rule 45· 
When an order for granting a commission shall be Order to be filed. 
made by a judge in vacation, such order shall be filed in 
the office of the clerk of the court in which the cause is 
pending before issuing such commission, and shall be 
granted only in the like cases and upon the same terms 
that the court would award such commission, and shall 
he subject to the control of the court in all respects. 
Rule 46. 
The commissioners named by the party applying 
for a commission will, of course, be appointed, unless the 
opposite party object to any [*1commissioner, and show 
sufficient cause, by affidavit, when a substitution will be 
made. 
Rule 47· 
The interrogatories shall be settled by a judge of the 
circuit court, in vacation, and a copy thereof, and a notice 
of the time and place of settling the same, shall be served 
on the adverse party at least four days before the time 
designated in the notice. 
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Rule 48. 
The judge may in his discretion direct the commis­
sion, interrogatories, and depositions to be returned by 
an agent, or private person, or by mail, directed to the 
clerk of the court out of which the commission issued. 
Rule 49· 
The persons to whom such commission shall be di­
rected, or any one of them, unless otherwise expressly 
directed therein, shall execute the same as follows: 
First. They, or any of them, shall publicly adminis­
ter an oath to the witnesses named in the commission, 
that the answers given by such witnesses to the inter­
rogatories proposed to them shall be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth. 
Second. They shall cause the examination of each 
witness to be reduced to writing, and to be subscribed 
by him and certified by such of the commissioners as are 
present at the taking of the same. 
Third. I f  any exhibits are produced and proved be­
fore them, they shall be annexed to the depositions to 
which they relate, and shall, in like manner, be sub­
scribed by the witness proving the same. (This section 
must be understood to refer to such papers as can be 
produced upon the examination. If  the paper referred to 
be a record, not subj ect to the control of the party or 
the commissioners, it will be sufficient to annex a copy, 
and the original may be produced on the trial, separate 
from the commission.) 
Fourth. The commissioners, or commissioner, shall 
subscribe each sheet of the depositions, shall annex all 
the depositions and exhibits to the commission upon 
which the return shall be endorsed, and shall close them 
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up under their, or his, seals, and shall address the same, 
when so closed, to the clerk of the court from which the 
commission issued, at his place of residence. 
Fifth. If there is a direction on the commission to 
return the same by mail, they, or he, shall immediately 
deposite the packet, so directed, in the nearest post office. 
[*lSixth. If there be a direction on the commission 
to return the same by an agent of the party who sued 
out the same, the packet, so directed, shall be delivered 
to such agent. 
Seventh. A copy of this rule must b� annexed to 
every commission issued under these rules. 
Rule 50. 
The clerk, upon receiving such commission and re­
turn, shall open the same, and immediately endorse 
thereon the time and manner of receiving them, and 
file such commission and return. 
Rule s r .  
Depositions o f  any witness taken within this state, 
in all cases provided for in the revised statutes, shall be 
received, opened, endorsed, and filed by the clerk, in the 
same manner as is provided for in the preceding rules 
for taking depositions of witnesses without this state 
under a commission. 
Rule 52: 
All objections of form as to the taking of depositions 
to be read in evidence, shall be filed in writing at least 
one day before the cause is called for trial. 
195 
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Rule 53· 
When a deposition has been filed, if  not read on the 
trial by the party taking it, it may be used by the other 
party if he sees fit. 
Rule 54. 
Whenever it shall be necessary in any affidavit to 
swear to the advice of counsel, the party shall, in addi­
tion to what has usually been inserted, swear that he has 
fully and fairly stated his case) to his counsel, and shall 
give the name of such counsel. 
Rule 55· 
When a party applies for the continuance of a cause 
a second time, the affidavit must state, in addition to the 
usual requirements, the facts which the party expects to 
prove by the absent witness, and the diligence he has 
used to procure his attendance ; but it shall be optional 
with the opposite party to proceed to trial if he admit 
the facts expected to be proved. 
Rule 56. 
Where a rule is granted upon payment of costs, a 
copy of the rule and of the taxed bill of costs must be 
served upon the opposite party, at the same time ex­
hibiting to him a certified copy of the original rule ; 
!*1and if the costs be not paid on demand, and proof, 
by affidavit, shall be made of the personal demand 
of such sum of money, and of a refusal to pay it, the 
court may issue a precept to commit the person so dis­
obeying to prison, un�il such sum, and the costs and 
expenses of the proceeding, be paid. 
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Rule 57· 
It shall be the duty of the clerk of each of the circuit 
courts, previous to each term, to make out a docket of the 
causes at issue, arranging them according to the date of 
their issues, which docket shall be denominated "Issues 
of Fact; "  also, a separate docket of causes which may 
not be at issue, or which may be for assessment of dam­
ages, either by the clerk, court, or jury, arranging them 
according to the time of commencing the suits, which 
docket shall be denominated "Imparlances ; "  also, an­
other docket of all cases in which an issue at law is joined, 
arranging them according to the date of such issues, 
which shall be denominated "The Law Docket;" and 
also, a docket of all original appearances to the term. 
Rule 58 .  
The clerk of  each circuit court shall make two copies 
of each of said dockets, one for the court and the other 
for the bar. 
Rule 59. 
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of fact. 
Rule 6o. 
Causes shall be heard according to their standing on 
the dockets, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Rule 6 r .  
On the trial o f  causes, one counsel on each side only 
shall examine or cross-examine a witness, and two coun­
sel only on each side shall sum up the cause to the 
jury, unless the court shall otherwise order. 
Order of trying 
causes. 
One counsel only 
to examine 
witnesses and only 
two on each side 
to address jury. 
Who to commence 
the evidence. 
Order of opening 
case to the jury by 
the plaintiff or 
defendant. 
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counsel only to be 
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Order of argument. 
Clerks to provide 
"Special Motion 
Book," in which all 
special motions to 
be entered. 
Order in which to 
be heard. 
Motions for new 
trial, with the 
reasons, to be filed 
in two days. 
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Rule 62. 
The party having the affirmative shall commence the 
evidence, and counsel may in all cases, previously to the 
opening of the evidence, make a statement of their case ; 
the defendant making his statement immediately after 
the statement of the plaintiff, and before the evidence 
of the plaintiff be given, or after the evidence of the 
plaintiff shall have been given and before his own evi­
dence is given, at his election. 
r*1Rule 63. 
Not more than two counsel on each side shall be 
heard on the argument of any motion, the mover being 
entitled to open the argument and to reply to the argu­
ment of the opposite attorney. Only one counsel can be 
heard on any reply. 
Rule 64. 
The clerk of every circuit court shall provide a book, 
to be denominated "The Special Motion Book," in which 
the attorneys shall, in term time, enter all special mo­
tions to be made to the court. 
Rule 65. 
The motions so made shall be heard by the court 
according to the order in which they stand in the special 
motion book, unless otherwise ordered on good cause 
shown. 
Rule 66. 
Motions for new trials shall be made and filed, with 
the reasons and grounds on which such motions are 
made, within two days after the rendition of the verdict. 
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Rule 67. 
Motions in arrest of judgment, with the reasons and 
grounds on which they are founded, shall be made and 
filed within two days after the rendition of the verdict ; 
or if a motion for a new trial has been interposed and 
overruled, then within two days after the overruling of 
such motion. 
Rule 68. 
The time limited for moving to set aside defaults, 
or for making defaults absolute, or for filing motions 
and reasons for new trial, or in arrest of judgment, may 
be shortened or extended by the circuit courts respec­
tively in their discretion. 
Rule 69. 
On the argument of motions for new trial, or in 
arrest of judgment, the party making such motion will 
furnish the court with a copy of the reasons on which 
such motion is founded, and also a brief. 
Rule 70. 
Whenever a stay of proceedings may be necessary 
in order to make a special motion, the presiding judge 
may grant an order for that purpose ; and service of 
such order, with copies of the affidavits on which it is  
grounded, and the notice of the motion, shall operate 
as a stay of [*1proceedings until the order of the 
court is had in the premises, unless the judge should in 
the mean time supersede or set aside such order. But 
the proceedings shall not be stayed for a longer time 
than to enable the party to make his motion, according 
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zoo 
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to the practice of the court, and if made, until the deci­
sion of the court thereon. 
Rule 7 1 .  
The clerk shall endorse on every paper the day on 
which the same is filed. Parties must take notice of the 
filing of papers at their peril ; and the clerk shall not 
suffer or permit any writ, pleading, affidavit, deposition, 
or other paper whatever, on file in his office, to be taken 
therefrom without the order of the court ; but parties 
interested in any such, may inspect the same in his office, 
and take copies thereof. 
Rule 7Z. 
All cases not disposed of at any term shall stand 
continued to the next term, and shall be considered as 
continued from term to term until finally disposed of, 
without any special entry of a continuance. 
Rule 73· 
These rules shall take effect in the county of Wayne 
on the sixteenth day of February instant, and in each 
of the other counties in this state, excepting in the coun­
ties of Michilimackinac and Chippewa, on the fifteenth 
day of March next ; and in the counties of Chippewa and 
Michilimackinac on the first day of May next ; and shall 
govern the practice in the several circuit courts in this 
state until altered by the supreme court, or any two of 
the justices thereof; provided, however, that any of said 
circuit courts may make such further and additional rules 
as may be deemed necessary, but which shall not be 
inconsistent, or conflict, with these rules or any of them ; 
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and provided also, that either of said courts, or any 
judge thereof, may, upon good cause shown by affidavit 
or otherwise, in any case grant an extension of the time 
limited by any of these rules for filing pleadings, or for 
complying with the exigency of any rule, order, or 
notice. 
Rule 74. 
All rules and parts of rules made anterior to this 
day by said circuit courts, or any or either of them, or 
by any one or more of the judges of any or either of said 
courts, and all rules of practice which now obtain in any 
of said courts, are hereby rescinded, abolished, and re­
pealed. This rule to take effect in the several counties in 
this state at the times respectively provided in the last 
rule above for the taking effect of the preceding rules in 
the counties respectively. 
£•1R.ule 75. 
It shall be the duty of the clerk of the supreme 
court for the first circuit, forthwith to cause these rules 
to be printed, and to transmit a copy thereof to the clerk 
of each of the circuit courts in this state ; and it shall also 
be the duty of every such clerk to copy the said rules 
in their respective common rule books. 
Adopted I 6th February, I839· 
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two only to be heard on argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
Covenant, action of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
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Damages, assessment of, how obtained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 8 
how final judgment entered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 9 
Debt, action of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
notice of special matter may be given . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
Declaration, when commencement of suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I 
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how and when default of defendant is entered . . . . . . . . . . I I 
Default of defendant, how and when entered . . . . . . . . . .  I I - I6  
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motion to set aside, when to be made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Defendant's appearance, how and when entered . . . . . . . . . . I I 
attorney of, when served with copy of declaration . . . . . . . . I 3 
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after default of entered, no plea to be accepted · . . . . . . . . . . I 7 
Demurrer to be special . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
argument on, court to be furnished with copy of special cause 41  
Depositions, under commission, how to  be  returned . . . . . . . . 48 
to whom to be directed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
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Discovery, when to be  made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
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order for to operate as a stay of proceedings . . . . . . 3 7 
when order complied with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
when order for may be vacated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
Dockets, clerk to make out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 
how made up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7  
E 
Endorsement on pleadings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23  
Evidence, how commenced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
commission to take . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
F 
Final judgment after assessment, when entered . . . . . . . . . . I 9 
Folios, number of to be endorsed on pleadings . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
I 
Interrogatories, judge to settle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
notice to be given opposite party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 
J 
Judge to settle interrogatories under commission . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
Judgment final after assessment, how entered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 
Jury, order of opening case to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
M 
Misnomer, motion to set aside proceedings for . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 I 
Motions, affidavits, and papers to be filed when made . . . . . . . . 24 
to be in writing . . . . .  , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
parties' names to be endorsed on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 
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for new trial, when to be made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
in arrest of judgment, within what time to be made . . . . . . 67 
Motion book, clerk to provide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
N 
Notices to be in writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
how served if defendant defend in person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5 
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for contempt of court, how served . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
when served on attorney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-
of retainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 
0 
Order instanter, when to be performed 9 
p 
Papers, mode of coercing production of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
Particulars, bill of, plaintiff to furnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29  
defendant to furnish of setoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 I  
Plaintiff, when to amend declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
Plea of abatement, when filed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
not to be accepted after default, except on service of affidavit I 7 
Pleadings, parties to take notice of filing of at their peril . . . . . . 7 1 
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when to be filed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I O  
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number of folios to be endorsed on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
Production of books and papers, how coerced . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
R 
Retainer, notice of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 
within what time served . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 
Rules, when party entitled to enter common . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
day on which any may be entered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
computation of time for complying with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
when granted on payment of costs, how coerced . . . . . . . . 56  
in  certain cases to be  shortened or enlarged by the court . . . . 68 
of court, when to take effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 
provisio to make additional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  · .  . . . . 73 
all former repealed . . . . . ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4 
clerk of supreme court to get printed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5 
s 
Service of papers, on whom made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
by putting notice or papers in post office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5 
Special motions, affidavits, and papers to be filed when made . . 24 
Special motion book, clerk to provide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
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w 
Writing, agreements to be made in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Writs, when may be issued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
when returnable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Index Digest of Opinions 
(References are to pages) 
ABATEMENT 
Where the only basis for issuing a warrant of arrest against a nonresident 
was the fact that he was about to leave the county, the action should be 
abated, I .  
Writs, actions, etc., are abated by the creation of new courts unless ex­
pressly preserved by statute, 4· 
Statutes passed in I 8 3 6 authorizing transfer of cases from territorial courts 
did not include cases in which the chancellor served as counsel, hence 
these cases abated, 4· 
Once an action has abated the legislature has no power to revive it, 4· 
ACTIONS See Abatement ; Forcible entry and detainer; Summary proceedings. 
AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Where a case is submitted to a trial court on an agreed statement of facts 
which does not "contain all the facts necessary to turn the case into a 
question of law," the trial court's determination of the facts is con­
clusive if the statement contains evidence tending to prove the facts 
found, 30. 
In the absence of statutory authority an agreed statement of facts is not a 
part of the court's record and, therefore, cannot be considered on a writ 
of error, 30. 
AIDER BY VERDICT 
The omission of a similiter is a mere matter of form which is aided by 
verdict, 9· 
AMENDMENT 
At common law a writ of error may not be amended by adding a party, I 6I .  
Statute authorizing amendments in substance does not apply to proceedings 
in error, I 6I .  
In the absence o f  ,statute, usage, or  court rule changing the common law, 
proceedings in error may be amended only in form, I 6I .  
APPEAL 
Prior to I 8 3 8  a summary judgment by a justice of the peace against an 
officer for failure to return an execution could be reviewed by certiorari, 
even though the statute authorizing the summary judgment expressly pro­
hibited an appeal, 85. 
Under the statutes of I 8 3 8 a summary judgment by a justice of the peace 
against an officer for failure to return an execution can be reviewed on 
appeal in the nature of certiorari, even though the statute authorizing the 
summary judgment expressly prohibits an appeal, 85. 
APPELLATE RECORD 
Iri the absence of statutory authority an agreed statement of facts is not a 
part of the court's record and, therefore, cannot be considered on writ of 
error, 30. 
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ARBITRATION 
Delivery of an award of arbitrators (addressed to the court) to the clerk 
of the court in vacation is a delivery to the court, 1 2 9· 
The rule that an award made without notice is void does not apply where 
the parties appeared before the arbitrators and agreed that they might, 
after viewing the land involved, make an award without notice and 
without hearing evidence, 1 29. 
Where an award is silent with respect to notice of hearing, it is fair and 
reasonable to intend that notice was given, 1 29. 
An agreement that arbitrators may, after viewing the land involved, make 
an award without notice and without hearing evidence, does not annul 
the original agreement for arbitration, 1 2 9. 
ARREST 
The fact that a nonresident is about to leave the county is not a sufficient 
basis for issuing a warrant for his arrest, I .  
ASSIGNMENT See I SS·  
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR See Error. 
ATTACHMENT See also I 6I .  
Although it appears that a writ o f  attachment directed to the sheriff of 
another county was levied by summoning a person of that county who 
appeared and admitted that he had money and effects belonging to the de­
fendants, the court is without jurisdiction to render judgment unless it 
appears that a writ of attachment was nrst directed to the sheriff of the 
county in which the attachment suit was commenced and levied on 
property in that county. A suit in attachment must be "pending" before 
a writ may be issued to another county, I S 6. 
ATTORNEY 
It is not error to permit an attorney to appear without express authority after 
he has appeared several times without objection, 9· 
If, after dissolution of a law partnership, a client knows that his claim is 
being collected by the surviving partner, he cannot recover from the 
retiring partner money misappropriated by the surviving partner, 30. 
A WARD See Arbitration. 
BILLS AND NOTES See Negotiable instruments. 
BOATS AND VESSELS See t6 I .  
CAPIAS AD SATISFACIENDUM 
A sheriff, being a ministerial officer, must obey the command of a writ of 
capias ad satisfaciendum with respect to the county in which the prisoner 
shall be confined, 9S· 
A writ of capias ad satisfaciendum issued from the circuit court of G. County 
directing the sheriff of 0. County to imprison a j udgment debtor in G. 
County is void insofar as it fixes the place of imprisonment, 9 s: 
CERTIORARI 
An erroneous instruction to jurors that they were bound to allow a certain 
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credit to the defendant is not harmless error on certiorari brought by the 
defendant, 1 7. 
Where there is "some evidence" to support the j udgment of a j ustice of the 
peace, the Supreme Court on certiorari "will not stop to enquire whether 
it was so full or ample as to render the case entirely free from doubt, 2.3. 
· On certiorari to a justice of the peace the appellate court need not consider a 
point not raised below, 2.3.  
Prior to 1 8 3 8 a summary j udgment by a j ustice of the peace against an 
officer for failure to return an execution, could be reviewed by certiorari 
even though the statute authorizing the summary j udgment expressly 
prohibited an appeal, 85. 
Under the statutes of 1 8 3 8  a summary j udgment by a j ustice of the peace 
against an officer for failure to return an execution, can be reviewed on 
appeal in the nature of certiorari, even though the statute authorizing 
the summary j udgment expressly prohibits an appeal, 85.  
CHANCELLOR 
Statutes passed in 1 8 3 6 authorizing the transfer of cases from territorial 
courts to state courts did not include cases in which the chancellor served 
as counsel, 4· 
CHANCERY See Equity. 
CITIES See Municipal ordinances. 
COMMON COUNTS See Pleading. 
COMPLAINT See r o7, r so. 
CONFLICT OF LAWS See r 6 r .  
CONSTITUTION See also 1 5 0. 
The schedule of the Constitution of 1 8 35,  declaring that all writs, actions, 
etc., pending in the territorial courts shall continue, preserves these mat­
ters only until the legislature acts, 4· 
CONTINUANCE See 1 07. 
CORPORATIONS See 68. 
COURTS See also r so. 
Statutes passed in 1 83 6  authorizing transfer of cases from territorial courts to 
state courts did not include cases in which the chancellor served as 
counsel, 4· 
CRIMES See Larceny ; Malicious killing of livestock ; Perjury. 
DAMAGES 
In an action for libel (that plaintiff and three others had "robbed" a ballot 
bOJc by taking out ballots for Crary and putting in ballots for Wells, 
leaving only 1 5  7 ballots for Crary) , evidence that zoo persons had voted 
for Crary is inadmissible in mitigation o f  damages in the absence of evi­
dence connecting the plaintiff with the "robbery", 65. 
DEPUTY SHERIFF See Officers. 
DIRECTED VERDICTS See Instructions to j uries. 
2 1 0  
DOWER 
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The clearing of wild land not being waste, it is proper to endow a widow in 
wild land, 69. · 
ELECTIONS 
In an action for libel (that plaintiff and three others had "robbed" a ballot 
box by taking out ballots for Crary and putting in ballots for Wells, 
leaving only 1 5 7  ballots for Crary) , evidence that zoo persons had 
voted for Crary is inadmissible in mitigation of damages in the absence 
of evidence connecting the plaintiff with the "robbery," 65. 
Proof that a person was clerk at the polls and had lawful custody of the 
ballots does not connect him with an alleged "robbery» of the ballot box, 
6s. 
EQUITY See also 94· 
A bill in equity which alleges that the plaintiff assigned a land contract 
to one of the defendants to secure him ana another defendant against lia­
bility as indorsers on certain notes is not demurrable on the ground that 
it appears the assignment was made in fraud of creditors, although the 
bill also speaks of securing a retreat for the plaintiff and his family, refers 
to a nominal consideration, and alleges that the assignee was to hold the 
contract subject to the plaintiff's directions, 70. 
A bill in equity which directly charges that a person to whom a land con­
tract was assigned for a particular purpose violated his trust by disposing 
of the contract in a manner not warranted by the terms of the assign­
ment alleges enough to show an equity between the plaintiff and the 
assignee, 70. 
A bill in equity which alleges that the maker of a land contract procured 
from a trustee, to whom the contract had been assigned for a particular 
purpose, a wrongful assignment so as to destroy the plaintiff's interest in 
the land, and then conveyed the land to a third person, alleges enough to 
show an equity between the plaintiff an!f the maker of the contract, 70. 
A bill in equity which alleges that the purchaser of certain land knew 
that it had been sold to the plaintiff under a land contract states an 
equitable claim against said purchaser, 70. 
A bill in equity which claims a general right in which all the defendants 
are interested is not multifarious although each defendant has a separate 
and distinct interest, 7 o. 
ERROR See also 1 55.  
Where a case is  submitted to a trial court on an agreed statement of facts 
which does not "contain all the facts necessary to turn the case into a 
question of law", the trial court's determination of the facts is conclusive 
if the statement contains evidence tending to prove the facts found, 30. 
In the absence of statutory authority an agreed statement of facts is not a 
part of the court's record and, therefore, cannot be considered on writ 
of error, 30. 
A writ of error sued out in the names of two of three persons against whom 
a joint judgment was rendered should be quashed unless an amendment 
is allowed, I 6 I .  
A t  common law a writ o f  error may not be amended by adding a party, I 6 I .  
Statute authorizing amendments i n  substance does not apply to proceedings 
in error, 1 6 1 .  
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In the absence of statute, usage, or court rule changing the common law, 
proceedings in error may be amended only in form, I 6 I .  
ESCAPE 
In an action for the escape of a person taken in execution, it is not necessary 
that the jury find specially that the officer consented or was negligent. A 
general verdict is sufficient, 9· 
In an action against a sheriff for an escape, the sheriff's deputy who released 
the prisoner on an insufficient bond was interested in the event of the action, 
and, therefore, was properly rejected as a witness, 9· 
In an action for an escape, it is error to reject as a witness the escaped 
prisoner when called by the defendant. If interested, his interest is against 
the party calling him, 9· 
EVIDENCE Also see Witnesses. 
In an action against an indorser of a promissory note, the certificate of a 
notary public that he presented the note for payment, that payment was 
refused, and that he mailed notice of protest, is not admissible to prove 
these facts, z 7. 
Whether the declaration of a defendant sued for trespass can be used against 
,a codefendant sued as a joint tort feasor, quaere, u z .  
Testimony by a witness that it was his uniform practice to give indorsers of 
promissory notes notice of nonpayment, is  "no evidence" that notice was 
given in the particular case, I s  I .  
EXECUTION 
In a summary proceeding against an officer for failing to levy or return a 
writ of execution, a justice of the peace does not exceed his j urisdiction by 
rendering a judgment for more than $ 1 0o, 1 3 .  
A renewal o f  an execution at the instance o f  the officer without the re­
quest or consent of the plaintiff will not defeat a claim against the officer 
for failing to levy or return the writ in time, I 3· 
Prior to I 8 3 8 a summary judgment by a justice of the peace against an 
officer for failure to return an execution, could be reviewed by certiorari, 
8s.  
Under the statutes of I838 a summary j udgment by a justice of the peace 
against an officer for failure to return an execution, can be reviewed on 
appeal in the nature of certiorari, 8 s. 
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER See s.o, I o7, I S S, I 7 I .  
FRAUD Also see Statute o f  frauds. 
In an action of replevin the plaintiff may prove that a sale by the original 
owner to the defendant was in fraud of creditors, I46. 
GENERAL APPEARANCE See Process. 
GENERAL ISSUE See Pleading. 
GENERAL VERDICT See Verdict. 
GRAND JURY See Indictments. 
HARMLESS ERROR 
An erroneous instruction to j urors that they were bound to allow a certain 
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credit to defendant is not harmless error on certiorari brought by the 
defendant, 1 7. 
INDICTMENTS See also 1 5o. 
Although, in an indictment for perjury, it is not necessary to allege that 
issue was joined in the action in which the perjury is alleged to have 
been committed, such an allegation is descriptive and must be proved strictly, 
97· 
An indictment which charges that defendants killed certain hogs of one D. 
and did "thereby" destroy the personal property of said D., does not em­
brace two distinct offenses, viz., { 1 )  the killing of another's livestock, 
and (z) the destruction of another's personal property, 1 04. 
INDORSERS See Negotiable instruments. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES 
In an action for work and labor in a justice's court, it is error for the justice 
to instruct the j ury that inasmuch as the defendant has proved that the 
plaintiff received one-half of certain crops, the jurors are bound by their 
oaths to allow the defendant credit for the same, 1 7. 
Where in an action for trespass there is any legal testimony, however slight, 
against one of the defendants, the court may not direct a verdict for that 
. defendant in order that he may testify in behalf of a codefendant, 1 22.  
ISSUE See Pleading. 
JOINDER OF ISSUE See Pleading. 
JOINT PARTIES See Parties. 
JOINT TENANCY 
Payment of rent to one of three joint owners is a discharge of the joint 
claim, 2 1 . 
JUDGMENTS Also see Summary proceedings. 
Where rent is sued for in a j ustice's court in the names of three joint owners 
and one of them informs the j ustice that the rent has been paid, it is error 
for the justice to render j udgment against the defendant in his absence at 
the instance of the other joint owners, 2 I .  
JURISDICTION 
In a summary proceeding against an officer for failing to levy or return 
a writ of execution, a justice of the peace does not exceed his jurisdiction 
by rendering a judgment for more than $ t oo, I J· 
JURY' See also I SS· 
In justices' courts jurors are judges of the law as well as of the facts, I 7. 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE See also 1 07. 
A person sued in a j ustice's court must be sued in the county of his residence, 
except, etc., 1 .  
I n  a summary proceeding against a n  officer for failure t o  levy or return a 
writ of execution, a justice of the peace does not exceed his jurisdiction 
by rendering a judgment for more than $ 1  oo, 1 3.  
In justices' courts jurors are judges of the law as well as of the facts, 1 7. 
Prior to 1 8 3 8 a summary judgment by a j ustice of the peace against an offi-
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cer for failure to return an execution could be reviewed by certiorari, 
85. 
Under the statutes of 1 8 3 8  a summary judgment by a justice of the peace 
against an officer for failure to return an execution can be reviewed on 
appeal in the nature of certiorari, 8 5· 
LARCENY 
Repeal of a statute under which a larceny was committed does not exempt 
the defendant from the punishment prescribed by the statute, the repeal­
ing statute having expressly provided against such exemption except to the 
extent that any punishment was mitigated by the repealing statute, 1 42. 
Where a statute reducing the punishment for a larceny previously committed 
is repealed, the defendant may be punished under the statute in force when 
the larceny was committed, 1 42. 
LEGISLATIVE POWER 
Once an action has abated the legislature has no power to revive it, 4· 
LEVY See Attachment ; Execution. 
LIBEL 
In an action for libel (that plaintiff and three others had "robbed" a 
ballot box by taking out ballots for Crary and putting in ballots for 
Wells, leaving only 1 5 7  ballots for Crary) , evidence that 200 persons 
had voted for Crary is inadmissible in mitigation of damages in the ab­
sence of evidence connecting the plaintiff with the "robbery", 65.  
LIENS See 1 6 1 .  
MALICIOUS KILLING OF LIVESTOCK 
An indictment which charges that defendants killed certain hogs of one 
D. and did "thereby" destroy the personal property of said D., does not 
embrace two distinct offenses, viz. ( 1 ) the killing of another's livestock, 
and ( 2 )  the destruction of another's personal property, 1 04. 
MAYOR'S COURT See Courts. 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES See Damages. 
MULTIFARIOUSNESS See Pleading. 
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES See also 1 50. 
A city ordinance providing that "no person shall sell meat except in stalls 
rented from the corporation" is invalid, being unreasonable and in restraint 
o f  trade (opinion of one j udge ) ,  3 6. 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
In an action against an indorser of a promissory note, the certificate of a 
notary public that he presented the note for payment, that payment was 
refused, and that he mailed notice of protest, is not admissible to prove 
these facts, 27 .  
In the absence of  evidence a court cannot presume that a memorandum at 
the foot of a promissory note ("At 1 2  per cent int. D.P.") was made 
when the note was made or that "D.P." means David Paddock, one of 
the makers o f  the note, 62.  
-
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The fact that an indorser of a promissory note received security from the 
maker to indemnify him against liability as an indorser does not make 
him absolutely liable without demand on the maker and notice to the 
indorser of nonpayment, to8. 
In an action by the indorsee of a promissory note against the indorser, a 
declaration which alleges that the defendant received from the maker 
certain property to indemnify him as indorser and that the defendant 
has not "sustained any damages by reason of his not having received 
notice of the nonpayment of the note" is demurrable, to8.  
Testimony by a witness that it  was his uniform practice to give indorsers 
of proll!issory notes notice of nonpayment, is "no evidence" that notice was 
given in the particular case, 1 5 1 .  
NONSUIT 
The fact that a witness called by the plaintiff on rebuttal testified that one 
of the defendants had declared during the trial "that he had no hand in 
taking the property" did not j ustify a conclusion by the court that the 
plaintiff had abandoned his action against that defendant, uz. 
NOT ARIES PUBLIC 
In an action against an indorser of a promissory note, the certificate of a 
notary public that he presented the note for payment, that payment was 
refused, and that he mailed notice of protest, is not admissible to prove 
this fact, 2. 7. 
NOTICE TO QUIT See t55· 
NUNCUPATIVE WILLS See Wills. 
OFFICERS 
In an action against a sheriff for an escape, the sheriff's deputy, who rel�ased 
the prisoner on an insufficient bond, was interested in the event of the 
action, and, therefore, properly rejected as a witness, 9• 
In a summary proceeding against an officer for failing to levy or return 
a writ of execution, a j ustice of the peace does not exceed his jurisdiction 
by rendering a judgment for more than $ I  oo, 1 3. 
A renewal of an execution at the instance of the officer without the re­
quest or consent of the plaintiff will not defeat a claim against the officer 
for failing to levy or return the writ in time, 1 3. 
Prior to t8j8 a summary judgment by a justice of the peace against an officer 
for failure to return an execution could be reviewed on certiorari, 85. 
Under the statutes of I 8 3 8 a summary judgment by a j ustice of the peace 
against an officer for failure to return an execution can be reviewed on 
appeal in the nature of certiorari, 85. 
A sheriff, being a ministerial officer, must obey the command of a writ of 
capias ad satisfaciendum with respect to the county in which the prisoner 
shall be confined, 9 5. 
ORDINANCES See Muncipal ordinances. 
PARTIES See also I5S. 
Where rent is sued for in a justice's court in the names of three joint owners 
and one of them informs the justice that the rent has been paid, it is 
error for the justice to render judgment against the defendant in his 
absence at the instance of the other joint owners, 2. I .  
' INDEX DIGEST OF OPINIONS 2 1 5  
A writ of error sued out in the names of two of thr�e persons against whom 
a joint judgment was rendered should be quashed, 1 6 1 .  
PARTNERSHIPS 
Testimony by a person claiming to be agent that he was "authorized by the 
defendants to . . • employ workmen for them" is sufficient basis for in­
ferring that the defendants, sued as "traders under the style of the Detroit 
Iron Co." constituted such company, 23.  
If, after dissolution of a law partnership, a client knows that his claim is 
being collected by the surviving partner, he cannot recover from the re­
tiring partner money misappropriated by the surviving partner, 23.  
PAYMENT 
Payment of rent to one of three joint owners is a discharge of the joint 
claim, 2 1 .  
PERJURY 
Although, in an indictment for perjury, it is not necessary to allege that 
issue was joined in the action in which the perjury is alleged to have been 
committed, such an allegation is descriptive and must be proved strictly, 
. 97· 
PLEADING See also so, 68, 94, 1 07. 
Where the defendant has pleaded the general issue and a special plea, and 
the return of the justice states that issue was joined, the appellate court 
will presume that the plaintiff added a similiter to the general issue and 
traversed the special plea, 9· 
The omission of a similiter is a mere matter of form which is aided by 
verdict, 9· 
Where labor is performed under a subsisting special agreement, recovery 
may not be had under the common counts. But if the agreement has been 
fully performed by the plaintiff or rescinded by mutual consent, common 
counts may be used, 1 7. 
Where it does not appear that a memorandum at the foot of a promissory 
note is a substantial part of the note, proof of the note and memorandum 
is not a material variance from a pleading which describes the note with­
out mentioning the memorandum, 62. 
A bill in equity which claims a general right in which all of the de­
fendants are interested is not multifarious although each defendant has 
a separate and distinct interest, 70. 
Proof ( 1) that a plaintiff, in an action on a jail-limits bond before a justice 
of the peace, filed the bond as his declaration ; ( 2) that the defendants 
filed no plea; ( 3 )  that, on appeal to the circuit court, the transcript of 
the j ustice stated "The plaintiff declares on a limit bond on file", which 
bond was attached to the transcript; (4) that defendants in the circuit 
court filed a plea of nil debit; and (s) that no similiter was added, or 
other pleadings filed-is not proof that issue was joined in the circuit 
court, 97· 
PRESENTMENT See Indictment ; Negotiable instruments. 
PRIVITY See I 7 I .  
PROCESS Also see Attachment ; Capias ; Execution. 
All objections to process are waived by a general appearance, 23.  
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PROMISSORY NOTES See Negotiable instruments. 
PROTEST See Negotiable instruments. 
RENEWAL OF EXECUTION See Execution. 
REPEAL See Statutes. 
REPLEVIN 
Property held on a writ of replevin may be replevied by a third person, 146. 
In an action of replevin the plaintiff may prove that a sale by the original 
· owner to the defendant was in fraud of creditors, 1 46. 
RESTRAINT OF TRADE 
A city ordinance providing that "no person shall sell meat except in stalls 
rented from the corporation" is invalid, being unreasonable and in restraint 
of trade (opinion of one judge) , 36. 
RETURN OF EXECUTION See Execution. 
REVIVAL OF ACTIONS See Abatement. 
SHERIFF See Officers. 
SIMILITER See Pleading. 
SPECIAL VERDICT See Verdict. 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE See 94· 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS See 94· 
STATUTES 
Repeal of a statute under which a crime was committed does not exempt 
the defendant from the punishment prescribed by the statute, the repealing 
statute having provided expressly against such exemption except to the ex­
tent that any punishment was mitigated by the repealing statute, 142.. 
Where a statute reducing punishment for a crime previously committed is 
repealed, the defendant may be punished under the statute in force when 
the crime was committed, 142.. 
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS See also 1 50. 
In a summary proceeding against an officer for failing to levy or return 
a writ of execution, a j ustice of the peace does not exceed his jurisdic­
tion by rendering a judgment for more than $ I oo, 1 3· 
Prior to 1 8 3 8  a summary judgment by a justice of the peace against an 
officer f(}r failure to return an execution, could be reviewed by certiorari 
even though the statute authorizing the summary judgment expressly 
prohibited an appeal, 8 5.  
Under the statutes of 1 8 3 8  a summary judgment by a j ustice of the peace 
against an officer for failure to return an execution, can be reviewed on 
appeal in the nature of the certiorari even though the statute authorizing 
the summary judgment expressly prohibits an appeal, 85. 
SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS See Abatement. 
TRUSTS See Equity. 
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VARIANCE See Indictments ; Pleading. 
VENUE 
2 1 7  
A person sued in a justice's court must be sued in the county of his resi­
dence, except, etc., I. 
VERDICT Also see Instructions to juries. 
In an action for the escape of a person taken in execution it is not necessary 
that the jury :find especially that the officer consented or was negligent. A 
general verdict is sufficient, 9· 
WARRANT OF ATTORNEY See Attorney. 
WASTE 
The clearing of wild land not being waste, it is proper to endow a widow in 
wild land, 69. 
WILD LANDS 
The clearing of wild land not being waste, it is proper to endow a widow 
in wild land, 69. 
WILLS 
A declaration by a person in his last sickness, which was read over to him, 
approved by him, and declared by him to be his will in the presence of 
:five persons who signed as witnesses at his request, is a nuncupative will, 
and not a written will which is defective because not signed by the testator, 
so. 
A valid nuncupative will which purports to dispose of both real and per­
sonal property may be allowed to stand as to the personalty, so. 
For the proper execution of a will it is necessary that all the witnesses see 
the act of signing, or the testator must acknowledge that he signed it, or 
declare that it is his will, I 3 6. 
WITNESSES 
In an action against a sheriff for an escape the sheriff's deputy who re­
leased the prisOner on an insufficient bond waS interested in the event of 
the action, and, therefore, properly rejected as a witness, 9·  
In an action for an escape it is error to reject as a witness the escaped 
prisoner when called by the defendant. If interested, his interest is against 
the party calling him, 9· 
Where in an action for trespass there is any testimony, however slight, against 
one of the defendants, the court may not direct a verdict for that de­
fendant in order that he may testify in behalf of a codefendant 1 1 2 2. .  
A person sued as principal, who has defaulted and consents to testify, is a 
competent witness for the plaintiff against a codefendant sued as secondar­
ily liable on the same contract, I 66. 
WRITS See Attachment ; Capias ad satisfaciendum ; Certiorari ; Execution ; 
Error; Replevin. 
